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A –  Proceedings of the Court of Justice 2003
  by Mr V. Skouris, President of the Court of Justice
1
A —  Proceedings of the Court of Justice in 2003 
by Mr V. Skouris, President of the Court of Justice 
1. This part of the annual report provides a survey of the activity of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities in 2003. Apart from a brief statistical appraisal (section 
2), it presents the main developments in the case-law, arranged as follows: 
jurisdiction of the Court and procedure (section 3); general principles and constitutional 
and  institutional  cases  (section  4);  free  movement  of  goods  (section  5);  common 
agricultural policy (section 6); freedom of movement for workers (section 7); freedom to 
provide services (section 8); freedom of establishment (section 9); free movement of 
capital (section 10); transport policy (section 11); competition rules (section 12); trade 
protection measures (section 13); trade mark law (section 14); harmonisation of laws 
(section 15); public procurement (section 16); social law (section 17); environmental 
law (section 18); justice and home affairs (section 19); external relations (section 20); 
Brussels Convention (section 21). 
This selection covers only 90 of the 455 judgments and orders pronounced by the 
Court during 2003 and refers only to their essential points. Nor does it include the 
Opinions of the Advocates General, which are of undeniable importance for a detailed 
understanding of the issues at stake in certain cases but would increase the length of a 
report which must necessarily be brief. The full texts of all judgments, opinions and 
orders of the Court, as well as of the Opinions of the Advocates General, are available 
in all the official Community languages on the Court's internet site (www.curia.eu.int)
and on the Europa site (www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex). In order to avoid any confusion 
and to assist the reader, this report refers, unless otherwise indicated, to the numbering 
of the articles of the Treaty on European Union and the EC Treaty established by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
2. As regards statistics, the Court brought 455 cases to a close in 2003 (net figure, that 
is to say, taking account of joinder). Of those, 308 cases were dealt with by judgments 
and 147 cases gave rise to orders. These figures show a slight decrease compared 
with the previous year (466 cases brought to a close). In 2003, 561 new cases arrived 
at the Court (477 in 2002, gross figures). At the end of 2003, there were 974 cases 
pending (gross figure) compared with 907 at the end of 2002. 
The upward trend in the duration of proceedings did not change this year. References 
for preliminary rulings and direct actions took approximately 25 months, as compared 
with 24 months in 2002. The average time taken to deal with appeals was 28 months, 
compared with 19 months in 2002. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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In  2003  the  Court  made  differing  degrees  of  use  of  the  various  instruments  at  its 
disposal to expedite its treatment of certain cases (priority treatment, the accelerated or 
expedited procedure, and the simplified procedure). For the second time, the Court 
made use of the expedited or accelerated procedure, as provided for in Articles 62a 
and  104a  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure,  this  time  in  an  appeal  (Case  C-39/03  P 
Commission v Artegodan and Others [2003] ECR I-7887). Since this instrument allows 
for the omission of certain stages in the proceedings, it was possible to give judgment 
within  six  months  of  the  case  being  brought.  Use  of  the  expedited  or  accelerated 
procedure  was  sought  in  seven  other  cases,  but  the  requirement  of  exceptional 
urgency laid down in the Rules of Procedure was not satisfied. 
Also, the Court made frequent use of the simplified procedure provided for in Article 
104(3) of the Rules of Procedure for answering certain questions referred to it for a 
preliminary ruling. Eleven orders were made on the basis of that provision. 
As regards the distribution of cases between the full Court (in all its formations) and 
Chambers of Judges, the former disposed of almost 25% of the cases brought to a 
close in 2003, while Chambers of five Judges and Chambers of three Judges disposed 
of 55% and 20% of the cases respectively. 
For further information with regard to the statistics for the 2003 judicial year, the reader 
is referred to Chapter IV of this report. 
3. In the areas of the jurisdiction of the Court and procedure, two cases concerning 
references  for  preliminary  rulings  (3.1)  and  one  relating  to  review  of  the  legality  of 
measures (3.2) are of interest. 
3.1. In Case C-318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I-905, the 
Court held inadmissible a question referred to it to enable the referring court to decide 
whether the legislation of another Member State is in accordance with Community law. 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that, when such a question is before it, 
the Court must display special vigilance and "must be informed in some detail of [the 
referring court's] reasons for considering that an answer to the questions is necessary 
to enable it to give judgment" (paragraph 46). The Court pointed out, inter alia, that 
where the national court has confined itself to repeating the argument of one of the 
parties, without indicating whether and to what extent it considers that a reply to the 
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, and, as a result, the Court does not 
have the material before it to show that it is necessary to rule on the question referred, 
that question is inadmissible. 
The Court had an opportunity in Case C-300/01 Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899 to clarify 
its  case-law  on  the  admissibility  of  a  reference  for  a  preliminary  ruling  where  the 
circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings are confined to a single Member 
State.  The  Court  pointed  out  to  begin  with  that  the  referring  court  was  seeking  an Proceedings  Court of Justice
10
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interpretation of Community law for the purpose of determining the scope of rules of 
national  law  which  refer  to  it.  The  Court  cited  its  own  case-law  in  that  connection, 
according to which, first, it is for the national courts alone to determine, having regard 
to  the  particular  features  of  each  case,  both  the  need  to  refer  a  question  for  a 
preliminary  ruling  and  the  relevance  of  such  a  question  (Case  C-448/98  Guimont
[2000] ECR I-10663, paragraph 22, and Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 
and C-526/99 to C-540/99 Reisch [2002] ECR I-2157, paragraph 25), and, second, it is 
only  in  the  exceptional  case,  where  it  is  quite  obvious  that  the  interpretation  of 
Community law sought bears no relation to the facts or the purpose of the main action, 
that the Court refrains from giving a ruling (Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099, 
paragraph  33,  and  Case  C-281/98  Angonese  [2000]  ECR  I-4139,  paragraph  18). 
However,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  a  situation  where  national  law  requires  that  a 
national be allowed to enjoy the same rights as those which nationals of other Member 
States would derive from Community law in the same situation does not correspond to 
such an exceptional case. Moreover, the Court held that "where, in relation to purely 
internal  situations,  domestic  legislation  adopts  solutions  which  are  consistent  with 
those adopted in Community law in order, in particular, to avoid discrimination against 
foreign nationals, it is clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future 
differences of interpretation, provisions or concepts taken from Community law should 
be interpreted uniformly, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are to apply" 
(paragraph 34). 
3.2.  In  judgments  delivered  on  30  September  2003  in  Case  C-93/02  P  Biret
International v Council (not yet published in the ECR) and Case C-94/02 P Biret et Cie 
v  Council  (not  yet  published  in  the  ECR),  the  Court  ruled  in  two  appeals  against 
judgments of the Court of First Instance 
1 in litigation over prohibitions on imports into 
the Community of beef and veal from farm animals to which certain substances with 
hormonal action had been administered. 
After outlining its case-law on the conditions under which non-contractual liability on the 
part of the Community arises (Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v Commission and Council
[1999]  ECR  I-6983,  paragraph  65),  the  Court  stated  that,  given  their  nature  and 
structure,  the  WTO  agreements  are  not  in  principle  among  the  rules  in  the  light  of 
which  the  Court  is  to  review  the  legality  of  measures  adopted  by  the  Community 
institutions. According to the Court, it is only where the Community has intended to 
implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the 
Community  measure  refers  expressly  to  the  precise  provisions  of  the  WTO 
agreements, that it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in 
question in the light of the WTO rules. 
1   Case T-174/00 Biret International v Council [2002] ECR II-17, and Case T-210/00 Biret & 
Cie v Council [2002] ECR II-47. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Moreover, noting that the Community has been granted a period for compliance with its 
obligations in relation to the WTO, the Court pointed out that, for the period prior to 
expiry of that period, the Community Courts cannot, in any event, carry out a review of 
the legality of the Community measures in question, particularly not in the context of an 
action for damages under Article 235 EC, without rendering ineffective the grant of 
such a period for compliance with the recommendations or decisions of the WTO's 
dispute settlement body. 
4. Of the cases concerning the general principles of Community law and those with 
constitutional  or  institutional  implications,  those  relating  to  fundamental  rights  (4.1), 
citizenship of the European Union (4.2), the comitology procedure (4.3), the validity of 
the OLAF Regulation and its scope (4.4), the right of access of the public to documents 
(4.5), the scope of interim measures ordered by the national courts (4.6) and the legal 
basis for two decisions concluding international agreements (4.7) should be noted. Two 
cases concerning non-contractual liability of the European Community (4.8) and the 
Member States (4.9) respectively are also of interest. 
4.1. Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood GSP
[2003] ECR I-7446 concerned the compatibility of Directive 93/53 
2 and certain national 
measures adopted in implementation of it with the fundamental principle of respect for 
private property. Neither the directive nor the contested national measures contain any 
provision  concerning  compensation  for  owners  affected  by  a  decision  on  the 
destruction and slaughter of fish affected by a disease in List I of Annex A to Directive 
91/67.
3
The Court stated, first, that the absence of provisions on compensation for owners 
whose fish have been destroyed or slaughtered cannot affect the validity of Directive 
93/53. The Court recalled that fundamental rights are not absolute rights but must be 
considered  in  relation  to  their  social  function.  Consequently,  restrictions  may  be 
imposed  on  the  exercise  of  those  rights,  in  particular  in  the  context  of  a  common 
organisation  of  the  markets,  provided  that  those  restrictions  in  fact  correspond  to 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with 
regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing 
the very substance of those rights (Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, paragraph 
18;  Case  C-177/90  Kühn  [1992]  ECR  I-35,  paragraph  16,  and  Case  C-22/94  Irish
Farmers' Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 27). In that regard, the 
2   Council Directive 93/53/EC of 24 June 1993 introducing minimum Community measures 
for the control of certain fish diseases (OJ 1993 L 175, p. 23). 
3   Council Directive 91/67/EEC of 28 January 1991 concerning the animal health conditions 
governing the placing on the market of aquaculture animals and products (OJ 1991 L 46, 
p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
12
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Court pointed out that Directive 93/53 fulfils a double function of enabling the taking of 
control measures as soon as the presence, on a farm, of a disease is suspected and 
preventing  the  spread  of  the  disease,  so  that  the  measures  which  that  directive 
imposes  are  in  conformity  with  objectives  of  general  interest  pursued  by  the 
Community. Further, those measures, which are emergency measures, do not deprive 
farm owners of the use of their fish farms, but, as they enable owners to restock the 
affected farms as soon as possible, enable them to continue to carry on their activities 
there. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the minimum measures laid down by the 
directive  do  not  constitute,  in  the  absence  of  compensation  for  affected  owners,  a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of the right 
to property. 
Second, as regards the measures taken by the United Kingdom in implementation of 
the directive, the Court cited its case-law according to which "the requirements flowing 
from the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order are also binding 
on  Member  States  when  they  implement  Community  rules.  Consequently,  Member 
States  must,  as  far  as  possible,  apply  those  rules  in  accordance  with  those 
requirements"  (paragraph  88)  (see  Wachauf,  cited  above,  paragraph  19,  and  Case 
C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 16). In the light of the objectives pursued 
by  the  directive,  the  Court  held  that  those  measures  are  not  incompatible  with  the 
fundamental right to property. 
In  Joined  cases  C-465/00,  C-138/01  and  C-139/01  Österreichischer  Rundfunk  and 
Others [2003] ECR I-4989, the Court interpreted Directive 95/46 
4 in relation to the 
obligation of public bodies subject to control by the Rechnungshof (Austrian Court of 
Audit) to communicate to it the salaries and pensions exceeding a certain level paid by 
them to their employees and pensioners together with the names of the recipients, for 
the purpose of drawing up an annual report to be made available to the general public. 
According to the Court, the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the 
processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the 
right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, which 
form  an  integral  part  of  the  general  principles  of  law  whose  observance  the  Court 
ensures. In that regard, the Court interpreted the directive in the light of Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), which, while stating the principle that the public authorities must not interfere 
with the right to respect for private life, accepts that such an interference is possible 
where it is in accordance with the law and pursues one or more of the legitimate aims 
4   Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31). Proceedings  Court of Justice
14
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specified in Article 8(2), and is "necessary in a democratic society" for achieving that 
aim or aims. 
In accordance with those principles, the Court held that "the collection of data by name 
relating to an individual's professional income, with a view to communicating it to third 
parties, falls within the scope of Article 8 of the [ECHR]" (paragraph 73) and that "... the 
communication  of  that  data  to  third  parties,  in  the  present  case  a  public  authority, 
infringes the right of the persons concerned to respect for private life, whatever the 
subsequent use of the information thus communicated, and constitutes an interference 
within the meaning of Article 8 of the [ECHR]" (paragraph 74). In particular, the Court 
made  the  point  that  such  interference  may  be  justified  only  in  so  far  as  the  wide 
disclosure not merely of amounts of annual income above a certain threshold but also 
of the names of the recipients of that income is both necessary for and appropriate to 
the aim of keeping salaries within reasonable limits, that being a matter for the national 
courts to examine. 
Finally, the Court concluded that, if the national legislation at issue is incompatible with 
Article 8 of the ECHR, that legislation is also incapable of satisfying the requirements of 
Directive 95/46, whereas if the national courts were to consider that the provision at 
issue  is  both  necessary  for  and  appropriate  to  the  public  interest  objective  being 
pursued, they would then still have to ascertain whether, by not expressly providing for 
disclosure of the names of the persons concerned in relation to the income received, it 
complies  with  the  requirement  of  foreseeability  laid  down  by  the  case-law  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  In  that  regard,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the 
provisions of the directive at issue are sufficiently precise to be relied on by individuals 
before the national courts to oust the application of rules of national law which are 
contrary to those provisions. 
4.2. In Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello (judgment of 2 October 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR), the Court gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of 
the EC Treaty relating to citizenship of the Union and the principle of non-discrimination 
in  relation  to  Belgian  legislation  which,  in  the  case  of  persons  with  more  than  one 
nationality, including Belgian, gives precedence to the latter. In this case, the national 
administration had given the applicant's sons a surname in accordance with Belgian 
legislation as they had dual Belgian and Spanish nationality. 
First, the Court outlined its case-law (see, inter alia, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R
[2002]  ECR I-7091,  paragraph  82),  according  to  which  citizenship  of  the  Union  "is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States" (paragraph 
22) and "enables nationals of the Member States who find themselves in the same 
situation  to  enjoy  within  the  scope  ratione  materiae  of  the  EC Treaty  the  same 
treatment  in  law  irrespective  of  their  nationality,  subject  to  such  exceptions  as  are 
expressly  provided  for"  (paragraph  23)  (see  Case  C-184/99  Grzelczyk  [2001] 
ECR I-6193,  paragraph  31,  and  Case  C-224/98  D'Hoop [2002]  ECR I–6191, Proceedings  Court of Justice
14
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paragraph 28). The Court went on to hold that, although, as Community law stands at 
present,  the  rules  governing  a  person's  surname  are  matters  coming  within  the 
competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less, when exercising that 
competence, comply with Community law and in particular the Treaty provisions on the 
freedom of every citizen of the Union to move and reside in the territory of the Member 
States.
Second, the Court recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of non-
discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and 
that different situations must not be treated in the same way. In that regard, the Court 
observed that, under the national provisions at issue, persons who have, in addition to 
Belgian  nationality,  the  nationality  of  another  Member  State  are,  as  a  general  rule, 
treated  in  the  same  way  as  persons  who  have  only  Belgian  nationality.  However, 
according to the Court, those two categories of person are not in the same situation. 
The  Court  pointed  out  that  "in  contrast  to  persons  having  only  Belgian  nationality, 
Belgian nationals who also hold Spanish nationality have different surnames under the 
two legal systems" (paragraph 35). Moreover, the Court observed that, in the present 
case, the children concerned are refused the right to bear the surname which results 
from application of the legislation of the Member State which determined the surname 
of their father. According to the Court, such a discrepancy in surnames is liable to 
cause  serious  inconvenience  for  those  concerned  at  both  professional  and  private 
levels and, moreover, the practice at issue cannot be justified either with regard to the 
principle of the immutability of surnames or with regard to the objective of integration 
pursued.
4.3. In Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I-937, the 
Court had an opportunity to clarify its case-law on comitology. In an action brought by 
the Commission for annulment of Regulation No 1655/2000 
5 in so far as it makes the 
adoption of measures for the implementation of the LIFE programme subject to the 
regulatory procedure under Article 5 of the second comitology decision, 
6 the Court 
considered  first  the  admissibility  of  the  application,  stating,  by  analogy  with  Case 
166/78 Italy v  Council  [1979]  ECR  2575,  paragraph  6,  that  exercise  of  the 
Commission's right to challenge the legality of any measure is not conditional on the 
position  taken  by  the  Commission  at  the  time  when  the  measure  in  question  was 
adopted.
5   Regulation (EC) No 1655/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 
2000 concerning the Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE) (OJ 2000 L 192, 
p. 1). 
6   Council  Decision  1999/468/EC  of  28  June  1999  laying  down  the  procedures  for  the 
exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (OJ 1999 L 184, p. 23). Proceedings  Court of Justice
16
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As to the substance, the Court recalled that, under Article 202 EC, on the basis of 
which the second comitology decision was adopted, the Council is empowered to lay 
down  principles  and  rules  with  which  the  manner  of  exercising  the  implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission must comply and added that "the scope of the 
principles and rules which the Council is empowered to lay down in that area is not 
limited  by  Article  202  EC  to  establishing  the  various  procedures  to  which  the 
Commission's exercise of the implementing powers conferred on it may be subject" 
(paragraph  41)  and  those  principles  and  rules  may  also  apply  to  the  methods  for 
choosing between those various procedures. In that regard, the Court observed that 
the second comitology decision did not intend to make the criteria laid down in Article 2 
binding in character. None the less, the legal effect of that provision is that, when the 
Community legislature departs, in the choice of committee procedure, from the criteria 
which are laid down in Article 2 of the second comitology decision, it must state the 
reasons for that choice. In this case the Court held that a declaration by the Council at 
the time of adoption of the regulation at issue cannot be taken into account for the 
purpose of determining whether Regulation No 1655/2000 complies with the obligation 
to state reasons because a declaration adopted by the Council alone cannot in any 
event  serve  as  a  statement  of  reasons  for  a  regulation  adopted  jointly  by  the 
Parliament and the Council. Moreover, the Court pointed out that a statement which 
amounts to no more than a reference to the applicable Community instrument does not 
constitute a sufficient statement of reasons. 
4.4. By its judgment in Case C-11/00 Commission v European Central Bank [2003] 
ECR I-7215, the Court annulled a decision of the European Central Bank establishing 
that  the  Directorate  for  Internal  Audit  is  solely  responsible  for  administrative 
investigations  within  the  ECB  so  far  as  combating  fraud  is  concerned 
7  and  thus 
precludes  both  the  investigative  powers  conferred  on  OLAF  by  Regulation 
No 1073/1999 
8 and the applicability of the regulation to the ECB. 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court confirmed, first, that Regulation No 1073/1999, 
which,  under  Article 1(3),  applies  to  "institutions,  bodies,  offices  and  agencies 
established by, or on the basis of, the Treaties" also applies to the ECB, whether or not 
that circumstance is liable to affect the legality of the regulation. 
Second, the Court dismissed the ECB's plea alleging that Regulation No 1073/1999 is 
illegal. In particular, the Court dismissed a first plea that the regulation at issue had no 
7   Decision  1999/726/EC  of  the  European  Central  Bank  of  7  October  1999  on  fraud 
prevention (ECB/1999/5) (OJ 1999 L 291, p. 36). 
8   Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999  concerning  investigations  conducted  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF) 
(OJ 1999 L 136, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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legal  basis,  stating  that  the  expression  "financial  interests  of  the  Community"  in 
Article 280  EC  "must  be  interpreted  as  encompassing  not  only  revenue  and 
expenditure  covered  by  the  Community  budget  but  also,  in  principle,  revenue  and 
expenditure covered by the budget of other bodies, offices and agencies established by 
the EC Treaty" (paragraph 89) and that, accordingly, it also covers the resources and 
expenditure  of  the  ECB.  As  for  the  argument  that  the  regulation  undermined  the 
independence of the ECB, the Court pointed out that "neither the fact that OLAF was 
established  by  the  Commission  and  is  incorporated  within  the  Commission's 
administrative  and  budgetary  structures  on  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Decision 
1999/352, nor the fact that the Community legislature has conferred on such a body 
external to the ECB powers of investigation on the conditions laid down in Regulation 
No 1073/1999,  is  per  se  capable  of  undermining  the  ECB's  independence" 
9
(paragraph  138)  and  that  "the  system  of  investigation  set  up  by  Regulation 
No 1073/1999 is specifically intended to permit the investigation of suspicions relating 
to  acts  of  fraud  or  corruption  or  other  illegal  activities  detrimental  to  the  financial 
interests of the European Community, without in any way being similar to forms of 
control which, like financial control, are likely to follow a more rigid pattern" (paragraph 
141).  Finally,  the  Court  observed  that,  in  adopting  the  regulation  at  issue,  the 
legislature  did  not  breach  the  principle  of  proportionality  as  it  was  entitled,  in  the 
exercise of its wide discretion in this area, to take the view that it was necessary to set 
up  a  control  mechanism  which  is  simultaneously  centralised  within  one  particular 
organ,  specialised  and  operated  independently  and  uniformly  with  respect  to  those 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 
In conclusion, the Court held that the decision of the ECB is incompatible with the 
regulation because it seeks to set up a system for the prevention of fraud which is 
distinct from and exclusive of that provided for by Regulation No 1073/1999. 
It should also be noted that in Case C-15/00 Commission v European Investment Bank 
[2003] ECR I-7342, the Court held that Regulations Nos 1073/1999 and 1047/1999 
10
also  covered  the  EIB.  As  a  consequence,  the  Court  annulled  the  decision  of  the 
Management Committee of the EIB of 10 November 1999 concerning cooperation with 
OLAF which excluded the application of those regulations and established a separate 
system for the prevention of fraud peculiar to the EIB. 
4.5.  By  Case  C-41/00  P  Interporc v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  I-2125,  the  Court 
dismissed an appeal brought against the judgment by which the Court of First Instance 
9   Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the 
European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 20).
10   Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations 
conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 8). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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partially  dismissed  Interporc's  action  for  annulment  of  the  Commission  Decision 
refusing  it  access  to  certain  documents  held  by  the  Commission  of  which  the 
Commission was not the author (Case T-92/98 Interporc v Commission [1999] ECR 
II-3521). The Commission's refusal was based, inter alia, on the authorship rule, as 
provided for by the code of conduct adopted by that institution. 
11 That rule establishes 
that where a document held by an institution was not written by that institution, any 
application for access must be sent direct to the author of the document. 
First, the Court rejected a plea by the applicant that the authorship rule is void on the 
ground that it infringes the principle of transparency as a rule of law of a higher order. 
On that point, the Court held that the Court of First Instance had correctly applied the 
case-law  of  the  Court  (Case  C-58/94  Netherlands v  Council  [1996]  ECR  I-2169, 
paragraph 37), in holding that "so long as the Community legislature has not adopted 
general  rules  on  the  right  of  public  access  to  documents  held  by  the  Community 
institutions, the institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests 
by  virtue  of  their  power  of  internal  organisation,  which  authorises  them  to  take 
appropriate measures in order to ensure their internal operation in conformity with the 
interests of good administration" (paragraph 40) and that "so long as there was no rule 
of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in 
Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which 
it was not the author, the authorship rule could be applied" (paragraph 41). 
Next, the Court cited its case-law, according to which "the aim pursued by Decision 
94/90 as well as being to ensure the internal operation of the Commission in conformity 
with  the  interests  of  good  administration,  is  to  provide  the  public  with  the  widest 
possible access to documents held by the Commission, so that any exception to that 
right of access must be interpreted and applied strictly" (paragraph 48) (see Joined 
Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] 
ECR I-1, paragraph 27). It concluded that "under the Code of Conduct adopted by 
Decision 94/90, a strict interpretation and application of the authorship rule imply that 
the  Commission  must  verify  the  origin  of  the  document  and  inform  the  person 
concerned of its author so that he can make an application for access to that author" 
(paragraph 49). 
4.6. The Court had an opportunity in Case C-213/01 P T. Port v Commission [2003] 
ECR I-2319, to clarify the scope of the interim legal protection that national courts are 
authorised to grant to individuals. In this case, a company which imported fruit and 
vegetables brought an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance (Case 
T-52/99 T. Port v Commission [2001] ECR II-981) in which it was held that it could not 
ask  to  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  its  reference  quantity  the  quantity  of 
11   Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994 on public access to 
Commission documents (OJ 1994 L 46, p. 58). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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bananas a national court authorised it to release for free circulation, on payment of the 
customs duties of ECU 75 per tonne. 
First, the Court held that interim measures ordered in interlocutory proceedings are 
granted only pending the final decision in the main proceedings, and without prejudice 
to that decision and that, moreover, they may themselves be challenged, and may be 
set aside or varied pending that decision. It concluded that customs duties determined 
provisionally in interlocutory proceedings are not necessarily the customs duties which 
are applicable on the day on which customs import formalities are completed, proof of 
payment of which operators must provide in order to demonstrate that the quantities of 
bananas which they wish to have included in the calculation of the reference quantity 
have actually been imported. In that regard the Court stressed that "the interim legal 
protection which national courts are authorised to grant to individuals in accordance 
with the case-law of the Court of Justice must not have the effect of creating a definitive 
factual framework which cannot be challenged subsequently" (paragraph 21). 
4.7. By Case C-211/01 Commission v Council (judgment of 11 September 2003, not 
yet published in the ECR), the Court annulled Decisions 2001/265 
12 and 2001/266 
13
concerning  the  conclusion  of  agreements  between  the  European  Community  and 
Bulgaria and Hungary respectively, establishing certain conditions for the carriage of 
goods by road and the promotion of combined transport. Because those agreements 
contained provisions relating to the principle of equal treatment in the area of road 
vehicle  taxation,  they  were  concluded  on  the  basis  of  Articles  71  EC  and  93  EC. 
However,  the  Court  held  that  the  aspect  of  the  agreements  which  concerns  the 
harmonisation of fiscal laws is, in the light of their aim and their content, only secondary 
and indirect in nature compared with the transport policy objective which they pursue 
and, consequently, held that "the Council should have used Article 71 EC alone, in 
conjunction with Article 300(3) EC, as the legal basis for the decisions" concluding the 
agreements  (paragraph  50).  The  Court  therefore  annulled  the  contested  decisions, 
while  declaring  that  the  effects  of  the  decisions  were  to  be  maintained  until  new 
measures had been adopted. 
12   Council  Decision  2001/265/EC  of  19  March  2001  concerning  the  conclusion  of  the 
agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Bulgaria establishing 
certain  conditions  for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  road  and  the  promotion  of  combined 
transport (OJ 2001 L 108, p. 4). 
13   Council  Decision  2001/266/EC  of  19  March  2001  concerning  the  conclusion  of  the 
agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Hungary establishing 
certain  conditions  for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  road  and  the  promotion  of  combined 
transport (OJ 2001 L 108, p. 27). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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4.8. In Case C-472/00 P Commission v Fresh Marine Company [2003] ECR I-7577, the 
Court ruled in an appeal against a decision of the Court of First Instance of 24 October 
2000  in  Case  T-178/98  Fresh  Marine  v  Commission  [2000]  ECR  II-3331  that  an 
unlawful measure had been adopted such as to entail the non-contractual liability of the 
European  Community.  In  this  case  the  Commission,  after  initially  exempting  a 
Norwegian  company  from  definitive  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  duties  and 
accepting its undertaking to adhere to a minimum price, had then imposed provisional 
duties  on  that  company  on  the  ground  that  analysis  of  the  report  submitted  by  it 
suggested that that undertaking was not observed. The company complained that the 
Commission had manipulated the report and sent it an amended version on the basis 
of which the Commission concluded that there was no longer any reason to believe 
that the undertaking had been broken. 
In its analysis of the conditions to be met for a right to damages to arise, the Court 
observed that the decisive test for finding that a breach of Community law is sufficiently 
serious  is  whether  the  Community  institution  concerned  manifestly  and  gravely 
disregarded the limits on its discretion and pointed out that where that institution has 
only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community 
law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach
The  Court  therefore  analysed  the  limits  to  which  the  Commission's  discretion  was 
subject in this case. In so doing it found that the provisional and countervailing duties 
were imposed on Fresh Marine on the basis of Article 8(10) of the basic anti-dumping 
Regulation No 384/96 
14 and Article 13(10) of Regulation No 2026/97 
15 on protection 
against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community 
respectively. Those provisions, while granting the Commission the power to impose 
provisional anti-dumping and countervailing duties, require at the same time that there 
be  reason  to  believe  that  the  undertaking  to  adhere  to  a  minimum  price  has  been 
breached and that the decision imposing such duties be taken on the basis of the best 
information available. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Commission's conduct 
must be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Community law satisfying 
one of the conditions for the incurring of non-contractual liability by the Community 
where it imposes such duties solely on the basis of the analysis of a report by the 
exporting company concerned which gave reason to believe that that company had 
complied with its undertaking to adhere to a minimum price, but which the Commission 
had amended on its own initiative, without taking the precaution of asking the company 
14   Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1). 
15   Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1997 L 288, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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what impact its unilateral action might have on the reliability of the information with 
which the company had provided it. 
4.9. Case C-224/01 Köbler (judgment of 30 September 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR) concerns a German national who, having worked as an ordinary professor in an 
Austrian University for 10 years and having applied for the special length-of-service 
increment normally paid to professors with 15 years' experience exclusively at Austrian 
universities, argued that he had completed the requisite length of service if the duration 
of his service in universities of other Member States of the European Community were 
taken into consideration. After it had referred a question on this point for a preliminary 
ruling  the  Austrian  court  took  account  of  the  judgment  in  Case  C-15/96  Schöning-
Kougebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47, according to which the provisions of Community 
law on freedom of movement for workers within the Community preclude a clause in a 
collective agreement applicable to the public service of a Member State which provides 
for promotion on grounds of seniority for employees of that service after eight years' 
employment  in  a  salary  group  determined  by  that  agreement  without  taking  any 
account of previous periods of comparable employment completed in the public service 
of another Member State. The Austrian court then withdrew the question it had referred 
for a preliminary ruling and, without referring a second question to the Court of Justice, 
confirmed that the refusal of the application of the person concerned was justified, on 
the  ground  that  the  special  length-of-service  increment  was  a  loyalty  bonus  which 
objectively justified a derogation from the Community law provisions on freedom of 
movement  for  workers.  The  German  national  then  brought  an  action  for  damages 
before the referring court for breach of Community law. 
In its preliminary ruling the Court confirmed that the principle, stated in particular in 
Joined  Cases  C-46/93  and  C-48/93  Brasserie  du  Pêcheur  and  Factortame  [1996] 
ECR I-1029,  where  Member  States  are  obliged  to  make  good  damage  caused  to 
individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible applies in 
cases where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at 
last instance where the rule of Community law infringed is intended to confer rights on 
individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link between 
that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties. The Court made 
clear  that,  as  regards  the  second  condition,  in  order  to  determine  whether  the 
infringement  is  sufficiently  serious  when  the  infringement  at  issue  stems  from  a 
decision of a court, the competent national court, taking into account the specific nature 
of the judicial function, must determine whether that infringement is manifest. Finally, it 
added  that  it  is  for  the  legal  system  of  each  Member  State  to  designate  the  court 
competent to determine disputes relating to that reparation. 
Although it is generally for the national courts to consider the abovementioned criteria, 
the Court took the view that it had available to it all the materials enabling it to establish 
whether the conditions necessary for liability of the Member State concerned to be 
incurred were fulfilled. As regards the existence of a sufficiently serious breach, it held 
that an infringement of Community law does not have the requisite manifest character Proceedings  Court of Justice
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for liability under Community law to be incurred by a Member State for a decision of 
one of its courts adjudicating at last instance, where, first, Community law does not 
expressly cover the point of law at issue, no reply was to be found to that question in 
the Court's case-law and that reply was not obvious, and, second, that infringement 
was not intentional but is the result of an incorrect reading of a judgment of the Court. 
5. On the subject of the free movement of goods the judgments of the Court to be 
noted concern the scope of the protection afforded to the name "chocolate" (5.1), the 
scope of the concept of selling arrangements within the meaning of the decision in 
Keck and Mithouard (5.2), the protection of protected designations of origin (5.3), a 
demonstration  which  caused  the  blocking  of  a  major  transit  route  in  Austria  (5.4), 
registration duty on second-hand cars imported into Denmark (5.5), the prohibition on 
the sale of medicines in Germany from another Member State via the internet (5.6) and 
the failure to implement certain directives in Gibraltar (5.7). 
5.1. In two judgments concluding proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations, in Case 
C-12/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-459 and Case C-14/00 Commission v Italy
[2003] ECR I-513, the Court considered whether the Spanish and Italian legislation 
prohibiting  cocoa  and  chocolate  products  to  which  vegetable  fats  other  than  cocoa 
butter have been added, and which are lawfully manufactured in Member States which 
authorise the addition of those fats, from being marketed under the name "chocolate" 
used in the Member State of production, and requiring the use of the term "chocolate 
substitute"  for  their  marketing,  is  consistent  with  the  principle  of  free  movement  of 
goods.
In  those  two  cases,  the  Court  considered  first  whether  Directive  73/241 
16  brought 
about  total  harmonisation.  In  the  light  of  its  previous  case-law  (inter  alia,  Case 
C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857 and Case C-191/99 Kvaerner
[2001]  ECR  I-4447),  it  held  that  Directive  73/241  was  not  intended  to  regulate 
definitively the use of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter in the cocoa and chocolate 
products to which it refers. Both the wording and the scheme of the directive indicate 
that it lays down a common rule, that is, the prohibition on adding to chocolate fat 
preparations  not  derived  exclusively  from  milk,  and  establishes  in  Article 10(1)  free 
movement for products which comply with that rule, while permitting Member States in 
Article 14(2)(a) to adopt national rules authorising the addition of vegetable fats other 
than cocoa butter to cocoa and chocolate products manufactured within their territory. 
16   Council Directive 73/241/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member  States  relating  to  cocoa  and  chocolate  products  intended  for  human 
consumption (OJ 1973 L 228, p. 23). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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As  regards  the  applicability  of  Article 28  EC  to  the  prohibition  laid  down  by  the 
legislation  at  issue,  the  Court  took  the  view  that  cocoa  and  chocolate  products 
containing  fats  not  authorised  by  the  common  rule  but  whose  manufacture  and 
marketing under the name "chocolate" are authorised in certain Member States cannot 
be deprived of the benefit of free movement of goods solely on the ground that other 
Member  States  require  within  their  territory  that  cocoa  and  chocolate  products  be 
manufactured  according  to  the  common  rule  in  the  directive  (Case  C-3/99  Ruwet
[2000] ECR I-8749, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 and Case 120/78 REWE-
Zentral [1979] ECR 649 ("Cassis de Dijon")). In Case C-12/00, the Court cited Joined 
Cases  C-267/91  and  C-268/91  Keck  and  Mithouard  [1993]  ECR  I-6097  and  Case 
C-470/93 Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, to dismiss the objection of the Spanish Government 
that its national legislation constitutes a selling arrangement. As the requirements at 
issue relate to the labelling and packaging of the products in question they do not come 
under the exception referred to in Keck and Mithouard. In Case C-14/00 the Court also 
dismissed  the  argument  that  the  application  of  Article 28  EC  would  effectively 
discriminate against national producers, on the basis of the judgments in Case 98/86 
Mathot [1987] ECR 809 and in Case C-448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663. 
As regards the compatibility of the legislation at issue with Article 28 EC, the Court 
observed that such legislation is likely to impede trade between Member States (Case 
182/84 Miro [1985] ECR 3731, Case 298/87 Smanor [1988] ECR 4489, Case 286/86 
Deserbais  [1988]  ECR  4907  and  Guimont,  cited  above).  It  compels  the  traders 
concerned to adjust the presentation of their products according to the place where 
they  are  to  be  marketed  and  consequently  to  incur  additional  packaging  costs  and 
adversely affect the consumer's perception of the products. Moreover, the inclusion in 
the label of a neutral and objective statement informing consumers of the presence in 
the product of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter would be sufficient to ensure that 
consumers are given correct information. The Court concluded that the obligation to 
change the sales name of those products which is imposed by the Italian legislation 
does not appear to be necessary to satisfy the overriding requirement of consumer 
protection and that the legislation at issue is incompatible with Article 28 EC. 
5.2. In Case C-416/00 Morellato (judgment of 18 September 2002, not yet published in 
the ECR) the Court ruled on the compatibility with Articles 28 EC and 30 EC of Italian 
legislation prohibiting the sale of bread obtained by completing the baking of partly 
baked bread, whether deep-frozen or not, if that bread has not been packaged by the 
retailer  prior  to  sale.  In  considering  the  question,  the  Court  had  first  to  determine 
whether  such  requirements  constituted  selling  arrangements  which  are  not  likely  to 
hinder trade between Member States within the meaning of its judgment in Keck and 
Mithouard. In that regard, it recalled that, according to that judgment, the need to alter 
the packaging or the labelling of imported products prevents such requirements from 
constituting  selling  arrangements.  Accordingly,  national  legislation  which  prohibits  a 
product  that  is  lawfully  manufactured  and  marketed  in  another  Member  State  from 
being put on sale in the first Member State without being subjected to new packaging 
of a specific type that complies with the requirements of that legislation cannot be held Proceedings  Court of Justice
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to concern such selling arrangements. The Court held, however, that in this case the 
requirement for prior packaging laid down in the legislation at issue did not make it 
necessary to alter the product since it related only to the marketing of the bread which 
results from the final baking of pre-baked bread. Such a requirement is thus in principle 
such as to fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC provided that it does not in reality 
constitute discrimination against imported products. If that were so, it would not be 
possible, in the absence of any evidence of a risk to health, to justify such an obstacle 
under the derogation authorised by Article 30 EC for reasons relating to the protection 
of the health and life of humans. 
5.3. In Case C-108/01 Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma [2003] ECR I-5121 and Case 
C-469/00 Ravil [2003] ECR I-5053, the Court had an opportunity to expand its case-law 
on the scope of the protection conferred by protected designations of origin ("PDO") for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs under Regulations No 2081/92 
17 and No 1107/96 
18 by ruling as to whether certain requirements for the processing of such products are 
consistent  with  Article 29  EC.  The  question  was  whether,  in  the  first  case,  a 
requirement  that  a  product  protected  by  the  PDO  "Parma  Ham"  be  sliced  and 
packaged in the region of production, and in the second, a requirement that a product 
bearing the PDO "Grana Padano" be grated in the region of production were consistent 
with Article 29 EC. 
In  both  cases  the  Court  found  that  Article 4(1)  of  Regulation  No 2081/92  makes 
eligibility to use a PDO subject to the product's compliance with a specification, that 
that  specification  contains  the  detailed  definition  of  the  protected  product  and 
determines both the extent of the obligations to be complied with for the purposes of 
using the PDO and the extent of the right protected against third parties. It concluded 
that Regulation No 2081/92 did not preclude the use of a PDO from being subject to 
the condition that operations such as the slicing, grating and packaging of the product 
take  place  in  the  region  of  production,  where  such  conditions  are  laid  down  in  the 
specification.
As to whether such requirements are consistent with Article 29 EC, the Court followed 
its earlier case-law, inter alia the judgments in Case C-209/98  Sydhavnens Sten & 
Grus [2000] ECR I-3743, Case C-114/96 Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629 and Case 
C-169/99 Schwarzkopf [2001] ECR I-5901, observing, first, that Article 29 EC prohibits 
17   Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 1992 
L 208, p. 1). 
18   Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 1107/96  of  12  June  1996  on  the  registration  of 
geographical  indications  and  designations  of  origin  under  the  procedure  laid  down  in 
Article 17 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 (OJ 1996 L 148, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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all measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of 
exports  and  thereby  the  establishment  of  a  difference  in  treatment  between  the 
domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a 
particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of the State in 
question. Accordingly, the condition that slicing, grating and packaging operations be 
carried out in the region of production constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to 
a quantitative restriction on exports within the meaning of Article 29 EC. 
The Court went on to observe, second, that designations of origin fall within the scope 
of industrial and commercial property rights. They are intended to guarantee that the 
product bearing them comes from a specified geographical area and displays certain 
particular characteristics. The requirement for the slicing, grating and packaging to be 
carried out in the region of production, in particular, is intended to allow the persons 
entitled  to  use  the  PDO  to  keep  under  their  control  one  of  the  ways  in  which  the 
product appears on the market and to thereby safeguard its quality and authenticity 
and consequently the reputation of the PDO. Since "Parma ham" and "Grana Padano" 
are consumed in large quantities in sliced and grated form respectively, slicing, grating 
and  packaging  constitute  important  operations,  while  checks  performed  outside  the 
region of production would provide fewer guarantees of the quality and authenticity of 
the product. Therefore, the requirement for slicing, grating and packaging in the region 
may be regarded as justified. The Court concluded that Article 29 EC did not preclude 
such a requirement. 
However, the Court held, third, that the principle of legal certainty required that the 
condition in question be brought to the knowledge of third parties by adequate publicity 
in Community legislation, which could have been done by mentioning that condition in 
Regulation No 1107/96. Failing that, such a condition could not be relied on against 
them before a national court. In its judgment in Grana Padano, however, the Court 
made clear that the principle of legal certainty does not preclude that condition from 
being regarded by the national court as capable of being relied on against operators 
who carried on the activity of grating and packaging the product in the period prior to 
the entry into force of Regulation No 1107/96, should that court consider that during 
that  period  the  contested  condition  was  applicable  in  its  legal  order  by  virtue  of  a 
bilateral convention 
19and capable of being relied on against those concerned by virtue 
of the national rules on publicity. 
5.4. Again on the subject of the free movement of goods, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger
[2003] ECR I-5659 supplemented and refined the solutions reached in Case C-265/95 
Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959. The Court observed first, that the fact that 
19   Convention of 28 April 1964 between the French Republic and the Italian Republic on the 
protection  of  designations  of  origin,  indications  of  provenance  and  names  of  certain 
products.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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the  competent  authorities  of  a  Member  State  did  not  ban  a  demonstration  which 
resulted in the complete closure of a major transit route for almost 30 hours on end is 
capable of restricting intra-Community trade in goods and must, therefore, be regarded 
as constituting a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction which is, in 
principle, incompatible with the obligations arising from Articles 28 EC and 29 EC, read 
together with Article 10 EC, unless that failure to ban can be objectively justified. In 
assessing whether there was any such objective justification in this case, the Court 
took account of the objective pursued by the Austrian authorities in authorising the 
demonstration in question and held that it was to respect the fundamental rights of the 
demonstrators  to  freedom  of  expression  and  freedom  of  assembly,  which  are 
enshrined in and guaranteed by the ECHR and the Austrian Constitution. Given that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law the observance 
of which the Court ensures, their protection is, according to the Court, a legitimate 
interest  which,  in  principle,  justifies  a  restriction  of  the  obligations  imposed  by 
Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as 
the free movement of goods. 
For the Court, the question whether the facts before the referring court are consistent 
with respect for fundamental rights raises the question of the need to reconcile the 
requirements  of  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Community  with  those 
arising from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the 
question of the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
and of the free movement of goods, given that they are both subject to restrictions 
justified by public interest objectives. In considering whether the restrictions on intra-
Community trade are proportionate in the light of the objective pursued, that is the 
protection of fundamental rights, the Court points out differences in the facts of this 
case (Schmidberger) and those of Commission v France, cited above, in which the 
Court  held  that  France  had  failed  to  fulfil  its  obligations  under  Article 28  EC  in 
conjunction with Article 10 EC, and under the common organisations of the markets in 
agricultural products, by failing to adopt all necessary and proportionate measures in 
order to prevent the free movement of fruit and vegetables from being obstructed by 
actions  by  private  individuals,  such  as  the  interception  of  lorries  transporting  such 
products and the destruction of their loads, violence against lorry drivers and other 
threats. The Court found that, in the present case, unlike in the case just cited, the 
demonstration  at  issue  took  place  following  authorisation,  the  obstacle  to  the  free 
movement of goods resulting from that demonstration was limited, the purpose of that 
public demonstration was not to restrict trade in goods of a particular type or from a 
particular source, various administrative and supporting measures were taken by the 
competent authorities in order to limit as far as possible the disruption to road traffic, 
the isolated incident in question did not give rise to a general climate of insecurity such 
as to have a dissuasive effect on intra-Community trade flows as a whole, and, finally, 
taking account of the Member States' wide margin of discretion, in the present case the 
competent national authorities were entitled to consider that an outright ban on the 
demonstration  at  issue  would  have  constituted  unacceptable  interference  with  the 
fundamental rights of the demonstrators to gather and express peacefully their opinion Proceedings  Court of Justice
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in public. The imposition of stricter conditions concerning both the site and the duration 
of  the  demonstration  in  question  could  have  been  perceived  as  an  excessive 
restriction,  depriving  the  action  of  a  substantial  part  of  its  scope.  According  to  the 
Court,  although  an  action  of  that  type  usually  entails  inconvenience  for  non-
participants,  such  inconvenience  may  in  principle  be  tolerated  provided  that  the 
objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an opinion. The 
Court concluded that the fact that the Austrian authorities did not, in the circumstances, 
ban a demonstration is not incompatible with Articles 28 EC and 29 EC, read together 
with Article 10 EC. 
5.5. In  Case  C-383/01  De  Danske  Bilimportører  [2003]  ECR  I-6065  the  Court 
considered, in the light of its judgment in Case C-47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] 
ECR I-4509 which concerned registration duty on imported second hand cars, whether 
the very high amount of duty on registration in Denmark of new cars constitutes a 
measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports prohibited 
under Article 28 EC which may be justified under Article 30 EC. The Court ruled out 
that  classification.  It  first  recalled  its  decision  in  Case  C-234/99  Nygård  [2002] 
ECR I-3657, paragraph 17, that provisions relating to charges having equivalent effect 
and those relating to discriminatory internal taxation cannot be applied together. It then 
found that the charge at issue was manifestly of a fiscal nature as it was charged not 
by reason of the vehicle crossing the frontier of the Member State which introduced it 
but upon first registration of the vehicle in the territory of that State, and that it had, 
therefore, to be examined in the light of Article 90 EC. The Court pointed out that it was 
not relevant, as held in Case 90/79 Commission v France [1981] ECR 283, paragraph 
14, that the charge is in fact imposed solely on imported new vehicles, because there is 
no  domestic  production.  Further,  it  recalled  that,  according  to  the  judgment  in 
Commission v Denmark, cited above, Article 90 EC cannot be invoked against internal 
taxation  imposed  on  imported  products  where  there  is  no  similar  or  competing 
domestic  production  and  that  it  does  not  provide  a  basis  for  censuring  the 
excessiveness  of  the  level  of  taxation  which  the  Member  States  might  adopt  for 
particular  products,  in  the  absence  of  any  discriminatory  or  protective  effect,  and 
concluded  that  the  duty  at  issue  is  not  covered  by  the  prohibitions  laid  down  in 
Article 90 EC. Finally, the Court took the view that the reservation it expressed in the 
judgment in Commission v Denmark, cited above, to the effect that such duty cannot 
be fixed at a level such that the free movement of goods within the common market 
would be impeded, is not applicable in this case. The figures communicated to it do not 
in any way show that the free movement of that type of goods between Denmark and 
the other Member States is impeded. It concluded that the Danish registration duty has 
not ceased to be internal taxation, within the meaning of Article 90 EC, and cannot be 
classified as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, for the 
purposes of Article 28 EC. 
5.6. In Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband (judgment of 11 December 2002, 
not  yet  published  in  the  ECR),  the  Court  considered  whether  a  prohibition  on  the 
importation and retail sale of medicinal products by mail order or over the internet from Proceedings  Court of Justice
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pharmacies in other Member States is consistent with Article 28 EC et seq., whether 
the internet site of such a pharmacy and the description of the medicinal products it 
contains  constitutes  advertising  of  medicinal  products  prohibited  by  national,  in  this 
case, German, legislation, and the relationship between that legislation and Articles 28 
EC and 30 EC. 
As  regards  medicinal  products  which  are  subject  to,  but  which  have  not  obtained, 
authorisation under the provisions of Directive 65/65, 
20 the Court considered that the 
prohibition at issue was consistent with that directive and the question of inconsistency 
with Article 28 EC and Article 30 EC did not arise. As regards authorised medicinal 
products, the Court recalled its settled case-law (judgments in "Cassis de Dijon" and 
Keck  and  Mithouard,  cited  above,  and  in  Case  C-368/95  Familiapress  [1997]  ECR 
I-3689) concerning the relevance of the actual or potential effect of a measure on intra-
Community trade to the assessment whether it is consistent with those provisions. In 
particular,  the  Court  held  that  the  criterion,  laid  down  by  the  decision  in  Keck,  for 
determining that legislation on selling arrangements does not constitute a measure with 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, which requires that it must affect in the 
same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of both domestic products and those 
from other Member States, was not fulfilled here. The prohibition at issue is more of an 
obstacle to pharmacies outside Germany than to those within it. Although there is little 
doubt that as a result of the prohibition, pharmacies in Germany cannot use the extra 
or  alternative  method  of  gaining  access  to  the  German  market  consisting  of  end 
consumers  of  medicinal  products,  they  are  still  able  to  sell  the  products  in  their 
dispensaries.  However,  for  pharmacies  not  established  in  Germany,  the  internet 
provides  a  more  significant  way  to  gain  direct  access  to  the  German  market.  A 
prohibition  which  has  a  greater  impact  on  pharmacies  established  outside  German 
territory could impede access to the market for products from other Member States 
more  than  it  impedes  access  for  domestic  products.  The  prohibition  in  question  is, 
therefore, a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction for the 
purposes of Article 28 EC. 
Second, as regards the justification of the prohibition in the light of Article 30 EC, the 
Court held that the only plausible arguments are those relating to the need to provide 
individual advice to the customer and to ensure his protection when he is supplied with 
medicines and to the need to check that prescriptions are genuine and to guarantee 
that medicinal products are widely available and sufficient to meet requirements. None 
of those reasons can provide a valid basis for the absolute prohibition on the sale by 
mail-order of non-prescription medicines, as the "virtual" pharmacy provides customers 
with an identical or better level of services than traditional pharmacies. On the other 
20   Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products 
(OJ, English Special Edition 1965-66, p. 24). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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hand, for prescription medicines, such control could be justified in view of the greater 
risks which those medicines may present and the system of fixed prices which applies 
to them and which forms part of the German health system. The need to be able to 
check  effectively  and  responsibly  the  authenticity  of  doctors'  prescriptions  and  to 
ensure that the medicine is handed over either to the customer himself, or to a person 
to  whom  its  collection  has  been  entrusted  by  the  customer,  is  such  as  to  justify  a 
prohibition on mail-order sales. Article 30 EC may, therefore, be relied on to justify such 
a prohibition. The same arguments apply where medicinal products are imported into a 
Member  State  in  which  they  are  authorised,  having  been  previously  obtained  by  a 
pharmacy in another Member State from a wholesaler in the importing Member State. 
As  regards  the  compatibility  with  Community  law  of  prohibitions  on  advertising  of 
medicines sold by mail order, the judgment declared that such prohibitions cannot be 
justified for medicines which can only be supplied by pharmacies but which are not 
subject to prescription. 
5.7. Case C-30/01 Commission v United Kingdom (judgment of 23 September 2003, 
not yet published in the ECR) concerned an action against the United Kingdom for 
failure to fulfil its obligations, seeking a declaration that it had failed to implement, as 
regards Gibraltar, certain directives adopted on the basis of Articles 94 EC and 95 EC. 
The Court, upholding the argument of the United Kingdom, stated that "the exclusion of 
Gibraltar from the customs territory of the Community implies that neither the Treaty 
rules on free movement of goods nor the rules of secondary Community legislation 
intended, as regards free circulation of goods, to ensure approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States pursuant to Articles 94 
EC and 95 EC are applicable to it" (paragraph 59). The Court added that although 
failure to apply the directives at issue to Gibraltar may endanger the consistency of 
other Community policies, that fact cannot lead to the extension of the territorial scope 
of those directives beyond the limits imposed by the Treaty and by the United Kingdom 
Act of Accession. 
6. Four cases concerning the common agricultural policy are of interest in the context 
of this report. 
On the subject of health policy and emergency measures to combat bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, in its judgment in Case C-393/01 France v Commission [2003] ECR 
I-5405, the Court annulled Commission Decision 2001/577 
21 setting the date on which 
dispatch from Portugal of bovine products under the Date-Based Export Scheme may 
commence  by  virtue  of  Article 22(2)  of  Decision  2001/376.  The  Court  held  that  the 
Commission did not first carry out the verifications required so as to ensure adequate 
21   Commission Decision 2001/577/EC of 25 July 2001 (OJ 2001 L 203, p. 27). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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safety  in  the  operation  of  that  scheme  applicable  to  the  products  referred  to  in 
Article 11 of Decision 2001/376, 
22 and thereby infringed Article 21, in conjunction with 
Article 22, of that decision. 
The Court had an opportunity, in its judgment in Case C-305/00 Schulin [2003] ECR 
I-3525,  to  give  a  preliminary  ruling  on  the  interpretation  of  the  sixth  indent  of 
Article 14(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights 
23 and Article 8 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1768/95 implementing rules on the 
agricultural  exemption  provided  for  in  Article 14. 
24  According  to  the  Court,  those 
provisions  cannot  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  holder  of  a  Community  plant 
variety  right  can  require  a  farmer  to  provide  the  information  specified  in  those 
provisions  where  there  is  no  indication  that  the  farmer  has  used  or  will  use,  for 
propagating  purposes  in  the  field,  on  his  own  holding,  the  product  of  the  harvest 
obtained by planting, on his own holding, propagating material of a variety other than a 
hybrid or synthetic variety which is covered by that right and belongs to one of the 
agricultural plant species listed in Article 14(2) of Regulation No 2100/94. 
In Case C-137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers' Union (judgment of 9 September 
2003, not yet published in the ECR) the Court was able to clarify its case-law on the 
application of national competition rules in the context of the common organisation of 
the market in milk and dairy products. In the main proceedings, a farmers' cooperative 
had contested the decisions of the United Kingdom competition authorities, alleging 
that, in asserting jurisdiction over the activities of the members of the cooperative and 
in recommending and taking steps to prevent them from obtaining a higher price for the 
milk  produced  by  their  members,  they  had  acted  contrary  to  various  provisions  of 
Community law. 
The Court, having stated that the common organisations of the markets in agricultural 
products are not a competition-free zone, pointed out that, in accordance with settled 
case-law  (Case  14/68  Walt  Wilhelm  and  Others  [1969]  ECR  1,  and  Joined  Cases 
253/78,  1/79  to  3/79  Giry  and  Guerlain  and  Others  [1980]  ECR  2327),  Community 
competition  law  and  national  competition  law  apply  in  parallel,  since  they  consider 
22   Commission  Decision  2001/376/EC  of  18  April  2001  concerning  measures  made 
necessary  by  the  occurrence  of  bovine  spongiform  encephalopathy  in  Portugal  and 
implementing a date-based export scheme (OJ 2001 L 132, p. 17).
23   Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights 
(OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1). 
24   Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 1768/95  of  24  July  1995  implementing  rules  on  the 
agricultural  exemption  provided  for  in  Article  14(3)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No 2100/94 
(OJ 1995 L 173, p. 14). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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restrictive practices from different points of view. In that regard, it stated that that case-
law can be applied in the area of the common organisation of the market in milk and 
dairy products where, as a result, the national authorities in principle retain jurisdiction 
to apply their national competition law. 
Next, the Court considered the limits of that jurisdiction, and, observing that Article 36 
EC gives precedence to the objectives of the common agricultural policy over those in 
relation to competition policy, made clear that the measures adopted by the national 
authorities must not produce effects which are likely to impede the functioning of the 
mechanisms provided for by that common organisation. With regard to the measures at 
issue, the Court held that the mere fact that the prices charged by a dairy cooperative 
were already lower than the target price for milk before those authorities intervened is 
not sufficient to render the measures taken by them in relation to that cooperative in 
application of national competition law unlawful under Community law. Furthermore, 
according  to  the  Court,  such  measures  may  not  compromise  the  objectives  of  the 
common agricultural policy as set out in Article 33(1) EC. In any event, the Court made 
clear that the national competition authorities are under an obligation to ensure that any 
contradictions between the various objectives laid down in Article 33 EC are reconciled 
where necessary, without giving any one of them so much weight as to render the 
achievement of the others impossible. 
Second, the Court held that the essential function of the target price provided for by 
Article 3(1) of Regulation No 804/68 
25 is to define, at Community level, the desirable 
point of equilibrium between the objective of ensuring a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural  community  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  ensuring  that  supplies  reach 
consumers  at  reasonable  prices  on  the  other  does  not  preclude  the  national 
competition  authorities  from  using  that  price  for  the  purposes  of  investigating  the 
market power of an agricultural undertaking, by comparing variations in actual prices 
with the target price. 
Next,  the  Court  held  that  the  Treaty  rules  on  the  free  movement  of  goods  do  not 
preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from prohibiting, pursuant to 
their national competition law, a dairy cooperative which enjoys market power from 
entering into contracts with undertakings, including undertakings established in other 
Member States, for the processing, on its behalf, of milk produced by its members. In 
reaching  that  conclusion,  the  Court  recalled,  first,  that  Article 28  EC  is  intended  to 
prohibit all measures which are capable of hindering intra-Community trade, but that 
none the less a Member State is entitled to take measures to prevent certain of its 
nationals, under cover of freedoms created by the Treaty, from wrongfully evading the 
application of their national legislation. Consequently, according to the Court, restrictive 
25   Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common organisation 
of the market in milk and milk products (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 176). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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measures concerning goods which have been exported for the sole purpose of being 
reimported in order to circumvent measures adopted under national competition law do 
not constitute measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports 
within  the  meaning  of  Article 28  EC.  Second,  the  Court  stated  that  Article 29  EC 
concerns national measures which have as their specific object or effect the restriction 
of  patterns  of  exports  and  thereby  the  establishment  of  a  difference  in  treatment 
between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as 
to provide a particular advantage for national production or for the domestic market of 
the  State  in  question.  The  Court  observed  that  that  is  not  the  case  with  regard  to 
measures which are designed to limit anti-competitive practices engaged in by just one 
agricultural cooperative and apply indistinctly to processing contracts entered into with 
undertakings  established  in  one  Member  State  and  those  entered  into  with 
undertakings established in other Member States. 
Finally, the Court held that Article 12 EC and the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) 
EC do not preclude the adoption of measures such as the prohibition on the conclusion 
of contracts for milk processing on its own account imposed on a dairy cooperative 
which enjoys market power and exploits that position in a manner contrary to the public 
interest,  even  though  large  vertically-integrated  dairy  cooperatives  are  permitted  to 
operate in other Member States. Whilst, on the one hand, it is true that Article 12 EC 
prohibits every Member State from applying its competition law differently on grounds 
of the nationality of the parties concerned, the fact remains that Article 12 EC is not 
concerned  with  any  disparities  in  treatment  which  may  result,  for  persons  and 
undertakings subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, from divergences existing 
between the laws of the various Member States, so long as the latter affect all persons 
subject  to  them,  in  accordance  with  objective  criteria  and  without  regard  to  their 
nationality.  The  mere  fact  that  there  are  vertically-integrated  cooperatives  in  other 
Member  States  is  not  sufficient  to  establish  that  the  adoption  of  those  measures 
amounts to discrimination on grounds of nationality. On the other hand, the Court held 
that the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC which prohibits all discrimination in 
the context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the 
general principle of equal treatment. 
By Case C-239/01 Germany v Commission (judgment of 30 September 2003, not yet 
published in the ECR), the Court annulled Article 5(5) of Regulation No 690/2001 
26 in
so far as that provision requires each Member State concerned to finance 30% of the 
price of the meat purchased under that regulation. The Court reached that conclusion 
on the basis of the findings that, first, the disputed provision requires each Member 
State concerned to finance a portion of the market support measures introduced by the 
26   Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No 690/2001 of  3  April  2001  on  special  market  support 
measures in the beef sector (OJ 2001 L 95, p. 8). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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contested regulation and that, second, Regulation No 1258/1999 
27 does not contain 
any  provision  expressly  authorising  the  Commission  to  derogate  from  the  principle 
flowing from the basic legislation that all Community support measures in the beef and 
veal sector must be exclusively financed by the Community. 
7. In the field of freedom of movement for workers, the Court ruled in cases concerning 
posts for masters of vessels entailing participation in the exercise of powers conferred 
by public law (7.1), a loyalty bonus (7.2), the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation 
No 1612/68 (7.3), access to the hospital managers' corps of the French civil service 
(7.4),  a  national  of  a  third  country  married  to  a  British  national  (7.5),  a  temporarily 
employed national of a Member State (7.6) and the interpretation of the first indent of 
Article 3(2) of Regulation No 1251/70 (7.7). 
7.1. In its judgments of 30 September 2003 in Case C-47/02 Anker and Others (not yet 
published in the ECR) and Case C-405/01 Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante 
Española (not yet published in the ECR) the Court had to interpret Article 39(4) EC in 
relation to provisions of German and Spanish law requiring nationality of the flag State 
for employment as master of a vessel used in small-scale maritime shipping and for 
employment as master and chief mate on merchant navy ships. 
Observing, first, that the concept of public service within the meaning of that article 
covers  posts  which  involve  direct  or  indirect  participation  in  the  exercise  of  powers 
conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the 
State or of other public authorities, the Court went on to consider the posts at issue in 
this case. 
It  held  that  the  national  rights  concerned  conferred  on  those  holding  them  rights 
connected to the maintenance of safety and to the exercise of police powers, which go 
beyond the requirement merely to contribute to maintaining public safety by which any 
individual is bound, and certain auxiliary duties in respect of the registration of births, 
marriages and deaths, which cannot be explained solely by the requirements entailed 
in commanding the vessel. It pointed out that the fact that masters are employed by a 
private natural or legal person is not, as such, sufficient to exclude the application of 
that article since it is established that, in order to perform the public functions which are 
delegated to them, masters act as representatives of public authority in the service of 
the general interests of the flag State. However, it pointed out that the scope of the 
derogation  from  the  principle  of  freedom  of  movement  for  workers  in  the  case  of 
employment in the public administration must be limited to what is strictly necessary for 
safeguarding the general interests of the Member State concerned, which would not be 
27   Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the financing of the Common 
agricultural policy (OJ 1999 L 160, p. 103). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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imperilled  if  rights  under  powers  conferred  by  public  law  were  exercised  only 
sporadically, indeed exceptionally, by nationals of other Member States. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that Article 39(4) EC must be construed as allowing a Member State 
to reserve for its nationals the posts at issue only if the rights under powers conferred 
by public law granted to persons holding such posts are in fact exercised on a regular 
basis and do not represent a very minor part of their activities. 
7.2. In Köbler,  cited  above  (see  paragraph  4.9),  the  Court  had  an  opportunity  to 
interpret Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council 
of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community 
28 in
relation to legislation of a Member State allowing the grant by that State, as employer, 
of a special length-of-service increment to university professors who have carried on 
that profession for at least 15 years with a university in that State. Although the Court, 
in Schöning-Kougebetopoulou, cited above, had already had to interpret those articles 
in relation to a bonus in respect of seniority, it had not yet ruled on their interpretation in 
relation to the grant of a loyalty bonus. 
The Court held, first, that by precluding, for the purpose of the grant of the special 
length-of-service increment for which it provides, any possibility of taking into account 
periods  of  activity  completed  in  another  Member  State,  such  a  regime  is  likely  to 
impede freedom of movement for workers. As, under national law, the increment at 
issue constituted a bonus seeking to reward the loyalty of professors of universities in 
the  Member  State  to  their  sole  employer,  namely  that  State,  the  Court  considered, 
therefore, whether the fact that it constitutes a loyalty bonus may be deemed under 
Community  law  to  indicate  that  it  is  dictated  by  a  pressing  public-interest  reason 
capable of justifying the obstacle. Although it cannot be excluded that an objective of 
rewarding  workers'  loyalty  to  their  employers  in  the  context  of  policy  concerning 
research or university education constitutes a pressing public-interest reason, the Court 
held that the obstacle which it entails clearly cannot be justified in the light of such an 
objective. It concluded that the above provisions of Community law relating to freedom 
of movement for workers are to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude such an 
increment which constitutes a loyalty bonus. 
7.3. In Case C-466/00 Kaba [2003] ECR I-2219 the Court was able to supplement its 
judgment in Case C-356/98 [2000] ECR I-2623 delivered in the same matter. In the first 
judgment,  the  Court  had  held  that  legislation  which  authorises  spouses  of  migrant 
workers who are nationals of a Member State to remain indefinitely in another Member 
State only if they have resided in the territory of that State for four years, but which 
requires residence of only 12 months for the grant of those rights to the spouses of 
28   Regulation  (EEC)  No 1612/68  of  the  Council  of  15  October  1968  on  freedom  of 
movement  for  workers  within  the  Community  (OJ,  English  Special  Edition  1968 (II), 
p. 475). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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persons who are settled in that Member State, which persons are not subject to any 
restriction  on  the  period  for  which  they  may  remain  there,  does  not  constitute 
discrimination contrary to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 
15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
29 Asked 
to  rule  as  to  whether  its  reply  would  have  been  different  had  the  Court  taken  into 
consideration the fact that the respective situation of those two categories of person in 
national law are, according to the referring tribunal, comparable in all respects except 
with regard to the period of prior residence which is required for the purpose of being 
granted indefinite leave to remain in the Member State in question. The Court replied in 
the negative. Inasmuch as the right of residence of a migrant worker who is a national 
of another Member State is subject to the condition that the person remains a worker 
or, where relevant, a person seeking employment, unless he or she derives that right 
from other provisions of Community law, his situation is not comparable to that of a 
person who, under the national legislation of a Member State, is not subject to any 
restriction regarding the period for which he or she may reside within the territory of 
that  Member  State  and  need  not,  during  his  or  her  stay,  satisfy  any  condition 
comparable to those laid down by the provisions of Community law granting nationals 
of  a  Member  State  a  right  of  residence  in  another  Member  State.  As  the  rights  of 
residence of these two categories of persons are not in all respects comparable, the 
same holds true with regard to the situation of their spouses, particularly so far as 
concerns the question of the duration of the residence period on completion of which 
they may be given indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. 
7.4. In Case C-285/01 Burbaud (judgment of 9 September 2003, not yet published in 
the  ECR)  the  Court  gave  a  preliminary  ruling  in  a  case  concerning  a  Portuguese 
national who was refused admission to the hospital managers' corps of the French civil 
service on the ground that it was first necessary to pass the entrance examination of 
the École nationale de la santé publique (the French National School of Public Health 
"the ENSP"). 
The Court first analysed whether the duties performed by the members of that corps 
fell within the scope of Directive 89/48 
30 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education  diplomas  awarded  on  completion  of  professional  education  and 
training of at least three years' duration and held that confirmation of passing the ENSP 
final examination can be regarded as a diploma. Its equivalence to the qualification 
awarded by the Lisbon School must, therefore, be ascertained by the national court. 
The Court held that, if it transpires that the diplomas are awarded on completion of 
29   Ibid. 
30   Council  Directive  89/48/EEC  of  21  December  1988  on  a  general  system  for  the 
recognition  of  higher-education  diplomas  awarded  on  completion  of  professional 
education and training of at least three years' duration (OJ 1989 L 19, p. 16). Proceedings  Court of Justice
36
Court of Justice  Proceedings
37 28
equivalent education or training, the directive precludes the French authorities from 
making  the  access  of  a  Portuguese  national  to  the  profession  of  manager  in  the 
hospital public service subject to the condition that she complete the ENSP course and 
pass its final examination. The specific features of that method of recruitment which do 
not  allow  for  account  to  be  taken  of  specific  qualifications  in  the  field  of  hospital 
management of candidates who are nationals of other Member States place them at a 
disadvantage which is liable to dissuade them from exercising their rights, as workers, 
to  freedom  of  movement.  While  such  an  obstacle  to  a  fundamental  freedom 
guaranteed by the Treaty may be justified by an objective in the general interest, such 
as selection of the best candidates in the most objective conditions possible, it is a 
further condition that that restriction does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
that objective. The Court found that requiring candidates who are properly qualified to 
pass the ENSP entrance examination has the effect of downgrading them, which is not 
necessary to achieve the objective pursued and which cannot therefore be justified in 
the light of the Treaty provisions. It therefore concluded that such an examination was 
incompatible with the EC Treaty. 
7.5. Case C-109/01 Akrich (judgment of 23 September 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR)  concerned  a  Moroccan  national  who  was  deported  twice  from  the  United 
Kingdom, returned there illegally and married a British citizen. He was again deported 
to Dublin in 1997, where his wife had been settled since June 1997 and had been 
employed from August 1997 to June 1998. Relying on its judgment in Case C-370/90 
Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, according to which Community law requires a Member State 
to grant leave to enter and reside in its territory to the spouse of a national of that State 
who has gone, with that spouse, to another Member State in order to work there as an 
employed person as envisaged by Article 39 EC and returns to establish himself or 
herself as envisaged by Article 43 EC in the territory of the State of which he or she is a 
national. Mr Akrich applied to the United Kingdom authorities for entry clearance as the 
spouse  of  a  person  settled  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  Court  pointed  out  that 
Community law, and, specifically, Regulation No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for 
workers
31 covers only freedom of movement within the Community and that it is silent 
as to the rights of a national of a non-Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen of 
the Union, in regard to access to the territory of the Community. In order to benefit from 
the right to settle with that citizen of the Union, that spouse must, according to the 
Court, be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another Member State 
to which the citizen of the Union is migrating. The Court stated that the same applied 
where a citizen of the Union, married to a national of a non-Member State returns to 
the  Member  State  of  which  he  or  she  is  a  national  in  order  to  work  there  as  an 
employed person. 
31   See footnote 28. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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As regards, next, the question of the abuse with which Mr and Mrs Akrich are charged 
in  that  their  move  to  Ireland  was  no  more  than  a  temporary  absence  deliberately 
designed to manufacture a right of residence for Mr Akrich and thereby to evade the 
provisions  of  the  United  Kingdom's  national  legislation,  the  Court  recalled  that  the 
motives of a citizen seeking work in a Member State are not relevant in assessing the 
legal situation of the couple at the time of their return to the Member State of origin. 
Such conduct cannot constitute an abuse even if the spouse did not, at the time when 
the  couple  installed  itself  in  another  Member  State,  have  a  right  to  remain  in  the 
Member  State  of  origin.  The  Court  considered  that  there  would  be  an  abuse  if 
Community rights were invoked in the context of marriages of convenience entered into 
in order to circumvent the national immigration rules. The Court observed, finally, that 
where the marriage is genuine and where, on the return of the national of a Member 
State married to a national of a third country to his State of origin where the spouse 
does not enjoy Community rights, not having resided lawfully on the territory of another 
Member State, the authorities of the State of origin must none the less take account of 
the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. 
7.6. Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche (judgment of 6 November 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR) concerned a national of a Member State who worked for a temporary period 
of two and a half months in the territory of another Member State, of which he is not a 
national, and then applied for a study grant  from that Member State. The question 
therefore arose whether that national could be considered to have acquired the status 
of a worker within the meaning of Article 39 EC. 
Having observed that the concept of "worker" has a specific Community meaning and 
must not be interpreted narrowly, the Court pointed out that the fact that employment is 
of short duration cannot, in itself, exclude that employment from the scope of Article 39 
EC. Employment such as that at issue can confer the status of a worker provided that 
the activity performed as an employed person is not purely marginal and ancillary. It is 
for  the  national  court  to  carry  out  the  examinations  of  fact  necessary  in  order  to 
determine whether that is so in the case before it. Factors relating to the conduct of the 
person  concerned  before  and  after  the  period  of  employment  are  not  relevant  in 
establishing the status of worker within the meaning of Article 39 EC. 
In the same case, the Court held that a Community national who has the status of a 
migrant worker for the purposes of Article 39 EC, is not voluntarily unemployed, within 
the  meaning  established  by  the  relevant  case-law  of  the  Court,  solely  because  his 
contract of employment, from the outset concluded for a fixed term, has expired. 
7.7. In case C-257/00 Givane [2003] ECR I-345, the Court was called upon to interpret 
the  first  indent  of  Article 3(2)  of  Regulation  No 1251/70  on  the  right  of  workers  to Proceedings  Court of Justice
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remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State,
32
which provides that the members of the family of a worker who died during his working 
life before acquiring the right to remain in the territory of the host Member State are 
entitled to remain there permanently if that worker had continuously lived in the territory 
of the Member State for at least two years. The Court ruled that the two-year period of 
continuous residence must immediately precede the worker's death. 
8.  On  the  freedom  to  provide  services,  the  Court  ruled  amongst  other  things  on 
discriminatory Italian charges for access to museums (8.1), the requirement for prior 
authorisation of the reimbursement of medical costs incurred in a Member State other 
than  the  State  of  affiliation  (8.2  and  8.3),  difference  in  treatment  in  relation  to 
complementary  retirement  insurance  policies  taken  out  in  different  Member  States 
(8.4),  the  prohibition,  without  prior  authorisation,  of  certain  activities  concerning  the 
taking  of  bets  across  national  borders  (8.5  and  8.6)  and  the  limitation  of  the 
reimbursement  of  the  fees  of  lawyers  established  in  other  Member  States  to  the 
amount prescribed by the fee scales applicable to domestic lawyers (8.7). 
8.1. First, the Court held, in Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-721, that 
Italian  legislation  whereby  local  authorities  or  decentralised  national  ones  reserved 
reduced-price access to museums and monuments for persons, aged over 60 or 65, 
who were Italian nationals or residents within the territory of the authorities managing 
the  cultural  installation  in  question,  to  the  exclusion  of  tourists  from  other  Member 
States  and  non-residents  who  satisfied  the  same  objective  age  conditions,  was 
incompatible with Articles 12 EC and 49 EC. The Court followed its previous case-law, 
particularly Case C-45/93 Commission v Spain [1994] ECR I-911, in which it held that 
national  legislation  on  access  to  museums  in  a  Member  State  which  discriminates 
against foreign tourists alone is prohibited by Articles 12 EC and 49 EC. Referring to its 
judgments in Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035 and Case C-224/97 
Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, the Court reiterated that the principle of equality of treatment 
prohibits  not  only  obvious  discrimination  based  on  nationality  but  also  all  forms  of 
hidden discrimination, as in the case of a measure which risks operating primarily to 
the detriment of nationals of other Member States. 
Moreover,  neither  the  need  to  preserve  the  coherence  of  the  tax  system  nor  the 
considerations of an economic nature put forward by the Italian government fell within 
the exceptions allowed by Article 46 EC in circumstances where there was no direct 
link between taxation of any kind and the application of preferential rates for admission 
to  the  museums  and  public  monuments.  Nor,  finally,  could  a  Member  State  plead 
conditions existing within its own legal system in order to justify its failure to comply 
with obligations arising under Community law. 
32   Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State (OJ L 142, p. 24). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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8.2. Case  C-385/99  Müller-Fauré  and  van  Riet  [2003]  ECR  I-4509  follows  Cases 
C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-5473, and C-157/99 
Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, but differs from Decker and Kohll in that it 
reasons in the context of national social security legislation based on the system of 
benefits in kind, whereas the former judgments dealt with the question whether it was 
in conformity with Community law to require prior authorisation in order to be able to 
reimburse a socially insured person in respect of medical costs incurred in a Member 
State other than that of affiliation in the context of a social security system based on the 
reimbursement of health costs incurred by affiliated persons. 
Müller-Fauré and van Riet begins by confirming the position in principle expressed in 
Smits and Peerbooms to the effect that national legislation which makes repayment of 
medical expenses incurred in a Member State other than that of affiliation subject to a 
requirement  of  prior  authorisation,  issued  only  in  the  case  of  medical  necessity, 
constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services. 
Subsequently,  in  order  to  establish  whether  or  not  such  legislation  was  objectively 
justified, the judgment distinguishes between hospital care and non-hospital care. 
Concerning  hospital  care,  making  it  subject  to  prior  acceptance  of  financial 
responsibility  by  the  national  social  security  system  in  cases  where  such  care  was 
provided in a Member State other than that of affiliation was, in the Court's view, a 
measure both reasonable and necessary so as not to compromise the planning of such 
care  operated  through  the  system  of  health  service  agreements  (Smits  and 
Peerbooms).  That  planning  is  designed  both  to  ensure  that  there  is  sufficient  and 
permanent accessibility to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment and to 
control costs, preventing, as far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and 
human resources. The Court did, however, go on to hold that, for the system of prior 
authorisation to be capable of operating, the conditions placed on the granting of such 
authorisation must be justified and satisfy the requirement of proportionality. Similarly, 
a  scheme  of  prior  administrative  authorisation  could  not  legitimise  discretionary 
decisions  taken  by  the  national  authorities  which  were  liable  to  negate  the 
effectiveness of Community law provisions on the freedom to provide services. Such a 
scheme therefore had to be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which were 
known  in  advance,  in  such  a  way  as  to  circumscribe  the  exercise  of  the  national 
authorities'  discretion,  so  that  it  was  not  used  arbitrarily  (Smits  and  Peerbooms).
Finally,  still  following  Smits  and  Peerbooms,  the  Court  held  that  a  condition  that 
treatment  must  be  necessary  may  be  justified  under  Article 49  EC  provided  that  is 
interpreted as meaning that prior authorisation may be refused only where treatment 
which is the same or equally effective for the patient can be obtained without undue 
delay,  within  the  State  of  affiliation,  from  an  establishment  with  which  the  insured 
person's sickness insurance fund has an agreement. Proceedings  Court of Justice
40
Court of Justice  Proceedings
41 32
Concerning non-hospital care, the Court held that the information in the documents 
brought before it for assessment did not demonstrate that removing the requirement for 
prior  authorisation  would  cause  cross-border  movements  of  patients  so  large  as 
seriously to undermine the financial stability of the social security system and thereby 
threaten  the  overall  level  of  public  health  protection.  Furthermore,  such  care  is 
generally  provided  near  to  the  place  where  the  patient  resides,  in  a  cultural 
environment which is familiar to him and which allows him to build up a relationship of 
trust  with  the  doctor  treating  him.  Those  factors  were  likely  to  limit  any  possible 
financial  impact  on  the  national  social  security  system  in  question  of  removing  the 
requirement for prior authorisation in respect of care provided in foreign practitioners' 
surgeries. Bearing in mind that it was for the Member States alone to determine the 
extent of the sickness cover available to insured persons, and finding that, in this case, 
the actual amount in respect of which reimbursement was sought was relatively small 
(paragraph  106),  the  Court  concluded  that  removing  the  requirement  for  prior 
authorisation issued by sickness funds to their insured persons, so as to enable them 
to benefit from such healthcare provided in a Member State other than the State of 
affiliation, was not likely to undermine the essential features of the sickness insurance 
scheme  in  question.  The  system  requiring  such  prior  authorisation  was  therefore 
incompatible with Article 59 EC. 
8.3. Some of the assessments made in that judgment are repeated in Case C-56/01 
Inizan (judgment of 23 October 2003, not yet published in the ECR). That judgment 
ruled as to whether the system established by Article 22(1)(c)(i) and (2) of Regulation 
No 1408/71,
33  requiring  that  the  competent  social  security  institution  give  prior 
authorisation before assuming financial responsibility for benefits in kind provided to 
the affiliated person on its behalf by the institution of the place of stay or residence 
situated in a Member State, and also making the grant of such authorisation subject to 
conditions, was compatible with Articles 49 and 50 EC. 
Having reaffirmed the conditions under which, in accordance with the judgments in 
Kohll, Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, Article 49 EC precludes a 
system of prior authorisation established by national legislation, the Court held that, 
given that that provision did not in any way prevent the reimbursement by Member 
States of costs incurred on the occasion of care provided in another Member State, 
even in the absence of prior authorisation, and that the competent national institution 
cannot refuse such authorisation where the two conditions in the second paragraph of 
the latter are met, Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 contributes to facilitating the free 
movement of socially insured persons. 
33   Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 1408/71  of  14  June  1971  on  the  application  of  social 
security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of 
their families moving within the Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1971 (II), p. 
416), as amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 
1996 (OJ 1997 L 28, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The  judgment  then  examined  the  compatibility  of  the  conditions  for  granting  prior 
authorisation, to which national legislation makes reimbursement of care costs incurred 
in a Member State other than the affiliated person's State of residence subject, with 
Article 22(1)(c)(i) and (2) of Regulation No 1408/71 and Articles 49 EC and 50 EC. 
Concerning  Regulation  No 1408/71,  the  Court  observed  that,  amongst  those 
conditions, the one stipulating that the treatment which the patient intends to undergo 
in a Member State other than that in which he resides must not be capable of being 
given to him within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question 
in the Member State of residence taking account of his current state of health and the 
probable course of the disease is not fulfilled whenever it appears that an identical 
course of treatment, or one with the same degree of effectiveness for the patient, may 
be obtained in time in the Member State of residence. In assessing whether that is the 
case, the competent institution is required to take into account all the circumstances of 
each particular case, paying due regard not only to the medical situation of the patient 
at the time authorisation is applied for and, where appropriate, to the degree of his pain 
or  the  nature  of  his  handicap,  which  might,  for  example,  make  it  impossible  or 
excessively difficult to work, but also to his previous history (Smits and Peerbooms and 
Müller-Fauré and van Riet).
Concerning Articles 49 EC and 50 EC, the judgment repeated the findings in Smits and 
Peerbooms  and  Müller-Fauré  and  van  Riet.  It  thus  held  that  those  findings  do  not 
preclude legislation of a Member State which, first, makes reimbursement of the cost of 
hospital care provided in a Member State other than that in which the insured person's 
sickness  fund  is  established  conditional  upon  prior  authorisation  by  that  fund  and, 
secondly,  makes  the  grant  of  that  authorisation  subject  to  the  condition  that  it  be 
established that the insured person could not receive within the territory of the Member 
State  where  the  fund  is  established  the  treatment  appropriate  to  his  condition. 
However, authorisation may be refused on that ground only if treatment which is the 
same or equally effective for the patient can be obtained without undue delay in the 
territory of the Member State in which he resides. 
8.4. The judgment in Case C-422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt [2003] ECR I-6817, ruled 
on the compatibility with Article 49 EC of Swedish legislation which provided that, in 
order to be capable of being regarded as an old-age insurance and thus conferring 
entitlement to immediate deduction from an employer's taxable income of contributions 
paid in respect of such insurance, an insurance policy had to be taken out with an 
insurer established in Sweden, whereas, if taken out with an insurer of another Member 
State, it was regarded as a capital life assurance policy, conferring a right to deduction 
only at the time of payment of the pension to the employee in question. The Court 
found that the disadvantage to the employer in financial terms in the postponement of 
the  right  to  deduction  introduced  a  difference  in  tax  treatment  incompatible  with 
Article 49 EC. That difference was liable both to dissuade Swedish employers from 
taking out complementary pension insurance with companies established in a Member 
State other than Sweden and to dissuade those companies from offering their services Proceedings  Court of Justice
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on the Swedish market. None of the justifications for that system put forward by the 
Swedish government, concerning coherence of the tax system, the effectiveness of tax 
controls, the need to preserve the tax base and competitive neutrality were accepted 
by the Court. 
8.5. Case C-243/01 Gambelli (judgment of 6 November 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR),  ruled  that  Italian  legislation  which  made  it  punishable  as  a  criminal  offence, 
without a concession or licence from the State, to collect, accept, register or transmit 
proposed bets, particularly on sporting events via the internet, was contrary to Articles 
43 EC and 49 EC. The judgment referred to the fact that the participation of nationals 
of a Member State in a lottery operated in another Member State relates to a "service" 
within the meaning of Article 50 EC, and transposed the case-law concerning services 
which  a  provider  offered  by  telephone  to  potential  recipients  established  in  other 
Member States and provided by him without moving from the Member State in which 
he was established (Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141) to services 
offered by internet. The prohibition on receiving such services and the prohibition on 
intermediaries facilitating the provision of betting services on sporting events organised 
by  a  provider  established  in  a  Member  State  other  than  the  one  in  which  those 
intermediaries did business constituted restrictions on the freedom to provide services. 
However, moral, religious and cultural factors, and the morally and financially harmful 
consequences for the individual and society associated with gaming and betting, could 
serve  to  justify  the  existence  on  the  part  of  the  national  authorities  of  a  margin  of 
appreciation sufficient to enable them to determine what consumer protection and the 
preservation of public order require. In order to be justified, those restrictions must be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest, be suitable for achieving the 
objective which they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
They must in any event be applied without discrimination. 
8.6. Case C-289/03 Lindman (judgment of 13 November 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR) also dealing with the cross-border aspects of games and bets, established that 
Article 49  EC  precludes  the  legislation  of  a  Member  State,  in  this  case  Finnish 
legislation, which provides that winnings arising from games of chance organised in 
other Member States are regarded as income of the winner which is liable to income 
tax, whereas gains arising from games of chance organised in the Member State in 
question are not taxable. 
8.7. Case C-289/02 AMOK (judgment of 11 December 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR), considered the question whether Articles 49 EC and 12 EC preclude a national 
legal practice limiting any claim for reimbursement of the costs of the services of a 
lawyer of a different Member State in domestic proceedings to the sum of the costs 
which would have been incurred in the case of representation by a domestic lawyer. 
The Court noted that the third paragraph of Article 50 EC provides that a person who Proceedings  Court of Justice
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provides services across national borders may carry on business in the country where 
the service is provided "under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its 
own nationals", and that that rule was transposed in Directive 77/249 
34 to facilitate the 
effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services with the exception of "any 
conditions requiring residence, or registration with a professional organisation, in that 
State". The Community legislature had therefore taken the view that, apart from the 
exceptions  expressly  mentioned,  all  other  conditions  and  rules  in  force  in  the  host 
country  might  apply  to  the  transfrontier  provision  of  services  by  a  lawyer.  The 
reimbursement of the fees of a lawyer established in a Member State might therefore 
also be made subject to the rules applicable to lawyers established in another Member 
State. That solution was, moreover, the only one which complied with the principle of 
predictability, and thus of legal certainty, for a party which entered into proceedings and 
thus incurred the risk of having to bear the costs of the other party in the event of being 
unsuccessful (paragraph 30). The Court observed, however, that the fact that the party 
which has been successful in a dispute and which has been represented by a lawyer 
established  in  another  Member  State  cannot  also  obtain  reimbursement,  from  the 
unsuccessful party, of the fees of the lawyer practising before the court seised and to 
whom the successful party has had recourse, on the ground that such costs are not 
regarded as being necessary, is liable to make the transfrontier provision by a lawyer of 
his services less attractive. Such a solution may have a deterrent effect capable of 
affecting  the  competitiveness  of  lawyers  in  other  Member  States.  Even  if  the 
appointment of a lawyer practising before the court seised is a mandatory requirement 
resulting  from  harmonisation  measures  and  therefore  falls  outside  the  will  of  the 
parties, it cannot be inferred therefrom that the additional associated costs must be 
attributed automatically and in every case to the party which had recourse to the lawyer 
established  in  another  Member  State,  irrespective  of  whether  that  party  has  been 
successful  in  the  dispute.  On  the  contrary,  the  obligation  to  have  recourse  to  the 
services of a lawyer practising before the court seised means that the resulting costs 
will be necessary for the purposes of appropriate legal representation. The general 
exclusion of those costs from the amount to be reimbursed by the unsuccessful party 
would penalise the successful party, with the effect of strongly discouraging parties to 
legal proceedings from having recourse to lawyers established in other Member States. 
The freedom of such lawyers to provide their services would thereby be obstructed and 
the harmonisation of the sector, as initiated by the directive, adversely affected. 
9.  On  the  matter  of  freedom  of  establishment,  most  noteworthy  were  a  series  of 
judgments on the mutual recognition of university degrees and courses of professional 
training (9.1 to 9.3), a judgment on the mutual recognition of driving licences issued by 
other Member States (9.4), and a judgment on the conformity with Community law of 
an  obligation  under  Netherlands  law  to  describe  a  company  as  a  "formally  foreign 
company" when registering it in the register of commerce. 
34   Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by 
lawyers of freedom to provide services (OJ 1977 L 78, p. 17). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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9.1. The judgment in Case C-110/01 Tennah-Durez [2003] ECR I-6239, concerned the 
part of a doctor's training carried out in Algeria, subsequently recognised in Belgium, 
and  which  the  person  concerned  sought  to  have  recognised  in  France.  The  Court 
began by stating that Directive 93/16 
35 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and 
the  mutual  recognition  of  their  diplomas,  certificates  and  other  evidence  of  formal 
qualifications establishes automatic and unconditional recognition of certain diplomas, 
requiring  Member  States  to  acknowledge  their  equivalence  without  being  able  to 
demand that the persons concerned comply with conditions other than those laid down. 
It went on to draw a distinction between that system and the system laid down by 
Directive 89/48, 
36 where recognition is not automatic but allows Member States to 
require  the  person  concerned  to  fulfil  additional  requirements,  including  a  period  of 
adaptation. Concerning the extent to which medical training may consist of training 
received in a non-member country, the Court held that the directive did not require all 
or any particular part of that training to be provided at a university of a Member State or 
under the supervision of such a university, and that neither did the general scheme of 
the  directive  preclude  medical  training  leading  to  a  diploma,  certificate  or  other 
evidence  of  a  medical  qualification  eligible  for  automatic  recognition  from  being 
received partly outside the Community. According to the Court, what mattered was not 
where the training had been provided but whether it complied with the qualitative and 
quantitative  training  requirements  laid  down  by  Directive  93/16.  Moreover, 
responsibility  for  ensuring  that  the  training  requirements,  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative, laid down by Directive 93/16 were fully complied with fell wholly on the 
competent  authority  of  the  Member  State  awarding  the  diploma.  A  diploma  thus 
awarded amounted to a "doctor's passport" enabling the holder to work as a doctor 
throughout the European Union, without the professional qualification attested to by the 
diploma being open to challenge in the host State except in specific circumstances laid 
down  by  Community  law.  Consequently,  provided  the  competent  authority  in  the 
Member  State  awarding  the  diploma  was  in  a  position  to  validate  medical  training 
received in a third country and to conclude on that basis that the training duly complied 
with the training requirements laid down by Directive 93/16, that training could be taken 
into  account  in  deciding  whether  to  award  a  doctor's  diploma.  In  that  respect,  the 
proportion of the training carried out in a non-member country, and in particular the fact 
that the major part of the training was received in such a country, is immaterial. In the 
first place, Directive 93/16 contains no reference or even allusion to such a criterion. 
Moreover,  a  requirement  for  training  to  have  been  received  mainly  within  the 
Community would undermine legal certainty, since such a concept is open to several 
35   Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the 
mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications 
(OJ 1993 L 165, p. 1).
36   Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of 
higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at 
least three years' duration (OJ 1989 L 19, p. 16).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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interpretations. The Court concluded that the training in question could consist, and 
even  mainly  consist,  of  training  received  in  a  non-member  country,  provided  the 
competent authority of the Member State awarding the diploma was in a position to 
validate  the  training  and  to  conclude  on  that  basis  that  it  duly  served  to  meet  the 
requirements for the training of doctors laid down by the directive. As for the extent to 
which national authorities are bound by a certificate certifying conformity of the diploma 
with the requirements of the directive, the Court held that the system of automatic and 
unconditional recognition would be seriously jeopardised if it were open to Member 
States at their discretion to question the merits of a decision taken by the competent 
institution  of  another  Member  State  to  award  the  diploma.  However,  where  new 
evidence cast serious doubt on the authenticity of the diploma presented, or as to its 
conformity with the applicable legislation, it was legitimate for Member States to require 
from  the  competent  institution  of  the  Member  State  which  awarded  the  diploma 
confirmation of its authenticity. 
9.2.  In  Case  C-313/01  Morgenbesser  (judgment  of  13  November  2003,  not  yet 
published  in  the  ECR),  the  Court  examined  whether  Community  law  precluded  the 
authorities  of  a  Member  State  from  refusing  to  enrol  the  holder  of  a  legal  diploma 
obtained in another Member State in the register of persons undertaking the necessary 
period of practice for admission to the bar solely on the ground that it was not a legal 
diploma issued or confirmed by a university of the first State. The Court began by ruling 
that Directives 98/5 
37 and 89/48 did not apply in such a situation. The former did not 
apply because it concerned only lawyers fully qualified as such in their Member State 
of  origin  and  did  not  therefore  apply  to  persons  who  had  not  yet  acquired  the 
professional  qualification  necessary  to  carry  out  the  profession  of  lawyer.  Directive 
89/48 did not apply to activities which were limited in time and constituted the practical 
part of the training necessary for access to the profession of "avvocato", that part not 
being capable of being described as a "regulated profession" within the meaning of that 
directive. The judgment went on to find that Community law precluded the authorities of 
a Member State from refusing to enrol the holder of a legal diploma obtained in another 
Member State in the register of persons undertaking the necessary period of practice 
for admission to the bar solely on the ground that it was not a legal diploma issued or 
confirmed by a university of the first State. Whilst recognition, for academic and civil 
purposes, of the equivalence of a diploma obtained in one Member State might be 
relevant, and even decisive, for enrolment with the bar of another Member State (Case 
71/76 Thieffry [1977] ECR 765), it did not follow that it was necessary to examine the 
academic equivalence of the diploma relied upon by the person concerned in relation 
to the diploma normally required of nationals of that State. The diploma of the person 
concerned, such as, in this case, the maîtrise en droit granted by a French university, 
37   Directive  98/5/EC  of  the  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  February  1998  to  facilitate 
practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in 
which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L 77, p. 36).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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had to be taken into account in the context of the assessment of the whole of the 
training, academic and professional, which that person was able to demonstrate. It was 
the duty of the competent authority to examine, in accordance with the principles set 
out in the judgments in Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR I-2357 and Case 
C-234/97 Fernández de Bobadilla [1999] ECR I-4773, whether, and to what extent, the 
knowledge  certified  by  the  diploma  granted  in  another  Member  State  and  the 
qualifications or professional experience obtained there, together with the experience 
obtained  in  the  Member  State  in  which  the  candidate  seeks  enrolment,  must  be 
regarded as satisfying, even partially, the conditions required for access to the activity 
concerned.
9.3. In Case C-152/02 Neri (judgment of 13 November 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR), the Court held that an Italian administrative practice refusing to recognise post-
secondary university diplomas issued by a British university in circumstances where 
the courses were given in Italy by an educational establishment operating in the form of 
a capital company in accordance with an agreement between the two establishments 
was incompatible with Article 43 EC. In the view of the Court, Article 43 EC requires the 
elimination  of  restrictions  on  freedom  of  establishment,  whether  they  prohibit  the 
exercise  of  that  freedom,  impede  it  or  render  it  less  attractive  (Case  C-145/99 
Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-2235). Non-recognition in Italy of degrees likely to 
facilitate the access of students to the employment market is likely to deter students 
from  attending  courses  and  thus  seriously  hinder  the  pursuit  by  the  educational 
establishment  concerned  of  its  economic  activity  in  that  Member  State.  Moreover, 
inasmuch as non-recognition of diplomas relates solely to degrees awarded to Italian 
nationals,  it  does  not  appear  suitable  for  attaining  the  objective  of  ensuring  high 
standards  of  university  education.  Similarly,  precluding  any  examination  and, 
consequently,  any  possibility  of  recognition  of  degrees  does  not  comply  with  the 
requirement  of  proportionality  and  goes  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  ensure  the 
objective pursued. It cannot therefore be justified. 
9.4. In its judgment in Case C-246/00 Commission v Netherlands [2003] ECR I-7504, 
the Court recalled, first, that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/439 
38 lays down the principle of 
mutual recognition of driving licences issued by the various Member States, and that, 
according to consistent case-law, that recognition, which must be without any formality 
"is a precise and unconditional obligation and the Member States have no discretion as 
to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with the requirement" (paragraph 61). 
In this case, the Court established that the holder of a driving licence issued by another 
Member State who has been resident in the Netherlands for over a year is deemed to 
have committed an offence which is subject to a fine if he drives a vehicle without 
having registered his driving licence in the Netherlands. In that respect, the Court held 
that, where registration of a driving licence issued by another Member State becomes 
38   Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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an  obligation,  that  registration  must  be  regarded  as  constituting  a  formality  and  is 
therefore contrary to Article 1(2) of the directive. 
The Court further stated that the measures adopted by a Member State to avail itself of 
the possibility offered by the directive of applying to the holder of a driving licence 
issued  by  another  Member  State  who  takes  up  residence  in  the  Netherlands  its 
national  rules  on  the  period  of  validity  of  the  licences,  medical  checks  and  tax 
arrangements  and  to  enter  on  the  licence  the  information  indispensable  for 
administration  must  not  hinder  or  make  less  attractive  for  Community  nationals  the 
exercise of their right to free movement and freedom of establishment and, where they 
none the less do so, those measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, 
be justified by imperative reasons of public interest, be appropriate for guaranteeing the 
attainment of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective.
9.5.  Finally,  Case  C-167/01  Inspire  Art  (judgment  of  30  September  2003,  not  yet 
published in the ECR) examined whether it was a breach of Articles 43 EC and 48 EC 
for Netherlands law to require, on the registration in the commercial register of the 
subsidiary  of  a  company,  established  in  another  Member  State  where  it  did  not 
genuinely carry on business in order to benefit from less strict rules there than the rules 
of the State of establishment of the subsidiary, that the company describe itself as a 
"formally foreign company", thereby entailing obligations additional to those weighing 
on a company of that kind not obliged to describe itself in that way. The Court held that, 
even if the Netherlands legislative provision largely complied with Directive 89/666 
39
concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State 
other than the State of establishment (Eleventh Company Law Directive; "the Eleventth 
Directive"),  that  compliance  did  not  automatically  make  the  sanctions  attached  by 
Netherlands law to non-compliance with those measures compatible with Community 
law.  Article 10  EC  requires  Member  States  to  take  all  measures  necessary  to 
guarantee  the  application  and  effectiveness  of  Community  law,  and  in  particular  to 
ensure  that  infringements  of  Community  law  are  penalised  in  conditions  which  are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and 
importance and which make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive (Case 
68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965; Case C-326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR 
I-2911; Case C-36/94 Siesse [1995] ECR I-3573; Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime and 
Loten Navigation [1997] ECR I-1111). 
The judgment then noted that differences between the laws of the Member States on 
the subject of the disclosure required in respect of branches might interfere with the 
39   Eleventh  Council  Directive  89/666/EEC  of  21  December  1989  concerning  disclosure 
requirements in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company 
governed by the law of another State (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 36).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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exercise of the right of establishment, and that the harmonisation in relation to such 
disclosure  carried  out  by  the  Eleventh  Directive  was  exhaustive.  It  was  therefore 
contrary to Article 2 of the Eleventh Directive for Netherlands legislation to impose on 
the branch of a company formed in accordance with the laws of another Member State 
disclosure  obligations  not  provided  for  by  that  directive.  Those  obligations  concern 
recording  in  the  commercial  register  the  fact  that  the  company  is  formally  foreign, 
recording in the business register of the host Member State the date of first registration 
in the foreign business register and information relating to sole members, compulsory 
filing of an auditor's certificate to the effect that the company satisfies the conditions as 
to minimum capital, subscribed capital and paid-up share capital, and mention on all 
documents emanating from the company that it is a formally foreign company. 
Concerning Articles 43 EC and 48 EC, the Court stated that the fact that the parent 
establishment was formed for the purpose of circumventing Netherlands company law 
does not prevent that company's establishment of a branch in the Netherlands from 
benefiting  from  freedom  of  establishment.  The  question  of  the  application  of  those 
articles  is  different  from  the  question  whether  or  not  a  Member  State  may  adopt 
measures in order to prevent attempts by certain of its nationals improperly to evade 
domestic  legislation  (Case  C-212/97  Centros  [1999]  ECR  I-1459).  Mandatory 
application of the rules of Netherlands company law on minimum capital and directors' 
liability to foreign companies when they carry on their activities exclusively, or almost 
exclusively, in the Netherlands, so that creation of a branch in the Netherlands by a 
company of that kind is subject to certain rules enacted by that State in respect of the 
formation  of  a  limited-liability  company,  has  the  effect  of  impeding  the  exercise  by 
those companies of the freedom of establishment conferred by the Treaty. As to the 
possible existence of justification, the Court held that neither Article 46 EC, nor the 
protection of creditors, nor combating improper recourse to freedom of establishment, 
nor  safeguarding  fairness  in  business  dealings  or  the  efficiency  of  tax  inspections 
provided any justification for the hindrance to freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
the  Treaty  which  the  provisions  of  Netherlands  legislation  in  question  constituted. 
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC therefore precluded such national legislation. 
10. On the question of free movement of capital, four cases are worthy of attention: the 
first  two  concern  the  conditions  which  two  Member  States  place  on  the  transfer  of 
public  holdings  in  undertakings  (10.1),  whilst  the  second  two  concern,  respectively, 
national legislation on prior authorisation for acquisitions of unbuilt plots and national 
measures governing the acquisition of real property (10.2 and 10.3). 
10.1. Two judgments delivered on 13 May 2003 (Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain
[2003] ECR I-4581 and C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] I-4641 ("BAA")
form part of the series of judgments on "golden shares", delivered the previous year 
(Case  C-367/98  Commission v  Portugal  [2002]  ECR  I-4731,  Case  C-483/99 
Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, and Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium
[2002] ECR I-4809). The first examines Spanish legal arrangements for the disposal of 
public shareholdings in certain undertakings, requiring prior administrative authorisation Proceedings  Court of Justice
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for  decisions  of  commercial  undertakings  concerning  the  undertaking's  winding-up, 
demerger or merger, the disposal or charging of the assets or shareholdings necessary 
for the attainment of the undertaking's object, a change in the undertaking's object, and 
dealings in the share capital which result in the State's shareholding in the undertaking 
being reduced. The second judgment concerns aspects of the scheme for privatising 
the British Airports Authority with regard to limiting the possibility of acquiring voting 
shares in BAA and to the procedure requiring consent to disposal of the company's 
assets, to the control of subsidiaries and to the company's winding-up. Following the 
case-law  referred  to  above,  the  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  there  was  no 
discrimination  against  nationals  of  other  Member  States  on  the  ground  that  the 
prohibition laid down in Article 56 EC goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal 
treatment, on grounds of nationality, as between operators on the financial markets. 
The restrictions in question affected the position of a person acquiring a shareholding 
as such and were thus liable to deter investors from other Member States from making 
such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market. In the BAA judgment, 
the Court further held that the restrictions at issue did not arise as the result of the 
normal operation of company law, since the Member State acted in its capacity as a 
public  authority.  Consequently,  the  rules  at  issue  constituted  a  restriction  on  the 
movement of capital for the purposes of Article 56 EC, and, by maintaining them in 
force,  the  United  Kingdom  failed  to  fulfil  its  obligations  under  that  provision.  In 
Commission v Spain, having held that there was a restriction on movements of capital 
(paragraph 62), the Court examined whether there might be a justification for it. In that 
respect, it confirmed its previous case-law, whereby concerns which might justify the 
retention  by  Member  States  of  a  degree  of  influence  within  undertakings  that  were 
initially public and subsequently privatised cannot entitle Member States to plead their 
own systems of property ownership, referred to in Article 295 EC, by way of justification 
for obstacles, resulting from privileges attaching to their position as shareholder in a 
privatised undertaking, to the exercise of the freedoms provided for by the Treaty. Such 
justification  may  result  only  from  reasons  referred  to  in  Article 58(1)  EC  or  from 
overriding requirements of the general interest. Furthermore, in order to be so justified, 
the national legislation had to be suitable for securing the objective which it pursued 
and must not go beyond what was necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with 
the principle of proportionality. That was not the case here. In this case, the Court 
found that there were no objective, precise criteria sufficient to ensure that the scheme 
in question did not go beyond what was necessary in order to meet the objective of 
safeguarding supplies in the event of crisis in the petroleum, telecommunications and 
electricity sectors, and to ensure that the administrative authorities' particularly broad 
discretion in this area would remain under control. 
10.2. In the case of Salzmann, referred to in paragraph 3.1 above, the Court was called 
upon to examine, first, whether Article 56(1) EC precludes national legislation which 
makes the purchase of land subject to prior administrative authorisation and provides 
that, apart from cases where the acquisition is carried out with a view to establishing a 
holiday home, authorisation is to be granted for acquisitions of unbuilt plots of land 
where the acquirer has plausibly demonstrated that the plot will, within a reasonable Proceedings  Court of Justice
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time, be used in accordance with the local development plan or for public interest, 
charitable or cultural purposes. Secondly, in the event that such national legislation 
was precluded, the Court was called upon to determine whether such an authorisation 
requirement might nevertheless be covered by the derogation provided for in Article 70 
of  the  Act  of  Accession  of  Austria.  The  Court  held  that,  although  the  legal  regime 
applicable to property ownership is a field of competence reserved for the Member 
States  under  Article 295  EC,  it  is  not  exempted  from  the  fundamental  rules  of  the 
Treaty  (Case  C-302/97  Konle  [1999]  ECR  I-3099).  Thus,  national  measures  which 
regulated the acquisition of land for the purposes of prohibiting the establishment of 
secondary residences in certain areas had to comply with the provisions of the Treaty 
on the free movement of capital. The prior authorisation procedure restricts, by its very 
purpose,  the  free  movement  of  capital  (see  Joined  Cases  C-515/99,  C-519/99  to 
C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99 Reisch and Others [2002] ECR I-2157, paragraph 
32), and therefore falls within the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 56(1) EC. 
Concerning the question whether such a measure might nevertheless be permitted, 
provided that it pursued an objective in the public interest, the judgment confirmed the 
case-law in Reisch and Konle to the effect that restrictions on the establishment of 
secondary residences in a specific geographical area, which a Member State imposed 
in order to maintain, for town and country planning purposes, a permanent population 
and  an  economic  activity  independent  of  the  tourist  sector,  might  be  regarded  as 
contributing to an objective in the public interest. However, in so far as it required the 
acquirer  to  produce  proof  of  the  future  use  of  the  land  he  was  acquiring,  such  a 
measure  allowed  the  competent  administrative  authority  considerable  latitude  which 
might be akin to a discretionary power, with the result that it could be applied in a 
discriminatory  way.  The  Court  found  that  the  condition  of  proportionality  was  not 
fulfilled  either.  A  procedure  simply  involving  a  declaration  might,  if  coupled  with 
appropriate legal instruments, make it possible to eliminate the requirement of prior 
authorisation  without  undermining  the  effective  pursuit  of  the  aims  of  the  public 
authorities, with the result that the prior authorisation procedure cannot be regarded as 
a  measure  strictly  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  the  town  and  country  planning 
objective pursued by the latter. 
10.3.  In  a  case  that  was  essentially  similar  (Case  C-452/01  Ospelt  and  Schlössle 
Weissenberg,  judgment  of  23  September  2003,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR),  but 
concerned a transaction between Liechtenstein nationals concerning a plot situated in 
Austria and subject to administrative authorisation, the Court reiterated that the scope 
of  national  measures  governing  the  acquisition  of  immovable  property  had  to  be 
assessed in the light of the Treaty provisions on the movement of capital. It went on to 
hold that rules such as Article 40 of, and Annex XII to, the EEA Agreement, prohibiting 
the restrictions on capital movements and the forms of discrimination specified in those 
provisions,  are,  so  far  as  concerns  relations  between  the  States  party  to  the  EEA 
Agreement, identical to those which Community law imposes with regard to relations 
between the Member States and must therefore be interpreted uniformly within the 
Member States. It would run counter to that objective as to uniformity of application of 
the  rules  relating  to  free  movement  of  capital  within  the  EEA  for  a  State  such  as Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Austria,  which  is  a  party  to  that  Agreement,  to  be  able  after  its  accession  to  the 
European Union to maintain legislation restricting that freedom vis-à-vis another State 
party to that Agreement by basing itself on Article 57 EC. It follows that rules which 
make transactions relating to agricultural and forestry plots subject to administrative 
controls must, where a transaction is in issue between nationals of States party to the 
EEA  Agreement,  be  assessed  in  the  light  of  Article 40  of  and  Annex  XII  to  that 
Agreement, which are provisions that have the same legal scope as the essentially 
identical provisions of Article 56 EC. 
As  for  whether  the  provisions  on  the  free  movement  of  capital  precluded  a  prior 
authorisation procedure for such acquisitions, the Court held that such a procedure 
might  be  allowed  provided  it  pursued  an  objective  in  the  public  interest  in  a 
non-discriminatory way and was proportionate. In this case, the Court found, first, that 
discrimination had not been established. Secondly, the national measures in question 
pursued  objectives  in  the  general  interest  −  preserving  agricultural  communities, 
maintaining a distribution of land ownership which allowed the development of viable 
farms and sympathetic management of green spaces and the countryside as well as 
encouraging a reasonable use of the available land, being objectives corresponding to 
those of the Common Agricultural Policy − which were capable of justifying restrictions 
of  the  freedom  of  capital  movements.  Thirdly,  concerning  the  condition  of 
proportionality, the principle of a sytem of prior authorisation cannot be challenged in 
so far as it seeks to ensure that land intended for agriculture continues to be used in 
that way under appropriate conditions. However, a condition that the acquirer must, in 
any event, farm the land himself as part of a holding in which he is also resident goes 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain the public-interest objectives and should 
therefore be regarded as incompatible with the freedom of movement of capital. 
11. In the area of transport policy, reference should first be made to Case C-445/00 
Austria v Council (judgment of 11 September 2003, not yet published in the ECR), 
concerning the system of ecopoints for heavy goods vehicles in transit across Austria. 
The  Court  first  held  that  the  provisions  of  Regulation  No 2012/2000, 
40 which  were 
designed to establish on a permanent basis the principle of spreading the reduction in 
ecopoints over a number of years, were incompatible with Annex 5, point 3, to Protocol 
No 9 to the Act of Accession of Austria, which provides that, in the event of reduction, 
the number of ecopoints is to be established for the following year. The Court drew 
attention to the fact that protocols and annexes to an Act of Accession are provisions of 
primary law which, unless the Act of Accession provides otherwise, can be suspended, 
40   Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2000 of 21 September 2000 amending Annex 4 to Protocol 
No 9 to the 1994 Act of Accession and Regulation (EC) No 3298/94 with regard to the system 
of ecopoints for heavy goods vehicles transiting through Austria (OJ 2000 L 241, p. 18).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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modified  or  abrogated  only  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  laid  down  for  the 
revision of the original treaties (paragraph 62). 
Concerning the provisions of the same regulation for the spreading over the years 2000 
to 2003 of the reduction in ecopoints made on account of the transit journey threshold 
provided for in Article 11 of Protocol No 9 to the Act of Accession of Austria having 
been exceeded in 1999, the Court held that the Council, faced with a situation in which 
reliable statistics had been transmitted late by the responsible national authorities, was 
justified in spreading the reduction in ecopoints beyond the end of the year following 
that  in  which  the  excess  was  established,  as  otherwise  applying  the  reduction  in 
ecopoints  solely  to  the  remaining  months  of  that  year  would  have  had  the 
disproportionate effect of stopping practically all transit traffic of goods by road through 
Austria, contrary to the fundamental principles of Community law. However, the Court 
held that to spread the reduction over a number of years would be contrary to the 
protocol. Moreover, the same illegality affected the provision of the regulation providing 
for the spreading of ecopoints between Member States. 
Finally, when considering the method used in the contested regulation to calculate the 
reduction in ecopoints, based on the actual level of NOx emission per heavy goods 
vehicle,  without  taking  "illegal"  journeys  into  consideration,  the  Court  held  that  that 
method complied both with the letter and with the spirit of Protocol No 9 to the Act of 
Accession  of  Austria.  The  protocol  is  concerned  with  the  average  level  of  NOx
emissions by heavy goods vehicles and not the fictitious calculation of a number of 
ecopoints. However, the Court held that a method of calculation which consisted in 
practice of dividing the total number of ecopoints used by the total number of journeys 
recorded, in circumstances where the total number of ecopoints used took no account 
of journeys for which the carrier should have used ecopoints but did not do so ("illegal" 
journeys) even though those "illegal" journeys were included in the total number of 
journeys made, did not comply with Annex 5, points 2 and 3 of that protocol. In any 
event, the Court decided that the effects of the annulled provisions of the regulation 
should be regarded as definitive. 
12. Two series of cases are worthy of note in the area of the competition rules: the first 
concerns the rules applicable to undertakings (12.1) and the second concerns State aid 
(12.2).
12.1. Concerning the first series, mention should be made of four cases. 
12.1.1. In Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (judgment of 9 September 
2003, not yet published in the ECR), the Court was asked to rule upon the scope of 
Article 81 EC where undertakings engaged in conduct contrary to Article 81(1) EC and 
where that conduct was required or facilitated by national legislation which legitimised 
or  reinforced  the  effects  of  the  conduct,  specifically  with  regard  to  price-fixing  or 
market-sharing arrangements. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The  Court  held  that,  faced  with  such  conduct,  a  national  competition  authority, 
entrusted inter alia with the task of ensuring compliance with 81 EC, was under an 
obligation to disapply that national legislation. Since that provision, in conjunction with 
Article 10 EC, imposes a duty on Member States to refrain from introducing measures 
contrary  to  the  Community  competition  rules,  those  rules  would  be  rendered  less 
effective if, in the course of an investigation under Article 81 EC into the conduct of 
undertakings, the authority were not able to declare a national measure contrary to the 
combined provisions of Articles 10 EC and 81 EC and if, consequently, it failed to 
disapply it. 
Nevertheless, if the general Community-law principle of legal certainty was not to be 
violated,  the  duty  of  national  competition  authorities  to  disapply  such  an  anti-
competitive law could not expose the undertakings concerned to any penalties, either 
criminal or administrative, in respect of past conduct where the conduct was required 
by the law concerned. The national authority could not therefore impose penalties on 
the undertakings concerned in respect of past conduct which had been required of 
them  by  that  national  legislation;  it  could,  however,  impose  penalties  on  such 
undertakings in respect of conduct subsequent to the decision finding infringement of 
Article 81 EC, once that decision had become definitive in their regard. 
The  Court  finally  stated  that,  in  any  event,  the  national  competition  authority  may 
impose penalties on the undertakings concerned in respect of past conduct where the 
conduct was merely facilitated or encouraged by the national legislation, whilst taking 
due  account  of  the  specific  features  of  the  legislative  framework  in  which  the 
undertakings  acted.  In  that  respect,  when  determining  the  level  of  the  penalty,  the 
conduct of those undertakings could be assessed in the light of the extenuating factor 
constituted by the national legal framework. 
12.1.2. In Case C-338/00 Volkswagen v Commission (judgment of 18 September 2003, 
not  yet  published  in  the  ECR),  the  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  of  the  Volkswagen 
Group  against  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  6  July  2000  in  Case 
T-62/98 Volkswagen v  Commission  [2000]  ECR II-2707,  which  in  turn  partially 
dismissed the action for annulment of the Commission's decision imposing a fine for 
infringement  of  Article 81  EC.  In  its  judgment,  the  Court  reaffirmed,  in  line  with  its 
judgment  in  Case  C-70/93  Bayerische  Motorenwerke  [1995]  ECR  I-3439,  that  a 
measure which was liable to partition the market between Member States could not 
come under those provisions of Regulation No 123/85 
41 that dealt with the obligations 
which  a  distributor  may  lawfully  assume  under  a  dealership  contract.  Although  that 
41   Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No 123/85  of  12  December  1984  on  the  application  of 
Article 8[8](3)  of  the  EEC  Treaty  to  certain  categories  of  motor  vehicle  distribution  and 
servicing agreements (OJ 1985 L 15, p. 16), replaced, as from 1 October 1995 by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 (OJ 1995 L 145, p. 25). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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regulation  provides  manufacturers  with  substantial  means  by  which  to  protect  their 
distribution systems, it does not authorise them to adopt measures which contribute to 
a partitioning of the market. 
The Court also considered that the Court of First Instance had correctly applied the 
case-law (particularly Bayerische Motorenwerke and Joined Cases 25/84 and 26/84 
Ford v Commission [1985] ECR 2725) whereby "a call by a motor vehicle manufacturer 
to  its  authorised  dealers  is  not  a  unilateral  act  which  falls  outside  the  scope  of 
Article 81(1) but is an agreement within the meaning of that provision if it forms part of 
a set of continuous business relations governed by a general agreement drawn up in 
advance". For a motor manufacturer to implement of policy of supply quotas on dealers 
with  a  view  to  blocking  re-exports  constitutes  not  a  unilateral  measure  but  an 
agreement within the meaning of that provision where, in order to impose that policy, 
the  manufacturer  uses  clauses  of  the  dealership  agreement,  such  as  that  enabling 
supplies to dealers to be limited, and thereby influences the commercial conduct of 
those dealers. 
12.1.3. In Case C-170/02 P Schlüsselvertrag J.S. Moser and Others v Commission
(judgment of 25 September 2003, not yet published in the ECR), the Court had to 
determine an appeal against the order of the Court of First Instance of 11 March 2002 
in  Case  T-3/02  Schlüsselverlag  J.S.  Moser  and  Others  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR 
II-1473,  dismissing  as  manifestly  inadmissible  an  action  for  a  declaration  that,  by 
unlawfully failing to adopt a decision on the compatibility of a concentration with the 
common market, the Commission had failed to act. 
The Court began by stating that the Commission cannot refrain from taking account of 
complaints from undertakings which are not party to a concentration capable of having 
a  Community  dimension.  Indeed,  the  implementation  of  such  a  transaction  for  the 
benefit of undertakings in competition with the complainants is likely to bring about an 
immediate change in the complainants' situation on the market or markets concerned. 
Nor, in the Court's view, could the Commission validly maintain that it was not required 
to take a decision on the very principle of its competence as supervising authority, 
when  it  is  solely  responsible,  under  Article 21  of  Regulation  No 4064/89 
42  on  the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, for taking, subject to review by the 
Court  of  Justice,  the  decisions  provided  for  by  that  regulation.  If  the  Commission 
refused  to  adjudicate  formally,  at  the  request  of  third-party  undertakings,  on  the 
question whether or not a concentration which has not been notified to it falls within the 
scope  of  the  regulation,  it  would  make  it  impossible  for  such  undertakings  to  take 
advantage  of  the  procedural  guarantees  which  the  Community  legislation  accords 
them. The Commission would, at the same time, deprive itself of a means of checking 
42   Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89  of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of 
concentrations between undertakings (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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that undertakings which are parties to a concentration with a Community dimension 
comply properly with their obligation to notify. Moreover, the complainant undertakings 
could not challenge, by means of an action for annulment, a refusal by the Commission 
to act which, as was stated in the previous paragraph, is likely to do them harm. Finally, 
nothing justifies the Commission in avoiding its obligation to undertake, in the interests 
of sound administration, a thorough and impartial examination of the complaints which 
are made to it. The fact that the complainants do not have the right, under Regulation 
No 4064/89,  to  have  their  complaints  investigated  under  conditions  comparable  to 
those for complaints within the scope of Regulation No 17,
43 does not mean that the 
Commission is not required to consider whether the matter is within its competence 
and to draw the necessary conclusions. It does not release the Commission from its 
obligation to give a reasoned response to a complaint that it has specifically failed to 
exercise its competence. 
The  Court  further  found  that,  in  this  case,  on  the  date  on  which  the  complainants 
lodged their complaint with the Commission, nearly four months had elapsed since the 
national  authorities'  decision  approving  completion  of  the  transaction.  The 
requirements of legal certainty and of continuity of Community action, which underlie 
both the fifth paragraph of Article 230 EC and Articles 4, 6 and 10(1), (3) and (6) of 
Regulation No 4064/89 would be disregarded if the Commission could, pursuant to the 
second paragraph of Article 232 EC, be requested to make a determination, outside a 
reasonable period, on the compatibility with the common market of a concentration 
which was not notified to it. Undertakings could thus lead the Commission to call in 
question  a  decision  taken  by  the  competent  national  authorities  with  regard  to  a 
concentration, even after the exhaustion of the possible legal remedies against such 
decision in the legal system of the Member State concerned. The Court concluded that 
a period of four months from the time when the competent national authority took its 
decision  on  the  concentration  operation  could  not  be  regarded  as  reasonable.  The 
applicants' action for failure to act was therefore manifestly inadmissible, and the Court 
dismissed their appeal. 
12.1.4.  In  Case  C-462/99  Connect  Austria  Gesellschaft  für  Telekommunikation  and 
Others [2003] ECR I-5197, two questions were referred for a preliminary ruling in a 
dispute  between  an  Austrian  telecommunications  undertaking  and  the  national 
regulatory  authority  with  responsibility  for  issuing  authorisations  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications services concerning the allocation to a public undertaking, which 
already held a licence to provide digital mobile telecommunications services over a 
frequency band, of additional frequencies in another band without imposing a separate 
fee.
43   Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962: First Regulation implementing Articles 
[81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87) Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The  Court  ruled  first  on  a  question  concerning  the  interpretation  of  Article 5a(3)  of 
Council  Directive  90/387 
44  on  the  establishment  of  the  internal  market  for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision. 
That  provides  that  Member  States  are  to  ensure  that  suitable  mechanisms  exist  at 
national level under which a party affected  by a decision of the national regulatory 
authority responsible for issuing authorisations for the provision of telecommunications 
services has a right of appeal to a body independent of the parties involved. However, 
under a provision of Austrian constitutional law, appeals alleging the unlawfulness of 
decisions by the Telekom-Control-Kommission, the Austrian regulatory authority, are 
inadmissible  because  that  provision  does  not  expressly  provide  for  them  to  be 
admissible.
The Court held that the requirement for national law to be interpreted in accordance 
with  Directive  90/387  and  the  requirement  that  the  rights  of  individuals  should  be 
effectively  protected  requires  national  courts  to  determine  whether  the  relevant 
provisions  of  their  national  law  provide  individuals  with  a  right  of  appeal  against 
decisions of the national regulatory authority which satisfies the criteria laid down in 
Article 5a(3) of that directive. If national law cannot be applied so as to comply with the 
requirements  of  that  article,  a  national  court  or  tribunal  which  satisfies  those 
requirements and which would be competent to hear appeals against decisions of the 
national regulatory authority if it were not prevented from doing so by a provision of 
national law explicitly excluding its competence is under an obligation to disapply that 
provision.
The  Court  then  answered  the  question  whether  Articles  82  EC  and  86(1)  EC, 
Article 2(3) and (4) of Directive 96/2, 
45 and Articles 9(2) and 11(2) of Directive 97/13 
46
had  to  be  interpreted  as  precluding  national  legislation  under  which  additional 
frequencies  in  a  frequency  band  may  be  allocated  to  a  public  undertaking  in  a 
dominant  position  which  already  holds  a  licence  to  provide  the  same 
telecommunications  services  in  another  band  without  imposing  a  separate  fee, 
whereas a new entrant to that market has had to pay a fee to obtain a licence to 
provide services in the first frequency band. The Court replied in the affirmative. 
44   Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision (OJ 1990 
L 192, p.1).
45   Commission  Directive  96/2/EC  of  16  January  1996  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with 
regard to mobile and personal communications (OJ 1996 L 20, p. 59).
46   Directive  97/13/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  10  April  1997  on  a 
common  framework  for  general  authorisations  and  individual  licences  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications services (OJ 1997 L 117, p. 15).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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The  Court  also  considered,  however,  that  those  provisions  did  not  preclude  such 
legislation if the fee imposed on the public undertaking in a dominant position for its 
licence, including the subsequent allocation without additional payment of additional 
frequencies, appeared to be equivalent in economic terms to the fee imposed on the 
new entrant. Concerning, more particularly, the case of Article 2(3) and (4) of Directive 
96/2, the Court held that those provisions do not preclude legislation allowing such a 
limited allocation of additional frequencies after at least three years have elapsed since 
the grant of the DCS 1800 licence or before the expiry of that period if the capacity of 
the public undertaking holding a GSM 900 licence to accept new customers has been 
exhausted despite the use of all commercially viable technical possibilities. 
12.2. On the matter of State aid, four cases are worthy of note. 
12.2.1. The first judgment to note is that in Joined Cases C-83/01 P, C-93/01 P and 
C-94/01 P Chronopost, La Poste and French Republic [2003] ECR I-7018, on an action 
brought by a trade association of companies offering express courier services against a 
Commission decision declaring that the logistical and commercial assistance given by 
the French Post Office (La Poste) to a private company to which it had entrusted the 
management of its express courier service did not constitute State aid. In its judgment 
of 14 December 2000 in Case T-613/97 Ufex and Others [2000] ECR II-4055, the Court 
of First Instance annulled that decision on the ground that the Commission should have 
examined whether those full costs took account of the factors which an undertaking 
acting  under  normal  market  conditions  should  have  taken  into  consideration  when 
fixing the remuneration for the services provided. 
Hearing the case on appeal, the Court considered at the outset that that assessment 
by the Court of First Instance failed to take account of the fact that an undertaking such 
as La Poste was in a situation very different from that of a private undertaking acting 
under  normal  market  conditions.  La  Poste  had  had  to  acquire  substantial 
infrastructures and resources to enable it to carry out its task of providing a service of 
general  economic  interest  within  the  meaning  of  Article 86  EC,  even  in  sparsely 
populated areas where the tariffs did not cover the cost of providing the service in 
question. The creation and maintenance of the basic postal network were not in line 
with a purely commercial approach. The Court then held that the provision of logistical 
and commercial assistance was inseparably linked to that network, since it consisted 
precisely in making available that network which had no equivalent on the market. 
The Court therefore concluded that, in the absence of any possibility of comparing the 
situation of La Poste with that of a private group of undertakings not operating in a 
reserved  sector,  “normal  market  conditions”,  which  are  necessarily  hypothetical, 
allowing it to be determined whether the provision by a public undertaking of logistical 
and  commercial  assistance  to  its  private-law  subsidiary  was  capable  of  constituting 
State aid, had to be assessed by reference to the objective and verifiable elements 
which were available. The costs borne by La Poste in providing such assistance could Proceedings  Court of Justice
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constitute  such  objective  and  verifiable  elements.  On  that  basis,  there  could  be  no 
question of State aid to the subsidiary if, first, it were established that the price charged 
properly covered all the additional, variable costs incurred in providing the logistical and 
commercial assistance, an appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from use 
of the postal network and an adequate return on the capital investment in so far as it 
was used for the subsidiary's competitive activity and if, secondly, there was nothing to 
suggest that those factors had been underestimated or fixed in an arbitrary fashion. 
12.2.2.  The  judgment  in  Case  C-280/00  Altmark  Trans  and  Regierungspräsidium 
Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7810, concerns the question whether State aid, within the 
meaning of the EC Treaty, covers public subsidies to allow the operation of regular 
urban, suburban or regional transport services. Examining first whether the condition 
that trade between Member States had to be affected was met, the Court emphasised 
that the latter did not depend on the local or regional character of the transport services 
supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned. Referring to its case-law 
describing State aid as an advantage granted to a beneficiary undertaking which the 
latter would not have obtained under normal market conditions, the Court emphasised 
that public subsidies such as those referred to above are not caught by Article 87(1) 
EC  where  such  subsidies  are  to  be  regarded  as  compensation  for  the  services 
provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations. 
The Court defined four conditions which had to be met for such compensation to be 
regarded as being present. First, the recipient undertaking must be actually required to 
discharge  public  service  obligations  and  those  obligations  must  have  been  clearly 
defined. Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated 
must have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner. Third, 
the compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs 
incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations. Fourth, where the 
undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen in a public 
procurement procedure, the level of compensation needed must have been determined 
on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  costs  which  a  typical  undertaking,  well  run  and 
adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary 
public  service  requirements,  would  have  incurred  in  discharging  those  obligations, 
taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations.
12.2.3.  In  Joined  Cases  C-261/01  and  C-262/01  Van  Calster  and  Cleeren  and 
Openbare Slachthuis (judgment of 21 October 2003, not yet published in the ECR) the 
Court analysed a number of questions referred for a preliminary ruling in relation to an 
aid measure which provided for a scheme of charges that formed an integral part of 
that measure and was intended specifically and exclusively to finance it. It first pointed 
out that a State aid measure in the narrow sense might not substantially affect trade 
between Member States and might thus be acknowledged as permissible, whilst the 
disturbance which it created was increased by a method of financing it which would 
render the scheme as a whole incompatible with a single market and the common Proceedings  Court of Justice
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interest.  The  Court  further  considered  that  where  a  charge  specifically  intended  to 
finance aid proved to be contrary to other provisions of the Treaty, for example Articles 
23 EC and 25 EC or Article 90 EC, the Commission could not declare the aid scheme 
of  which  the  charge  formed  part  to  be  compatible  with  the  common  market. 
Consequently,  the  method  by  which  an  aid  is  financed  could  render  the  entire  aid 
scheme  incompatible  with  the  common  market.  Therefore,  examination  of  an  aid 
measure could not be considered separately from the effects of its method of financing, 
and the Member State was therefore required in such a case to notify not only the 
planned aid in the narrow sense, but also the method of financing it. 
It follows that, where an aid measure of which the method of financing is an integral 
part has been implemented in breach of the obligation to notify, national courts must 
draw all the consequences under their national law concerning both the validity of the 
measures implementing the aid concerned and the recovery of the financial support 
granted and therefore, in principle, order reimbursement of charges or contributions 
levied specifically for the purpose of financing that aid. 
12.2.4. Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italian Republic and SIM 2 Multimedia v
Commission [2003] ECR I-4035 concerned, first, the position of a consumer electronics 
company  called  Seleco,  whose  capital  was  held,  inter  alia,  by  Friula,  a  finance 
company  entirely  controlled  by  the  region  of  Friuli  Venezia  Giulia,  and  by 
Ristruttorazione  Elettronica  (REL),  a  company  controlled  by  the  Italian  Ministry  of 
Industry,  Commerce  and  Craft  Trades,  and,  secondly,  the  position  of  the  company 
Multimedia created by Seleco. 
The first problem examined by the Court was whether interventions by Friula and REL 
in the recapitalisation operations of Seleco should be classified as State aid. 
Considering first the question whether Friula's operations had been carried out using 
State resources, the Court held that the financial resources of a private-law company 
such as Friulia, 87% of which was held by a public authority such as the Region of 
Friuli  Venezia  Giulia  and  which  acted  under  the  control  of  that  authority,  could  be 
regarded  as  State  resources  within  the  meaning  of  Article 87(1)  EC.  The  fact  that 
Friulia participated using its own funds was irrelevant in that regard, because for funds 
to be categorised as State resources it was sufficient that they constantly remain under 
public control and therefore available to the competent national authorities. 
Recalling that, pursuant to the principle that the public and private sectors are to be 
treated equally, capital placed directly or indirectly at the disposal of an undertaking by 
the State in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be 
regarded as State aid, the Court considered that it had to be determined whether, in 
similar  circumstances,  a  private  investor  of  a  dimension  comparable  to  that  of  the 
bodies managing the public sector could have been prevailed upon to make capital 
contributions of the same size, having regard in particular to the information available Proceedings  Court of Justice
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and foreseeable developments at the date of those contributions. Since that involved a 
complex economic appraisal, the Court had to limit its review to verifying whether the 
Commission complied with the relevant rules governing procedure and the statement of 
reasons, whether the facts on which the contested finding was based were accurately 
stated and whether there had been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of 
powers.  In  this  case,  it  concluded  that  the  Commission  was  right  to  hold  that  the 
interventions by REL and Friula in the recapitalisation operations of Seleco did indeed 
constitute State aid. 
The second problem which drew the Court's attention was that of recovering State aid 
from Multimedia, the question arising in this case being whether that company should 
also be considered as having been a beneficiary of the aid. Seleco had effectively 
created that company, concentrated its most profitable activities in it, and become its 
sole owner. It had then sold two thirds of the shares it held in Multimedia, the final third 
having been sold to a private company at a public sale by court order in the context of 
Seleco's liquidation. 
The Court held first that the possibility of a company in economic difficulties taking 
measures  to  rehabilitate  the  business  could  not  be  ruled  out  a  priori  because  of 
requirements relating to recovery of the aid which was incompatible with the common 
market.  However,  if  it  were  permissible,  without  any  condition,  for  an  undertaking 
experiencing difficulties and on the point of being declared bankrupt to create, during 
the formal inquiry into the aid granted it, a subsidiary to which it then transfers its most 
profitable assets before the conclusion of the inquiry, that would amount to accepting 
that any company may remove such assets from the parent undertaking when aid is 
recovered, which would risk depriving the recovery of that aid of its effect in whole or in 
part. In order to prevent the effectiveness of the decision to recover the aid from being 
frustrated and the market from continuing to be distorted, the Commission might be 
compelled  to  require  that  the  recovery  not  be  restricted  to  the  original  firm  but  be 
extended  to  the  firm  which  continued  the  activity  of  the  original  firm,  using  the 
transferred  means  of  production,  in  cases  where  certain  elements  of  the  transfer 
pointed to economic continuity between the two firms. 
In this case, however, the Court considered that the statement of reasons on which the 
contested decision was based was inadequate for the purposes of Article 253 EC, in 
particular in relation to the alleged irrelevance of the fact that the shares in Multimedia 
were bought at a price which seemed to be the market price, although that point was 
also  required  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  present  case.  The  Commission  had 
assumed that the price of the transfer of the multimedia branch was influenced and 
dictated by the risk for the parties that they might have to face a proceeding under 
Article 88(2) EC and eventually repay aid held to be unlawful, but it did not adduce any 
concrete evidence from which it might be inferred that the sworn expert took account of 
such a risk in his estimate of the value of the multimedia branch. Similarly, in reply to 
the Commission's contention that, whatever the price of the sale, it was not relevant in 
the present case, since it concerned an operation relating to the shares, the Court held Proceedings  Court of Justice
60
Court of Justice  Proceedings
61 53
that, whilst it was correct that the sale of shares in a company which is the beneficiary 
of unlawful aid by a shareholder to a third party does not affect the requirement for 
recovery, the situation at issue here was different from that case. This case involved 
the  sale  of  Multimedia  shares  by  Seleco,  which  created  that  company,  and  whose 
assets benefited from the sales price of the shares. Therefore, it could not be excluded 
that Seleco retained the benefit of the aid received from the sale of its shares at market 
price. The Court concluded by annulling the Commission's decision on that point. 
13. In the area of trade protection measures, two judgments are worthy of note (13.1 
and 13.2). 
13.1. In Case C-76/01 P Eurocoton (judgment of 30 September 2003, not yet published 
in  the  ECR),  the  Court  heard  an  appeal  against  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  First 
Instance  in  Case  T-213/97  Eurocoton  and  Others  v  Council  [2000]  ECR  II-3727, 
dismissing an action for the annulment of the "decision" of the Council of the European 
Union not to adopt a Commission proposal for a regulation imposing a definitive anti-
dumping  duty  on  imports  of  cotton  fabrics  from  certain  non-member  countries  as 
inadmissible.
Considering  first  the  question  whether  or  not  the  measure  concerned  was  open  to 
challenge, the Court held that failure to adopt a proposal submitted by the Commission 
for a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty, together with the expiry of the 
15-month  period  prescribed  in  Article 6(9)  of  the  basic  anti-dumping  regulation, 
Regulation No 384/96,
47 which definitively fixed the Council's position in the final phase 
of the anti-dumping proceeding, bore all the characteristics of a reviewable act within 
the  meaning  of  Article 230  EC,  in  that  it  produced  binding  legal  effects  capable  of 
affecting the interests of undertakings which had brought a complaint, at the origin of 
the anti-dumping inquiry, in the name of Community industry. It therefore annulled the 
judgment of the Court of First Instance. 
Considering next whether the Council, which had not indicated why the proposal for a 
regulation had been rejected, was in breach of its obligation to state reasons, the Court 
held that, from the time when under Article 9(4) of the basic antidumping regulation, 
Regulation  No 384/96,  the  Council  imposed  a  definitive  anti-dumping  regulation  in 
circumstances where the facts as finally established show that there was dumping and 
injury caused thereby, and the Community interest called for intervention in accordance 
with  Article 21  of  that  regulation,  compliance  with  the  obligation  to  state  reasons 
requires the act in question to indicate the absence of dumping or corresponding injury 
or  that  the  Community  interest  does  not call  for  intervention  on  its  part.  The  Court 
therefore annulled the Council's decision. 
47   Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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13.2. In Case C-76/00 P Petrotub and Republica v Council [2003] ECR I-79, the Court 
heard an appeal seeking the annulment of the judgment of the Court of First Instance 
in Joined Cases T-33/98 and T-34/98 Petrotub and Republica v Council [1999] ECR 
II-3837 dismissing the application by two companies established in Romania for the 
annulment  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 2320/97  imposing  definitive  anti-dumping 
duties  on  imports  of  certain  seamless  pipes  and  tubes  of  iron  or  non-alloy  steel 
originating in a number of countries including Romania. 
48
Petrotub first argued that the Court of First Instance had erred in law by holding that the 
obligation to state reasons was complied with even though the contested regulation 
contained  no  explanation  as  to  why,  in  order  to  establish  the  dumping  margin,  the 
Council  discarded  the  second  symmetrical  method  in  favour  of  the  asymmetrical 
method.
The Court upheld that argument, holding, first, that it was clear from the actual wording 
of Article 2(11) of the basic anti-dumping regulation, Regulation No 384/96, 
49 that the 
existence  of  a  dumping  margin  is  normally  to  be  established  using  one  of  the  two 
symmetrical  methods  and  that  recourse  to  the  asymmetrical  method,  by  way  of  an 
exception to that rule, may be had only on the twofold condition that, on the one hand, 
the pattern of export prices differs significantly among different purchasers, regions or 
time periods and, on the other hand, the symmetrical methods do not reflect the full 
degree  of  dumping  being  practised.  The  Court  further  took  the  view  that  it  was 
necessary to take account of Article 2.4.2 of the 1994 Anti-dumping Code 
50 in so far as 
that  provision  states  that  an  explanation  must  be  provided  as  to  why  significant 
differences in the pattern of export prices as among different purchasers, regions or 
time periods cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of the symmetrical 
methods. The Community adopted the basic regulation in order to satisfy its obligations 
arising from the 1994 Anti-dumping Code and, by means of Article 2(11) of the basic 
anti-dumping regulation, Regulation No 384/96, it intended to implement the particular 
obligations laid down by Article 2.4.2 of that code. The fact that it was not expressly 
specified  in  Article 2(11)  of  the  basic  regulation  that  the  explanation  required  by 
Article 2.4.2  of  the  1994  Anti-dumping  Code  had  to  be  given  by  the  Community 
48   Council Regulation (EC) No 2320/97 of 17 November 1997 imposing definitive anti-dumping 
duties on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, Romania and the Slovak Republic, repealing 
Regulation  (EEC)  No 1189/93  and  terminating  the  proceeding  in  respect  of  such  imports 
originating in the Republic of Croatia (OJ 1997 L 322, p. 1).
49   Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against  dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1).
50   Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 103).Proceedings  Court of Justice
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institution in the event of recourse to the asymmetrical method may be explained by the 
existence of Article 253 EC. Once Article 2.4.2 is transposed by the Community, the 
specific requirement to state reasons laid down by that provision can be considered to 
be subsumed under the general requirement imposed by the Treaty for acts adopted 
by the institutions to state the reasons on which they are based. 
Concerning the appeal by Republica, the Court allowed the appeal on the ground that 
the Court of First Instance had erred in law by holding that the Council had given, in the 
contested regulation, an adequate statement of the reasons for its refusal to exclude 
sales made using compensation from the determination of normal value. 
Determination of the normal value constituted one of the essential steps required to 
prove the existence of any dumping. It followed from the first and third subparagraphs 
of Article 2(1) of the basic anti-dumping regulation that, in principle, prices between 
parties which have a compensatory arrangement with each other may not be taken into 
account in determining normal value, and that there is no exception to this, unless it is 
determined that those prices are unaffected by the relationship. By merely stating, in 
the contested regulation, that it had been "found that sales made using compensation 
were  indeed  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade",  the  Council  did  not  satisfy  the 
requirements of the obligation to state reasons. Such a peremptory statement, which 
amounted to no more than a reference to the provisions of Community law, contained 
no explanatory element of such a kind as to enlighten the parties concerned and the 
Community judicature as to the reasons which had led the Council to consider that the 
prices charged in connection with those sales made using compensation had not been 
affected by the relationship (paragraph 87) and did not enable the parties concerned to 
know  whether  those  prices  were,  by  way  of  exception,  correctly  taken  into 
consideration  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  normal  value,  or  whether  that  latter 
circumstance might constitute a flaw affecting the legality of the contested regulation 
(paragraph 88). 
14.  In  the  field  of  trade  mark  law,  the  Court  gave  a  number  of  judgments  on  the 
concept of genuine use of a mark (14.1), the burden of proof of the exhaustion of the 
right conferred by a mark (14.2), the criteria for assessing the distinctiveness of three-
dimensional marks (14.3), the possibility of using a colour as such as a mark (14.4), the 
concept of a mark consisting exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to 
designate the characteristics of goods (14.5), the extent of the protection conferred by 
a mark with a reputation within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 
51 (14.6), 
and,  finally,  the  interpretation  of  Regulation  40/94 
52  on  the  Community  trade  mark 
51   First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1). 
52   Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark 
(OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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concerning the use of the second language before the Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (14.7). 
14.1. In its judgment in Case C-40/01 Ansul [2003] ECR I-2439 the Court interpreted 
the concept of "genuine use" of a trade mark in Articles 12(1) and 10(2) of Directive 
89/104.  It  observed  to  begin  with,  citing  Joined  Cases  C-414/99  to  C-416/99  Zino
Davidoff and Levi Strauss [2001] ECR I-8691, that it was the Community legislature's 
intention that the maintenance of rights in a trade mark should be subject to the same 
condition regarding genuine use in all the Member States, so that the level of protection 
trade marks enjoy does not vary according to the legal system concerned (paragraph 
29),  and  that  that  concept  must  be  given  a  uniform  interpretation  (paragraph  31). 
Genuine  use  is  actual  use  of  the  mark  (paragraph  31)  which  is  not  merely  token, 
serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the mark (paragraph 36). "Use of the 
mark  must  therefore  relate  to  goods  or  services  already  marketed  or  about  to  be 
marketed and for which preparations by the undertaking to secure customers are under 
way,  particularly  in  the  form  of  advertising  campaigns  …  Finally,  when  assessing 
whether there has been genuine use of the trade mark, regard must be had to all the 
facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial exploitation of 
the mark is real, in particular whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic 
sector concerned", giving consideration if appropriate to the nature of the goods or 
service  at  issue,  the  characteristics  of  the  market  concerned  and  the  scale  and 
frequency  of  use  of  the  mark.  Use  of  the  mark  need  not  therefore  always  be 
quantitatively  significant  for  it  to  be  deemed  genuine,  and  under  certain  conditions 
there may also be genuine use of the mark for goods for which it was registered that 
were sold in the past and are not newly available on the market. That applies inter alia 
where the proprietor makes use of the mark to sell component parts that are integral to 
the make-up or structure of the goods, or for goods or services directly connected with 
the  goods  previously  sold  and  intended  to  meet  the  needs  of  customers  of  those 
goods.
14.2. Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q [2003] ECR I-3051 examined the compatibility 
with Directive 89/104 and Articles 28 EC and 30 EC of a national provision imposing on 
a third party who is proceeded against for infringement of the exclusive right to the 
mark the burden of proving exhaustion of the right conferred by the mark. The Court 
began by noting that the place where the goods were first marketed was not identified 
in the case before it, unlike in Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, in which it had held that 
the burden of proving the proprietor's consent to the goods being marketed in the EEA, 
entailing exhaustion of the right conferred by the mark, is on the trader who relies on 
that  consent.  The  Court  pointed  out  that  Articles  5  to  7  of  the  directive  embody  a 
complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark. It 
is apparent from those provisions that the extinction of the exclusive right results either 
from the consent of the proprietor to goods being placed on the market within the EEA 
or from their being placed on the market within the EEA by the proprietor himself. It 
follows that a national rule that the exhaustion of the trade mark right constitutes a plea 
in defence for a third party against whom the trade mark proprietor brings an action, so Proceedings  Court of Justice
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that the conditions for such exhaustion must, as a rule, be proved by the third party 
who  relies  on  it  (paragraph  35),  is  consistent  with  those  provisions.  However,  the 
requirements deriving from Articles 28 EC and 30 EC may mean that that rule needs to 
be qualified, in particular where it allows the proprietor of the trade mark to partition 
national markets, as is the case where − as in the main proceedings − the trade mark 
proprietor  markets  his  products  in  the  EEA  using  an  exclusive  distribution  system. 
Where  the  third  party  against  whom  proceedings  have  been  brought  succeeds  in 
establishing  that  there  is  such  a  risk  if  he  bears  the  burden  of  proof,  it  is  for  the 
proprietor of the trade mark to establish that the products were initially placed on the 
market outside the EEA by him or with his consent. If such evidence is adduced, it is 
then for the third party to prove the consent of the proprietor to subsequent marketing 
of the products in the EEA. 
14.3. The judgment in Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01 Linde and Others [2003] ECR 
I-3161  related  to  the  criteria  for  assessing  the  distinctiveness  of  three-dimensional 
trade  marks.  The  Court  noted  that  a  three-dimensional  sign  may  constitute  a  mark 
(Case  C-299/99  Philips  [2002]  ECR  I-5475)  if  it  is  capable  of  being  represented 
graphically and is distinctive. Also according to Phillips, the criteria for assessing the 
distinctiveness of three-dimensional marks are no different from those to be applied to 
other categories of trade mark. However, under Article 3(1)(e) of Directive 89/104,
53
signs which consist exclusively of the shape which results from the nature of the goods 
themselves will not be registered. Thus, while neither the scheme of the directive nor 
the wording of Article 3(1)(b) indicates that stricter criteria than those used for other 
categories of trade mark ought to be applied when assessing the distinctiveness of a 
three-dimensional shape of product mark, it is nevertheless true that it may in practice 
be more difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to such a mark than to a word or 
figurative trade mark. That difficulty, which may explain why such a mark is refused 
registration, does not mean that it cannot acquire distinctive character following the use 
that has been made of it and thus be registered as a trade mark under Article 3(3) of 
the directive. 
In answer to the question whether Article 3(1)(c) of the directive 
54 also has significance 
for three-dimensional marks consisting of the shape of the product, the Court observed 
that each of the grounds for refusal listed in that provision is independent of the others 
and  calls  for  separate  examination,  so  that  it  also  has  significance  for  three-
dimensional  shape  of  product  marks.  As  regards,  finally,  the  question  whether  the 
general interest of the trade in the preservation of the availability of the shape of the 
53   See note 51. 
54   Under that provision, trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which 
may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin, or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, 
or other characteristics of the goods shall not be registered, or if registered shall be 
liable to be declared invalid. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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product  should  be  taken  into  account  if  Article 3(1)(e)  alone  applies  to  three-
dimensional marks, the Court recalled that each of the grounds for refusing registration 
is to be interpreted in the light of the underlying general interest. The rationale of the 
grounds for refusing registration laid down in that provision is to prevent trade mark 
protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional 
characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products of competitors. 
Similarly, Article 3(1)(c) of the directive pursues an aim which is in the public interest, 
namely preventing such signs or indications from being reserved to one undertaking 
alone  because  they  have  been  registered  as  trade  marks.  It  follows  that,  when 
examining  the  ground  for  refusing  registration  in  Article 3(1)(c)  of  the  directive  in  a 
concrete  case,  regard  must  be  had  to  the  public  interest  underlying  that  provision, 
which  is  that  all  three-dimensional  shape  of  product  trade  marks  which  consist 
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of 
the goods or service within the meaning of that provision should be freely available to 
all and, subject always to Article 3(3) of the directive, cannot be registered. 
14.4. The judgment in Case C-104/01 Libertel [2003] ECR I-3793 examined whether 
and  in  what  circumstances  a  colour  may  constitute  a  mark  within  the  meaning  of 
Articles  2  and  3  of  Directive  89/104.  The  Court  began  by  finding  that  a  colour  is 
capable of constituting a mark if it is a sign which is capable of graphic representation 
and of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.
In  view  of  the  limited  number  of  colours  that  the  relevant  public,  composed  of  the 
average  consumer,  reasonably  well  informed  and  reasonably  observant  and 
circumspect, is capable of distinguishing, and of the aim in the public interest pursued 
by  Article 3(1)(c)  of  Directive  89/104,  which  requires  that  the  signs  and  indications 
descriptive of the categories of goods or services for which registration is sought may 
be freely used by all (Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee
[1999] ECR I-2779, and Linde and Others), registration as trade marks of colours per 
se  would  have  the  effect  of  creating  an  extensive  monopoly  which  would  be 
incompatible with a system of undistorted competition, in particular because it could 
have  the  effect  of  creating  an  unjustified  competitive  advantage  for  a  single  trader 
(paragraph  54).  There  is  therefore  a  public  interest  in  not  unduly  restricting  the 
availability of colours for the other traders who offer for sale goods or services of the 
same type as those in respect of which registration is sought (paragraph 55), and that 
interest is relevant in assessing the potential distinctiveness of a given colour as a 
trade mark. 
As  to  the  conditions  under  which  a  colour  may  be  regarded  as  distinctive  and  so 
eligible  for  registration  in  accordance  with  Article 3(1)(b)  and  Article 3(3)  of  the 
directive,  the  Court  first  recalled  the  essential  function  of  a  trade  mark,  namely  to 
guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked goods or service to the consumer by 
enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish them from others which 
have another origin (Case C-39/97 Canon [1998] ECR I-5507 and Case C-517/99 MerzProceedings  Court of Justice
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& Krell [2001] ECR I-6959). Such distinctiveness without any prior use is inconceivable 
save  in  exceptional  circumstances,  and  particularly  where  the  number  of  goods  or 
services for which the mark is claimed is very restricted and the relevant market very 
specific. However, that distinctive character may be acquired following the use made of 
the colour, in particular after the normal process of familiarising the relevant public has 
taken place. The Court drew two conclusions from all those considerations. First, a 
colour per se, not spatially delimited, may, in respect of certain goods and services, 
have a distinctive character within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and Article 3(3) of the 
directive, provided that, inter alia, it may be represented graphically in a way that is 
clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective. The 
latter  condition  cannot  be  satisfied  merely  by  reproducing  on  paper  the  colour  in 
question,  but  may  be  satisfied  by  designating  that  colour  using  an  internationally 
recognised identification code. Second, a colour may be found to possess distinctive 
character within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and Article 3(3) of the directive, provided 
that, as regards the perception of the relevant public, the mark is capable of identifying 
the product or service for which registration is sought as originating from a particular 
undertaking and distinguishing that product or service from those of other undertakings. 
In the light of those findings, the Court also found that the number of goods or services 
for which registration of a colour as a trade mark is sought is relevant to assessing both 
the distinctive character of the colour and whether registration is consistent with the 
general interest described above. 
Finally, as regards the question whether the competent registration authority has to 
carry out an examination in the abstract or by reference to the actual situation in order 
to assess distinctive character, the Court confirmed that the examination must refer to 
the actual situation and take account of all the relevant circumstances of the case, 
including any use which has been made of the sign in respect of which trade mark 
registration is sought. 
14.5. In Case C-191/01 P Wrigley (judgment of 23 October 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR) the Court ruled, on appeal, on the concept of marks which consist exclusively 
of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods within 
the  meaning  of  Article 7(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 40/94,
55  which  lays  down  that 
registration is to be refused in such a case. In the Court's view, by prohibiting the 
registration as Community trade marks of such signs and indications, that provision 
pursues  an  aim  which  is  in  the  public  interest,  namely  that  descriptive  signs  or 
indications  relating  to  the  characteristics  of  goods  or  services  in  respect  of  which 
registration is sought may be freely used by all. That provision accordingly prevents 
such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking alone because they 
have been registered as trade marks (Windsurfing Chiemsee and Linde and Others).
55   See note 52. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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For OHIM to refuse on the basis of that provision to register a trade mark, it suffices 
that the signs and indications can be used to describe goods or services. A word sign 
must  therefore  be  refused  registration  if  at  least  one  of  its  possible  meanings 
designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned. To consider, as the 
Court  of  First  Instance  did,  that  the  compound  "Doublemint"  could  not  be  refused 
registration,  because  it  could  not  be  "characterised  as  exclusively  descriptive", 
amounted  to  considering  that  the  provision  in  question  must  be  interpreted  as 
precluding  the  registration  of  trade  marks  which  are  "exclusively  descriptive"  of  the 
goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, or of their characteristics. 
The  Court  of  First  Instance  had  therefore  applied  a  test  which  is  not  laid  down  by 
Regulation No 40/94,
56 without ascertaining whether the word at issue could be used 
by  other  operators  to  designate  a  characteristic  of  their  goods  and  services,  and 
thereby  erred  as  to  the  scope  of  that  provision.  The  Court  concluded  that  OHIM's 
submission  that  the  contested  judgment  was  vitiated  by  an  error  of  law  was  well 
founded, and set aside the judgment. 
14.6. The judgment in Case C-408/01 Adidas (judgment of 23 October 2003, not yet 
published in the ECR), which was given on a reference for a preliminary ruling, ruled on 
the  extent  of  the  protection  conferred  by  a  trade  mark  with  a  reputation  within  the 
meaning of Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104.
57 In answer to the first question, whether 
transposition of that provision entitles Member States to provide protection for the mark 
with a reputation in cases where the later mark or sign, which is identical with or similar 
to it, is intended to be used or is used in relation to goods or services identical with or 
similar  to  those  covered  by  the  mark,  the  Court,  recalling  its  judgment  in  Case 
C-292/00 Davidoff [2003] ECR I-389, stated that, where the sign is used for identical or 
similar goods or services, a mark with a reputation must enjoy protection which is at 
least  as  extensive  as  where  a  sign  is  used  for  non-similar  goods  or  services.  The 
Member  State  must  therefore  grant  protection  which  is  at  least  as  extensive  for 
identical or similar goods or services as for non-similar goods or services. 
The  Court  then  addressed  the  question  whether  the  protection  conferred  by  that 
provision is conditional on a finding of a degree of similarity between the mark with a 
reputation and the sign such that there exists a likelihood of confusion between them 
on  the  part  of  the  relevant  section  of  the  public.  It  recalled  that  Article 5(2)  of  the 
directive  establishes,  for  the  benefit  of  trade  marks  with  a  reputation,  a  form  of 
protection whose implementation does not require the existence of such a likelihood. 
Article 5(2)  applies  to  situations  in  which  the  specific  condition  of  the  protection 
consists  of  a  use  of  the  sign  in  question  without  due  cause  which  takes  unfair 
advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade 
mark  (Case  C-425/98  Marca  Mode  [2000]  ECR  I-4861).  The  condition  of  similarity 
56   Ibid. 
57   See note 51. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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between the mark and the sign requires the existence of elements of visual, aural or 
conceptual similarity, whereas the infringements referred to in the provision in question, 
where they occur, are the consequence of a certain degree of similarity between the 
mark and the sign, by virtue of which the relevant public makes a connection between 
the sign and the mark, that is to say, establishes a link between them even though it 
does not confuse them (see, to that effect, Case C-375/97 General Motors [1999] ECR 
I-5421).
As regards, finally, the effect on the question concerning the similarity between the 
mark with a reputation and the sign of a finding of fact by the national court to the effect 
that the sign in question is viewed by the public purely as an embellishment, the Court 
considered that in such circumstances the public, by definition, does not establish any 
link with a registered mark, with the result that one of the conditions of the protection 
conferred by Article 5(2) of the directive is then not satisfied. 
14.7. Finally, Case C-361/01P Kik (judgment of 9 September 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR) concerned an application for registration of a trade mark filed in Dutch and 
also  indicating  Dutch  as  the  second  language,  Dutch  not  being  one  of  the  five 
languages of OHIM. 
The Court, on appeal, first stated that the Court of First Instance had been right to 
conclude that Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark 
58 cannot be taken, in 
itself, as in any sense implying differentiated treatment as regards language, given that 
it in fact guarantees use of the language of the application filed as the language of 
proceedings.  The  Court  reached  that  conclusion  by  finding  that,  according  to 
Article 115(4) of Regulation No 40/94, the language of proceedings before OHIM is to 
be the language used for filing the application for a Community trade mark, although 
the  second  language  chosen  by  the  applicant  may  be  used  by  OHIM  to  send  him 
written communications. It follows from that provision that the option of using a second 
language for written communications is an exception to the principle that the language 
of proceedings be used, and that the term "written communications" must therefore be 
interpreted strictly. Since the proceedings comprise all such acts as must be carried out 
in processing an application, it follows that the term "procedural documents" covers any 
document that is required or prescribed by the Community legislation for the purposes 
of  processing  an  application  for  a  Community  trade  mark  or  necessary  for  such 
processing,  be  they  notifications,  requests  for  correction,  clarification  or  other 
documents. All such documents must therefore be drawn up by OHIM in the language 
used  for  filing  the  application.  In  contrast  to  procedural  documents,  "written 
communications",  as  referred  to  in  the  second  sentence  of  Article 115(4)  of  the 
regulation, are any communications which, from their content, cannot be regarded as 
58   See note 52. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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amounting to procedural documents, such as letters under cover of which OHIM sends 
procedural documents, or by which it communicates information to applicants. 
The Court, going on to analyse the obligation imposed on an applicant for registration 
of a Community trade mark by Article 115(3) to "indicate a second language which 
shall be a language of [OHIM] the use of which he accepts as a possible language of 
proceedings for opposition, revocation or invalidity proceedings", decided that it does 
not infringe the principle of non-discrimination. The language regime of a body such as 
OHIM is the result of a difficult process which seeks to achieve the necessary balance 
between the interests of economic operators and the public interest in terms of the cost 
of proceedings, but also between the interests of applicants for Community trade marks 
and those of other economic operators in regard to access to translations of documents 
which confer rights, or proceedings involving more than one economic operator, such 
as  the  opposition,  revocation  and  invalidity  proceedings  referred  to  in  Regulation 
No 40/94. Therefore, in determining the official languages of the Community which may 
be  used  as  languages  of  proceedings  in  opposition,  revocation  and  invalidity 
proceedings, where the parties cannot agree on which language to use, the Council 
was  pursuing  the  legitimate  aim  of  seeking  an  appropriate  linguistic  solution  to  the 
difficulties arising from such a failure to agree. Similarly, even if the Council did treat 
official  languages  of  the  Community  differently,  its  choice  to  limit  the  languages  to 
those which are most widely known in the European Community is appropriate and 
proportionate.
15. In the field of harmonisation of laws, there were cases concerning the procedure for 
the maintenance of national measures derogating from a harmonising directive (15.1), 
misleading advertising (15.2), the protection of personal data (15.3), two cases relating 
to novel foods and novel food ingredients (15.4), one case concerning authorisation to 
market medicinal products (15.5), one on national provisions more stringent than those 
provided for by Directive 97/69 
59 (15.6) and, finally, two cases on the interpretation of 
Directive 90/435 
60 (15.7.1 and 15.7.2). 
15.1. In Case C-3/00 Denmark v Commission [2003] ECR I-2643 the Court had to rule 
for the first time on an action brought by a Member State against a refusal by the 
Commission  to  approve  the  maintenance  of  national  measures  derogating  from  a 
directive adopted under Article 95 EC. In this case, Denmark sought annulment of a 
Commission decision refusing to approve the national provisions notified concerning 
59   Commission Directive 97/69/EC of 5 December 1997 adapting to technical progress for 
the  23rd  time  Council  Directive  67/548/EEC  on  the  approximation  of  the  laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and 
labelling of dangerous substances (OJ 1997 L 343, p. 19). 
60   Council  Directive  90/435/EEC  of  23  July  1990  on  the  common  system  of  taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States 
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the use of sulphites, nitrites and nitrates in foodstuffs, by derogation from Directive 
95/2.
61
The  Court  recalled  that,  under  Article 95  EC,  the  maintenance  of  already  existing 
national provisions that derogate from a measure for the harmonisation of laws must be 
justified on grounds of the major needs referred to in Article 30 EC or relating to the 
protection of the environment or the working environment, whereas the introduction of 
new  national  provisions  must  be  based  on  new  scientific  evidence  relating  to  the 
protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem 
specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure. 
In  this  case,  the  Court  rejected  a  plea  by  the  Danish  Government  alleging  a 
misinterpretation by the Commission of Article 95(4) EC, by finding that the contested 
decision had considered the possible existence of a situation specific to the Kingdom of 
Denmark merely as a useful element in assessing what decision to adopt, and had not 
treated  such  a  situation  as  a  condition  of  approval  for  already  existing  derogating 
national provisions. The Court none the less considered that "[a] Member State may 
base  an  application  to  maintain  its  already  existing  national  provisions  on  an 
assessment of the risk to public health different from that accepted by the Community 
legislature  when  it  adopted  the  harmonisation  measure  from  which  the  national 
provisions derogate. To that end, it falls to the applicant Member State to prove that 
those national provisions ensure a level of health protection which is higher than the 
Community harmonisation measure and that they do not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain that objective" (paragraph 64). In this respect, the Court held that "[i]n the light 
of the uncertainty inherent in assessing the public health risks posed by, inter alia, the 
use of food additives, divergent assessments of those risks can legitimately be made, 
without necessarily being based on new or different scientific evidence" (paragraph 
63).
15.2.  In  Case  C-44/01  Pippig  Augenoptik  [2003]  ECR  I-3095  four  questions  were 
referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Directive 84/450 as 
amended by Directive 97/55.
62 In the main proceedings, an undertaking was asking the 
national court to order a competitor to desist from comparative advertising. 
The  Court  noted,  first,  that  in  order  for  there  to  be  comparative  advertising,  it  is 
sufficient for there to be a statement referring even by implication to a competitor or to 
61   European Parliament and Council Directive No 95/2/EC of 20 February 1995 on food 
additives other than colours and sweeteners (OJ L 61, p. 1). 
62   Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17), as amended by Directive 97/55/EC of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  October  1997  amending  Directive 
84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising 
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the goods or services which he offers (Case C-112/99 Toshiba Europe [2001] ECR 
I-7945,  paragraphs  30  and  31).  In  the  context  of  the  directive,  it  is  not  therefore 
necessary to establish distinctions in the legislation between the various elements of 
comparison,  that  is  to  say  the  statements  concerning  the  advertiser's  offer,  the 
statements concerning the competitor's offer, and the relationship between those two 
offers.  In  this  respect,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the  directive,  which  exhaustively 
harmonised  the  conditions  under  which  comparative  advertising  is  lawful  in  the 
Member States, precludes the application to comparative advertising of stricter national 
provisions on protection against misleading advertising, as far as the form and content 
of the comparison is concerned. 
As  regards  compliance  with  the  conditions  under  which  comparative  advertising  is 
lawful, the Court held that "whereas the advertiser is in principle free to state or not to 
state the brand name of rival products in comparative advertising, it is for the national 
court to verify whether, in particular circumstances, characterised by the importance of 
the brand in the buyer's choice and by a major difference between the respective brand 
names of the compared products in terms of how well known they are, omission of the 
better-known brand name is capable of being misleading" (paragraph 56). Next, the 
Court stated that Article 3a(1) of the directive does not preclude compared products 
from being bought through different distribution channels. Moreover, the Court added 
that, where the conditions for the lawfulness of comparative advertising are complied 
with, that provision does not preclude an advertiser from carrying out a test purchase 
with  a  competitor  before  his  own  offer  has  even  commenced,  nor  does  it  prevent 
comparative advertising, in addition to citing the competitor's name, from reproducing 
its logo and a picture of its shop front. Finally, the Court said that a price comparison 
does  not  entail  the  discrediting  of  a  competitor,  either  on  the  grounds  that  the 
difference in price between the products compared is greater than the average price 
difference or by reason of the number of comparisons made. 
15.3. In Case C-101/01 Lindqvist (judgment of 6 November 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR) the Court gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Directive 95/46.
63
The  main  proceedings  concerned  criminal  proceedings  against  a  Swedish  national, 
who  was  accused  of  unlawfully  publishing  on  her  internet  site  personal  data  on  a 
number of people working with her on a voluntary basis in a parish of the Swedish 
Protestant Church. 
As regards the application of the directive to the case, the Court held that the act of 
referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by name or by 
other means constitutes "the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means" within the meaning of Directive 95/46. The Court added that such processing of 
63   See note 4. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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personal data for the purpose of charitable or religious activities does not fall within any 
of the exceptions to the application of the directive set out in Article 3. 
The Court then turned to the concept of "transfer [of data] to a third country" within the 
meaning  of  Article 25  of  the  directive,  and  noted  that  Chapter  IV  of  the  directive 
contains no provision concerning use of the internet. Consequently, given the state of 
development of the internet at the time when the directive was drawn up, one cannot 
presume that the Community legislature intended the expression "transfer [of data] to a 
third country" to cover prospectively the case where an individual in a Member State 
"loads personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his hosting provider 
which is established in that State or in another Member State, thereby making those 
data accessible to anyone who connects to the internet, including people in a third 
country" (paragraph 71). 
As regards the compatibility of the directive with the general principle of freedom of 
expression or with other rights and freedoms corresponding to the right enshrined in 
Article 10 of the ECHR, the Court stated that, while the directive does not in itself bring 
about  a  restriction  of  that  principle,  it  is  for  the  national  authorities  and  courts 
responsible for applying the national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to ensure 
a fair balance between the rights and interests in question, including the fundamental 
rights protected by the Community legal order. 
In conclusion, the Court held that measures taken by the Member States to ensure the 
protection of personal data must be consistent both with the provisions of Directive 
95/46 and with its objective of maintaining a balance between the free movement of 
personal data and the protection of private life. However, nothing prevents a Member 
State from extending the scope of the national legislation implementing the provisions 
of Directive 95/46 to areas not included in the scope thereof provided that no other 
provision of Community law precludes it. 
It may be noted, next, that in Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others (see point 4.1) the 
Court recalled that Directive 95/46 
64 had been adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC, 
and  consequently  that  its  applicability  "cannot  depend  on  whether  the  specific 
situations at issue in the main proceedings have a sufficient link with the exercise of the 
fundamental  freedoms  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty,  in  particular,  in  those  cases,  the 
freedom of movement of workers. A contrary interpretation could make the limits of the 
field of application of the directive particularly unsure and uncertain, which would be 
contrary  to  its  essential  objective  of  approximating  the  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative provisions of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the 
functioning of the internal market deriving precisely from disparities between national 
legislations" (paragraph 42). 
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15.4. Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others (judgment of 9 September 
2003, not yet published in the ECR) gave the Court an occasion to give a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation and validity of various provisions of Regulation No 258/97 
concerning  novel  foods.
65  The  main  proceedings  concerned  an  action  brought  by 
undertakings involved in the development of genetically modified food plants for use in 
agriculture against a preventive measure adopted by the Italian authorities suspending 
the  trade  in  and  use  of  certain  transgenic  products  in  Italy.  The  Italian  authorities 
considered, inter alia, that the foods the applicants wished to market, for which they 
had  made  use  of  the  simplified  procedure  under  Article 5  of  Regulation  No 258/97, 
were not "substantially equivalent" to existing foods, so that the use of that procedure 
was not appropriate. 
The Court, first, interpreted the concept of substantial equivalence, holding that the 
concept does not preclude novel foods which display differences in composition that 
have  no  effect  on  public  health  from  being  considered  substantially  equivalent  to 
existing foods. The Court further said that the concept of substantial equivalence does 
not  in  itself  involve  a  safety  assessment,  but  rather  constitutes  an  approach  for 
comparing  the  novel  food  with  its  conventional  counterpart  in  order  to  determine 
whether it should be subject to a risk assessment as regards, in particular, its unique 
composition  and  properties.  The  Court  held,  consequently,  that  "the  absence  of 
substantial equivalence does not necessarily imply that the food in question is unsafe, 
but simply that it should be subject to an assessment of its potential risks" (paragraph 
77), and concluded that "the mere presence in novel foods of residues of transgenic 
protein  at  certain  levels  does  not  preclude  those  foods  from  being  considered 
substantially  equivalent  to  existing  foods  and,  consequently,  use  of  the  simplified 
procedure for placing those novel foods on the market" (paragraph 84). However, the 
Court  stated  that  that  is  not  the  case  where  the  existence  of  a  risk  of  potentially 
dangerous  effects  on  human  health  can  be  identified  on  the  basis  of  the  scientific 
knowledge available at the time of the initial assessment, and that it is for the national 
court to determine whether that condition is satisfied. 
Second,  the  Court  ruled  on  the  effect  of  the  validity  of  the  use  of  the  simplified 
procedure on the power of the Member States, by virtue of the precautionary principle, 
to adopt measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings. In this respect, the 
Court stated that, since the simplified procedure does not imply any consent by the 
Commission, a Member State is not required to challenge the lawfulness of such a 
consent before adopting such measures. As regards protective measures adopted by a 
Member State under the safeguard clause, the Court said that they may not properly 
be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere suppositions 
which are not yet scientifically verified. Such measures, said the Court, can be adopted 
only if they are based on a risk assessment which is as complete as possible in the 
65   Regulation  (EC)  No 258/97  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27 
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particular circumstances of an individual case, which indicate that those measures are 
necessary  in  order  to  ensure  that  novel  foods  do  not  present  a  danger  for  the 
consumer. As to the burden of proof on the Member State concerned, the Court stated 
that, while the reasons put forward by the Member State, such as result from a risk 
assessment, cannot be of a general nature, the Member State none the less, in the 
light of the limited nature of the initial safety analysis of novel foods under the simplified 
procedure and of the essentially temporary nature of measures based on the safeguard 
clause,  satisfies  the  burden  of  proof  if  it  relies  on  evidence  which  indicates  the 
existence of a specific risk which those novel foods could involve. 
In  addition,  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  safeguard  clause  constitutes  a  specific 
expression of the precautionary principle, and that the conditions for the application of 
that  clause  must  therefore  be  interpreted  having  due  regard  to  this  principle. 
Consequently, such protective measures may be taken even if it proves impossible to 
carry out as full a scientific risk assessment as possible in the particular circumstances 
of a given case because of the inadequate nature of the available scientific data, and 
presuppose  that  the  risk  assessment  available  to  the  national  authorities  provides 
specific  evidence  which,  without  precluding  scientific  uncertainty,  makes  it  possible 
reasonably to conclude on the basis of the most reliable scientific evidence available 
and the most recent results of international research that the implementation of those 
measures  is  necessary  in  order  to  avoid  novel  foods  which  pose  potential  risks  to 
human health being offered on the market. 
Finally, the Court found no factor such as to affect the validity of Article 5 of Regulation 
No 258/97 as regards the possibility of using the simplified procedure notwithstanding 
the  presence  of  residues  of  transgenic  protein  in  novel  foods.  In  particular,  after 
observing  that  if  dangers  for  human  health  or  the  environment  are  identifiable,  the 
simplified procedure may not be used, and a more comprehensive risk assessment 
under the normal procedure is then required, the Court held that the provision at issue 
is sufficient to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment. 
As to compliance with the precautionary principle and the principle of proportionality, 
the Court observed that the simplified procedure applies only to certain novel foods, 
when the condition of substantial equivalence is satisfied, and that the recognition in 
advance  of  substantial  equivalence  may  subsequently  be  reassessed  by  means  of 
various procedures at both national and Community level. 
15.5. In Commission v Artegodan and Others the Court upheld a judgment of the Court 
of First Instance in which it had annulled decisions of the Commission concerning the 
withdrawal of authorisations to market medicinal products for human use containing 
certain anorectics.
66 The Court observed, in particular, that the Court of First Instance 
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had been right to hold that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adopt the contested 
decisions. It was common ground that they had been adopted solely on the basis of 
Article 15a of Directive 75/319,
67 which applies only to marketing authorisations which 
have been granted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of that directive, 
whereas the marketing authorisations whose withdrawal was ordered by the decisions 
at issue had initially been granted under purely national procedures. The Court then 
ruled that the amendment of certain terms of the initial marketing authorisations by 
decision of the Commission in 1996 could not amount to an authorisation granted in 
accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 75/319. 
15.6.  Still  in  the  field  of  harmonisation  of  laws,  the  Court  ruled  in  Case  C-512/99 
Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I-845, an action for annulment, on the temporal 
effect of Article 95 EC in connection with a dispute challenging the introduction by the 
German  Government  of  national  provisions  which  were  more  stringent  than  those 
provided for by Directive 97/69 
68 as regards the classification and labelling of certain 
carcinogenic  fibres.  The  applicant  Government  submitted  that  its  application  for  a 
derogation  from  the  provisions  of  the  directive,  submitted  on  the  basis  of 
Article 100a(4)  of  the  EC  Treaty  (now,  after  amendment,  Article 95  EC)  which  was 
applicable at the material time, should have been decided on that basis, whereas the 
Commission had rejected it on the basis of Article 95(6) EC. It also argued that the 
Commission  had  breached  its  duty  of  cooperation  under  Article 10  EC  and  had 
misinterpreted the conditions of application in Article 95(5) EC. 
The Court observed that the Treaty of Amsterdam had amended the chapter relating to 
the  approximation  of  laws  without  introducing  transitional  provisions  (paragraph  38) 
and that the legal rules laid down in Article 100a of the EC Treaty differ from those laid 
down in Article 95 EC. Unlike Article 100a of the EC Treaty, Article 95 EC distinguishes 
between national provisions already in place prior to harmonisation and those which a 
Member State seeks to introduce: the former must be justified on grounds of the major 
needs referred to in Article 30 EC or relating to the protection of the environment or the 
working environment, while the latter must be based on new scientific evidence relating 
to those questions. The procedure for authorisation of the derogation starts with the 
notification of the application to the Commission and ends with the Commission's final 
decision.  No new  legal  situation  can  be  established  before  the  final  step  in  that 
procedure has been taken; it is only then that, through approval or rejection by the 
Commission, a measure likely to affect the earlier legal situation arises (Case C-319/97 
Kortas [1999] ECR I-3143). Since, moreover, in the absence of transitional provisions, 
67   Second  Council  Directive  75/319/EEC  of  20  May  1975  on  the  approximation  of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary 
medicinal products (OJ 1975 L 147, p. 13), as amended by Council Directive 93/39/EEC 
of 14 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L 214, p. 22). 
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new rules apply immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the 
old rules, the contested decision was rightly based on Article 95(6) EC. 
As  to  whether  the  Commission  had  complied  with  its  duty  of  cooperation  under 
Article 10 EC, the Court observed that the applicant Government could not have been 
unaware of the entry into force of the new provisions on the approximation of laws and 
was deemed to know that the Commission's decision would necessarily be based on 
the  new  legal  basis,  Article 95  EC.  It  follows  that  the  Commission  was  in  no  way 
required  to  inform  the  Government  that  the  notification  of  the  contested  provisions 
would be assessed in the light of that provision. 
Finally, in the Court's view, the Commission had not misinterpreted the conditions of 
application  in  Article 95(5)  EC.  Among  those  conditions,  which  are  cumulative,  the 
German Government had failed to notify the reasons for the adoption of the contested 
provisions, as required by Article 95(5) EC. 
15.7. Two judgments, in Case C-168/01 Bosal (judgment of 18 September 2003, not 
yet published in the ECR) and Case C-58/01 Océ van der Grinten (judgment of 25 
September 2003, not yet published in the ECR) interpreted Directive 90/435 
69 on the 
common  system  of  taxation  applicable  in  the  case  of  parent  companies  and 
subsidiaries of different Member States. 
15.7.1. In Bosal the Court held that that directive, interpreted in the light of Article 43 
EC, precludes a national provision which, when determining the tax on the profits of a 
parent company established in one Member State, makes the deductibility of costs in 
connection with that company's holding in the capital of a subsidiary established in 
another  Member  State  subject  to  the  condition  that  such  costs  be  indirectly 
instrumental in making profits which are taxable in the Member State where the parent 
company is established. The Court began by noting that Article 4(2) of the directive 
leaves each Member State the option of providing that any charges relating to such a 
holding may not be deducted from the taxable profits of the parent company and that 
that option is not accompanied by any condition. The Court drew an initial conclusion, 
namely that the national provision implementing that option was compatible with the 
directive.  However,  in  examining  whether  the  option  had  been  implemented  in 
compliance with Article 43 EC, the Court observed, first, that the condition at issue 
constituted a hindrance to the establishment of subsidiaries in other Member States, 
since  such  subsidiaries  do  not  normally  generate  profits  that  are  taxable  in  the 
Netherlands. Second, the condition went against the directive's objective of eliminating 
the disadvantage to groups of companies caused by the application of different tax 
treatment depending on whether a parent company has subsidiaries in the Member 
State in which it is established or in a different Member State. Similarly, none of the 
69   See note 60. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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conditions was satisfied which could establish a direct link between the granting of a 
tax advantage to parent companies established in the Netherlands and the tax system 
relating to the subsidiaries of parent companies where the latter are established in that 
Member  State,  so  that  the  coherence  of  the  tax  system  could  not  be  relied  upon. 
Finally,  the  conditions  for  the  application  of  the  principle  of  the  territoriality  of  tax 
defined in Case C-250/95 Futura Participations and Singer [1997] ECR I-2471 were not 
satisfied here. 
15.7.2. The case in which the second judgment in this field was given, Océ van der 
Grinten,  concerned  the  charge  of  5%  imposed  on  the  aggregate  amount  of  the 
dividends paid by the subsidiary resident in the United Kingdom to its parent company 
resident in the Netherlands and the partial tax credit to which that distribution confers 
entitlement  when  profits  are  distributed  in  the  form  of  dividends,  that  charge  being 
provided  for  by  the  Convention  for  the  Avoidance  of  Double  Taxation  concluded  in 
1980  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands.  The  Court  classified  the 
charge, in so far as it is imposed on the dividends distributed by the resident subsidiary 
to  its  non-resident  parent  company,  as  a  withholding  tax  which  is  abolished  for 
distributions  of  profits  between  companies  within  the  same  transnational  group  by 
Article 5 of the directive. As far as that part of the charge is concerned, it satisfies the 
characteristics of a withholding tax, as determined in Case C-375/98 Epson Europe
[2000] ECR I-4243 and Case C-294/99 Athinaiki Zithopoiia [2001] ECR I-6797. Thus, 
first, it is imposed directly on the dividends in the State in which they are distributed 
because they form part of the amount chargeable to tax and, second, its chargeable 
event is the payment of those dividends. In this respect, it is irrelevant that the charge 
applies subject to the condition that a tax credit is granted, since, in accordance with 
the above convention, the tax credit is granted in conjunction with the payment of the 
dividends. Finally, the part of the 5% charge applying to the dividends is proportional to 
their  value  or  amount.  It  is  irrelevant  in  this  respect  that  the  shareholding  parent 
company ultimately receives an overall amount exceeding the amount of the dividends 
which are paid to it by its subsidiary. The rate of such a charge need only be set at a 
higher level in order for that sum to be less than the amount of the dividends paid, 
whereas the uniform interpretation of Community law cannot depend on the percentage 
at which the tax in question is set. 
On the other hand, the part of the charge applying to the tax credit does not possess 
the characteristics of a withholding tax on distributed profits, because it is not imposed 
on the profits distributed by the subsidiary. The tax credit does not constitute income 
from shares but an instrument designed to avoid double taxation of dividends in the 
case of cross-border distributions. Moreover, the partial reduction of the tax credit, by 
virtue of the 5% tax to which it is subject, does not affect the fiscal neutrality of such a 
distribution because that reduction does not apply to the distribution of dividends and 
does not diminish their value in the hands of the parent company to which they are 
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The  Court  found,  however,  that  Article 7(2)  of  the  Directive  allowed  the  contested 
charge. First, that provision entitles Member States to derogate from the prohibition in 
principle  of  withholding  tax  on  profits  distributed  by  the  subsidiary  and  to  tax  the 
distribution of profits in the hands of the parent company where the provision imposing 
the tax forms an integral part of a body of domestic or agreement-based provisions 
which  are  designed  to  lessen  economic  double  taxation  of  dividends  (which  is  in 
principle so in the case of a bilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation) 
and relate to the payment of tax credits to the recipients of dividends. Second, the 
charge at issue, which was established directly in conjunction with payment of a tax 
credit, was not set at a rate such as to cancel out the effects of that lessening of the 
economic double taxation of dividends, so that the objective of fiscal neutrality in the 
directive is not called into question even though the charge constitutes a withholding 
tax.  The  Court  held,  finally,  that  since  Article 7(2)  merely  enables  specific  sets  of 
domestic or agreement-based rules to continue to apply where they are consistent with 
the aim of the directive, the insertion of that provision into the text of the directive must 
be regarded as a technical adjustment and does not constitute a substantial change 
requiring consultation of the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee for a 
second time. It follows that the validity of the provision cannot be called into question. 
16. In the field of public procurement, Case C-327/00 Santex [2003] ECR I-1877 may 
be noted. It gave the Court an opportunity to develop its case-law on the compatibility 
with Directive 89/665 
70 of national rules establishing limitation periods in connection 
with  applications  for  review  of  contracting  authorities'  decisions  covered  by  that 
directive. In this respect, the Court recalled its case-law (Case C-470/99 Universale-
Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraph 79) according to which the directive in 
question does not preclude national legislation which provides that any application for 
review of a contracting authority's decision must be commenced within a time-limit laid 
down  to  that  effect  and  that  any  irregularity  in  the  award  procedure  relied  upon  in 
support of such application must be raised within the same period, if it is not to be out 
of time, provided that the time-limit in question is reasonable. Applying that case-law, 
the Court observed that, first, a limitation period of 60 days appears reasonable and, 
second, that such a period, which runs from the date of notification of the act or the 
date on which it is apparent that the party concerned became fully aware of it, is also in 
accordance with the principle of effectiveness. However, the Court said, "the possibility 
that,  in  the  context  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  before  the  referring 
court, the application of that time-limit may entail a breach of that principle cannot be 
excluded"  (paragraph  57).  In  particular,  it  said,  where  a  contracting  authority  has 
rendered impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by the 
Community legal order, Directive 89/665 imposes on the competent national courts an 
70   Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  the  application  of  review 
procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, 
p. 33). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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obligation to allow as admissible pleas in law alleging that the notice of invitation to 
tender is incompatible with Community law, which are put forward in support of an 
application  for  review  of  that  decision,  by  availing  itself,  where  appropriate,  of  the 
possibility afforded by national law of disapplying national rules on limitation periods, 
under which, when the period prescribed for bringing proceedings for review of the 
notice  of  invitation  to  tender  has  expired,  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  plead  such 
incompatibility.
17. As regards social law, one case concerning social security (17.1), four relating to 
equal treatment of men and women (17.2), one on the protection of the health and 
safety of workers (17.3) and two on the safeguarding of workers' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings (17.4) will be noted. 
17.1. In Case C-326/00 IKA [2003] ECR I-1703 the Court ruled on the interpretation of 
Regulation No 1408/71 
71 with respect to the funding of hospital treatment received by 
a  pensioner  during  a  stay  in  another  Member  State,  when  the  illness  in  question 
manifested  itself  suddenly  during  that  stay,  making  the  provision  of  treatment 
immediately necessary. In this respect, the Court noted that Regulation No 1408/71 
provides for different rules for pensioners and workers. In particular, that regulation 
does not subject the funding of care received by pensioners during a stay in another 
Member  State  to  the  condition,  which  applies  to  workers,  that  their  "condition 
necessitates immediate benefits during [the] stay" (paragraph 31). According to the 
Court,  that  difference  may  be  explained  by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Community 
legislature to promote effective mobility of pensioners. The Court added that the right to 
benefits in kind guaranteed to pensioners by Regulation No 1408/71 cannot be limited 
solely to cases where the treatment appears necessary because of a sudden illness. In 
particular, the circumstance that the treatment necessitated by developments in the 
insured person's state of health during his temporary stay in another Member State 
may be linked to a pre-existent pathology of which he is aware, such as a chronic 
illness, cannot suffice to prevent him from enjoying the benefits in kind under Article 31 
of  Regulation  No 1408/71.  Finally,  the  Court  stated  that  Article 31  of  Regulation 
No 1408/71 precludes a Member State from subjecting the enjoyment of the benefits in 
kind guaranteed by that provision to any authorisation procedure. 
As regards the application in practice of the regulation in question, the Court recalled 
that the principle which applies is that of reimbursement of the costs of the institution of 
the place of stay by the institution of the place of residence. It stated, however, that 
where it appears that the institution of the place of stay has wrongly refused to provide 
71   Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 1408/71  of  14  June  1971  on  the  application  of  social 
security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of 
their  families  moving  within  the  Community,  as  amended  and  updated  by  Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2001/83 of 2 June 1983 (OJ 1983 L 230, p. 6), with subsequent 
amendments.Proceedings  Court of Justice
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those benefits in kind and the institution of the place of residence, on being advised of 
that  refusal,  has  declined  to  contribute  to  facilitating  the  correct  application  of  that 
provision, it is for the latter institution, without prejudice to the possible liability of the 
institution of the place of stay, to reimburse directly to the insured person the cost of 
the  treatment  he  has  had  to  bear.  The  Court  added,  moreover,  that  in  that  event 
Regulation  No 1408/71  precludes  national  legislation  from  subjecting  such 
reimbursement to the obtaining of ex post facto authorisation which is granted only in 
so  far  as  it  is  shown  that  the  illness  which  necessitated  the  treatment  in  question 
manifested  itself  suddenly  during  the  stay,  making  that  treatment  immediately 
necessary.
17.2.  The  question  whether  the  limitation  of  compulsory  military  service  to  men  is 
compatible with the principle of equal treatment of men and women in Community law 
was considered in Case C-186/01 Dory [2003] ECR I-2479. 
The Court first defined the conditions under which that principle applies to activities 
relating to the organisation of the armed forces, pointing out that, in the absence of an 
inherent general exception in the Treaty excluding all measures taken for reasons of 
public security from the scope of Community law, "[m]easures taken by the Member 
States  in  this  domain  are  not  excluded  in  their  entirety  from  the  application  of 
Community  law  solely  because  they  are  taken  in  the  interests  of  public  security  or 
national  defence"  (paragraph  30).  The  Court  observed  that  Directive  76/207 
72  is 
applicable to access to posts in the armed forces and that it is for the Court to verify 
whether  the  measures  taken  by  the  national  authorities,  in  the  exercise  of  their 
recognised discretion, do in fact have the purpose of guaranteeing public security and 
whether they are appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim. As the Court said, 
"decisions  of  the  Member  States  concerning  the  organisation  of  their  armed  forces 
cannot  be  completely  excluded  from  the  application  of  Community  law,  particularly 
where observance of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in connection 
with  employment,  including  access  to  military  posts,  is  concerned"  (paragraph  35). 
However, the Court stated that Community law does not govern the Member States' 
choices of military organisation for the defence of their territory or of their essential 
interests,  and  that  "[i]t  is  for  the  Member  States,  which  have  to  adopt  appropriate 
measures  to  ensure  their  internal  and  external  security,  to  take  decisions  on  the 
organisation of their armed forces" (paragraph 36; see on this point Case C-273/97 
Sirdar [1999] ECR I-7403, paragraph 15, and Case C-285/98 Kreil [2000] ECR I-69, 
paragraph 15). 
72   Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p. 40). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Applying those principles, the Court held that the decision of the Federal Republic of 
Germany  to  ensure  its  defence  in  part  by  compulsory  military  service  was  the 
expression of such a choice of military organisation to which Community law is not 
applicable, and that while "[i]t is true that limitation of compulsory military service to 
men will generally entail a delay in the progress of the careers of those concerned, 
even if military service allows some of them to acquire further vocational training or 
subsequently to take up a military career[, n]evertheless, the delay in the careers of 
persons called up for military service is an inevitable consequence of the choice made 
by  the  Member  State  regarding  military  organisation  and  does  not  mean  that  that 
choice comes within the scope of Community law" (paragraphs 40 and 41). The Court 
added  that  "[t]he  existence  of  adverse  consequences  for  access  to  employment 
cannot,  without  encroaching  on  the  competences  of  the  Member  States,  have  the 
effect of compelling the Member State in question either to extend the obligation of 
military service to women, thus imposing on them the same disadvantages with regard 
to access to employment, or to abolish compulsory military service" (paragraph 43). 
In Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I-2741 the Court interpreted Directive 76/207 
73 in relation to a collective agreement applicable to the public service which allowed 
male and female employees to take advantage of the scheme of part-time work for 
older  employees.  Under  that  provision,  part-time  work  for  older  employees  was 
available only until the date on which the person concerned first became eligible for a 
full retirement pension under the statutory old-age insurance scheme. The Court ruled 
that  the  directive  precludes  a  collective  agreement  which  imposes  such  conditions 
"where the class of persons eligible for such a pension at the age of 60 consists almost 
exclusively of women whereas the class of persons entitled to receive such a pension 
only from the age of 65 consists almost exclusively of men, unless that provision is 
justified  by  objective  criteria  unrelated  to  any  discrimination  on  grounds  of  sex" 
(paragraph 63). 
The Court also recalled its case-law according to which a national court which is called 
upon to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those 
provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of 
national  legislation  (Case  106/77  Simmenthal  [1978]  ECR  629,  paragraph  24),  and 
stated that "[i]t is equally necessary to apply such considerations to the case where the 
provision at variance with Community law is derived from a collective agreement. It 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  very  nature  of  Community  law  if  the  court  having 
jurisdiction to apply that law were to be precluded at the time of such application from 
being  able  to  take  all  necessary  steps  to  set  aside  the  provisions  of  a  collective 
agreement which might constitute an obstacle to the full effectiveness of Community 
rules" (paragraphs 73 and 74). 
73   Ibid. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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It may also be noted that in Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker
(judgment  of  23  October  2003,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR)  the  Court  held  that 
Article 141  EC  precludes  legislation  which  may  entail  a  reduction  in  the  pension  of 
national civil servants who have worked part-time for at least a part of their working life, 
where that category of civil servants includes a considerably higher number of women 
than  men,  unless  the  legislation  is  justified  by  objective  factors  unrelated  to  any 
discrimination on grounds of sex. 
The Court also said that national legislation which has the effect of reducing a worker's 
retirement pension by a proportion greater than that resulting when his periods of part-
time work are taken into account cannot be regarded as objectively justified by the fact 
that the pension is in that case consideration for less work or on the ground that its aim 
is  to  prevent  civil  servants  employed  on  a  part-time  basis  from  being  placed  at  an 
advantage in comparison with those employed on a full-time basis. 
In Case C-25/02 Rinke (judgment of 9 September 2003, not yet published in the ECR) 
the Court examined whether the requirement laid down in Directives 86/457 
74 and 
93/16
75 that certain components of the specific training in general medical practice, 
completion of which confers the right to use the title "general medical practitioner", 
must be undertaken full-time constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of sex within 
the meaning of Directive 76/207, and, if so, how the incompatibility between Directive 
76/207,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Directives  86/457  and  93/16,  on  the  other,  is  to  be 
resolved.  The  Court  noted,  to  begin  with,  that  the  rule  that  part-time  training  must 
include  a  certain  number  of  periods  of  full-time  training  does  not  constitute  direct 
discrimination. As to whether it involves indirect discrimination against women workers, 
that is, according to the case-law, whether it works to the disadvantage of a much 
higher percentage of women than men, unless justified by objective factors unrelated to 
any discrimination on grounds of sex, the Court observed that, in fact, in the light of the 
statistical  data  available  to  it,  the  percentage  of  women  working  part-time  is  much 
higher than that of men working on a part-time basis. The Court therefore examined 
whether the requirement in question was justified by objective factors independent of 
any discrimination on grounds of sex. It held that it is. In Article 5(1) of Directive 86/457 
and  Article 34(1)  of  Directive  93/16  the  Community  legislature  considered  that 
adequate preparation for the effective exercise of general medical practice requires a 
certain number of periods of full-time training, both for students in hospitals or clinics 
and  for  those  in  approved  medical  practices  or  in  approved  centres  where  doctors 
provide primary care. It was reasonable for the legislature to take the view that that 
requirement  enables  doctors  to  acquire  the  experience  necessary,  by  following 
patients' pathological conditions as they may evolve over time, and to obtain sufficient 
74   Council  Directive  86/457/EEC  of  15  September  1986  on  specific  training  in  general 
medical practice (OJ 1986 L 267, p. 26). 
75   See note 35. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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experience in the various situations likely to arise more particularly in general medical 
practice.
17.3. Case C-151/02 Jaeger (judgment in 9 September 2003, not yet published in the 
ECR) gave the Court an occasion to refine its case-law on the concept of "working 
time" within the meaning of Directive 93/104 
76 in the case of doctors who are on call 
(see Case C-303/98 Simap [2000] ECR I-7963). The main proceedings concerned the 
question  whether  time  spent  in  the  provision  of  the  on-call  service 
("Bereitschaftsdienst") organised by the city of Kiel in the hospital operated by it should 
be regarded as working time or as a rest period. The on-call duty was organised in 
such a way that the doctor in question stayed at the clinic and was called upon to carry 
out his professional duties as the need arose, and was allocated a room with a bed in 
the hospital. 
The Court found, first, that on-call duty with the requirement of being physically present 
in  the  hospital  must  be  regarded  as  constituting  in  its  totality  working  time  for  the 
purposes of Directive 93/104. The decisive factor, in the Court's view, in considering 
that the characteristic features of the concept of "working time" were present was that 
the doctors were required to be present at the place determined by the employer and to 
be available to the employer in order to be able to provide their services immediately in 
case of need. The Court said that that conclusion is not altered by the mere fact that 
the  employer  makes  available  to  the  doctor  a  room  to  rest  in.  Consequently,  the 
directive precludes legislation of a Member State which classifies as rest periods an 
employee's periods of inactivity in the context of such on-call duty and "has the effect of 
enabling,  in  an  appropriate  case  by  means  of  a  collective  agreement  or  a  works 
agreement based on a collective agreement, an offset only in respect of periods of on-
call duty during which the worker has actually been engaged in professional activities" 
(paragraph 103). 
The Court stated, finally, that "in order to come within the derogating provisions set out 
in  Article 17(2),  subparagraph  2.1(c)(i)  of  the  directive,  a  reduction  in  the  daily  rest 
periods of 11 consecutive hours by a period of on-call duty performed in addition to 
normal  working  time  is  subject  to  the  condition  that  equivalent  compensating  rest 
periods  be  accorded  to  the  workers  concerned  at  times  immediately  following  the 
corresponding periods worked. Furthermore, in no circumstances may such a reduction 
in the daily rest period lead to the maximum weekly working time laid down in Article 6 
of the directive being exceeded" (paragraph 103). 
17.4.  In  Case  C-4/01  Martin  and  Others  (judgment  of  6  November  2003,  not  yet 
published  in  the  ECR)  the  Court  gave  a  preliminary  ruling  on  the  interpretation  of 
76   Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time (OJ 1993 L 307, p. 18). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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Article 3 of Directive 77/187.
77 The Court explained, first, that rights contingent upon 
dismissal or the grant of early retirement by agreement with the employer fall within the 
"rights and obligations" referred to in that provision. In this respect, the Court stated 
that early retirement benefits and benefits intended to enhance the conditions of such 
retirement,  paid  in  the  event  of  early  retirement  arising  by  agreement  between  the 
employer and the employee to employees who have reached a certain age, are not 
old-age,  invalidity  or  survivors'  benefits  under  supplementary  company  or  inter-
company pension schemes within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the directive. 
The Court held, next, that Article 3 of the directive is to be interpreted as meaning that 
obligations  arising  upon  the  grant  of  early  retirement,  arising  from  a  contract  of 
employment,  an  employment  relationship  or  a  collective  agreement  binding  the 
transferor  as  regards  the  employees  concerned,  are  transferred  to  the  transferee 
subject to the conditions and limitations laid down by that article, regardless of the fact 
that those obligations derive from statutory instruments or are implemented by such 
instruments  and  regardless  of  the  practical  arrangements  adopted  for  such 
implementation.
The Court then said that Article 3 of the directive precludes the transferee from offering 
the employees of a transferred entity terms less favourable than those offered to them 
by the transferor in respect of early retirement, and those employees from accepting 
those terms, where those terms are merely brought into line with the terms offered to 
the transferee's other employees at the time of the transfer, unless the more favourable 
terms previously offered by the transferor arose from a collective agreement which is 
no longer legally binding on the employees of the entity transferred, having regard to 
the conditions set out in Article 3(2). 
Finally, the Court held that where, in breach of the public policy obligations imposed by 
Article 3  of  Directive  77/187,  the  transferee  has  offered  employees  of  the  entity 
transferred early retirement less favourable than that to which they were entitled under 
their employment relationship with the transferor and those employees have accepted 
such  early  retirement,  it  is  for  the  transferee  to  ensure  that  those  employees  are 
accorded  early  retirement  on  the  terms  to  which  they  were  entitled  under  their 
employment relationship with the transferor. 
In Case C-340/01 Abler and Others (judgment of 20 November 2003, not yet published 
in the ECR) the Court pointed out that Directive 77/187 
78 is applicable whenever, in the 
context of contractual relations, there is a change in the legal or natural person who is 
77   Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ 1977 L 61, p. 26). 
78   Ibid. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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responsible  for  carrying  on  the  business  and  who  by  virtue  of  that  fact  incurs  the 
obligations of an employer vis-à-vis the employees of the undertaking, regardless of 
whether or not ownership of the tangible assets is transferred. Consequently, the Court 
held that the directive applies to a situation in which a contracting authority which has 
awarded the contract for the management of the catering services in a hospital to one 
contractor terminates that contract and concludes a contract for the supply of the same 
services with a second contractor, where the second contractor uses substantial parts 
of the tangible assets previously used by the first contractor and subsequently made 
available  to  it  by  the  contracting  authority,  even  where  the  second  contractor  has 
expressed the intention not to take on the employees of the first contractor. 
18. In the field of the environment, it may be noted that in Case C-182/02 Ligue pour la 
protection des oiseaux and Others (judgment of 16 October 2003, not yet published in 
the ECR) the Court gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Directive 79/409,
79
in which it held that "Article 9(1)(c) of the directive permits a Member State to derogate 
from the opening and closing dates for hunting which follow from consideration of the 
objectives set out in Article 7(4) of the directive" (paragraph 12). In this respect, the 
Court found that the hunting of wild birds for recreational purposes during the periods 
mentioned in Article 7(4) of the directive may constitute a judicious use of certain birds 
in small numbers authorised by Article 9(1)(c) of the directive, as do the capture and 
sale of wild birds even outside the hunting season with a view to keeping them for use 
as live decoys or to using them for recreational purposes in fairs and markets. 
The Court said, however, that hunting can be authorised under Article 9 only if there is 
no  other  satisfactory  solution.  According  to  the  Court,  that  condition  would  not  be 
fulfilled if the sole purpose of the derogation authorising hunting were to extend the 
hunting periods for certain species of birds in territories which they already frequent 
during the hunting periods fixed in accordance with Article 7 of the directive. Moreover, 
the Court pointed out that hunting must be organised so that it is carried out under 
strictly supervised conditions and on a selective basis and applies only to certain birds 
in small numbers. As regards the latter condition, the Court held that it "cannot be 
satisfied if a hunting derogation does not ensure the maintenance of the population of 
the  species  concerned  at  a  satisfactory  level"  (paragraph  17).  Finally,  the  Court 
stressed that the measures under which hunting is authorised pursuant to Article 9 of 
the directive must specify the species which are subject to the derogations, the means, 
arrangements or methods authorised for capture or killing, the conditions of risk and 
the circumstances of time and place under which such derogations may be granted, 
the authority empowered to declare that the required conditions obtain and to decide 
what means, arrangements or methods may be used, within what limits and by whom, 
and the controls which will be carried out. 
79   Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ 1979 
L 103, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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19. In the field of justice and home affairs, the Court ruled for the first time on the 
interpretation of the Schengen Agreement. In Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 
Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345 two questions were referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle laid down 
by Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement ("the CISA") in 
relation to national procedures under which it is possible for criminal proceedings to be 
discontinued following a settlement proposed by the prosecuting authorities without the 
involvement  of  a  court.  The  Court  pointed  out  that,  in  such  procedures,  "the 
prosecution is discontinued by the decision of an authority required to play a part in the 
administration of criminal justice in the national legal system concerned" (paragraph 
28) and that those procedures, "whose effects as laid down by the applicable national 
law  are  dependent  upon  the  accused's  undertaking  to  perform  certain  obligations 
prescribed by the Public Prosecutor, [penalise] the unlawful conduct which the accused 
is alleged to have committed" (paragraph 29). The Court drew the conclusion that, 
where  further  prosecution  is  definitively  barred,  the  person  concerned  must  be 
regarded as someone whose case has been "finally disposed of" for the purposes of 
Article 54 of the CISA in relation to the acts which he is alleged to have committed, and 
that, once the accused has complied with his obligations, the penalty entailed in the 
procedure whereby further prosecution is barred must be regarded as having been 
"enforced" for the purposes of Article 54. 
Moreover, according to the Court, the fact that no court is involved in such a procedure 
and that the decision in which the procedure culminates does not take the form of a 
judicial  decision  does  not  cast  doubt  on  that  interpretation,  since  such  matters  of 
procedure and form do not impinge on the effects of the procedure. In this respect, the 
Court pointed out that, in the absence of harmonisation or approximation of the criminal 
laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  to  procedures  whereby  further  prosecution  is 
barred, the ne bis in idem principle, whether it is applied to procedures whereby further 
prosecution is barred (regardless of whether a court is involved) or to judicial decisions, 
necessarily implies that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice 
systems  and  that  each  of  them  recognises  the  criminal  law  in  force  in  the  other 
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were 
applied. Moreover, the application by one Member State of that principle to procedures 
whereby  further  prosecution  is  barred,  which  have  taken  place  in  another  Member 
State without a court being involved, cannot be made subject to a condition that the 
first State's legal system does not require such judicial involvement either. 
Finally, the Court stated that applying Article 54 of the CISA to settlements in criminal 
proceedings cannot prejudice the rights of the victim of an offence, since the only effect 
of the ne bis in idem principle, as set out in that provision, is to ensure that a person 
whose case has been finally disposed of in a Member State is not prosecuted again on 
the same facts in another Member State, and it does not preclude the victim or any 
other person harmed by the accused's conduct from bringing a civil action to seek 
compensation for the damage suffered. Proceedings  Court of Justice
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20. In connection with the external relations of the Community, one case to be noted is 
Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund [2003] ECR I-4135, relating to the Association 
Agreement between the Communities and Slovakia.
80 In its judgment the Court held 
that the first indent of Article 38(1) of that agreement precludes the application to a 
professional  sportsman  of  Slovak  nationality,  who  is  lawfully  employed  by  a  club 
established in a Member State, of a rule drawn up by a sports federation in that State 
under which clubs are authorised to field, during league or cup matches, only a limited 
number of players from non-member countries that are not parties to the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area. 
In  reaching  that  conclusion,  the  Court  observed,  first,  that  in  its  judgment  in  Case 
C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-1049 it had recognised Article 37 of the 
Association Agreement with the Republic of Poland 
81 as having direct effect. Since the 
wording  of  the  said  Article 37  and  Article 38  is  identical  and  the  two  association 
agreements do not differ in regard to their objectives or the context in which they were 
adopted, Article 38 must also be recognised as having such effect. Addressing, next, 
the applicability of that article to a rule laid down by a sporting association, the Court 
recalled certain points made in its judgment in Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR 
I-4921, namely that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in the context of the 
provisions of the EC Treaty on the freedom of movement of workers applies not only to 
acts of the public authorities but also to rules laid down by sporting associations which 
determine the conditions under which professional sportsmen can engage in gainful 
employment. Referring to Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, in which it held that the right to equal 
treatment established by Article 37 has the same extent as that conferred in similar 
terms by Article 39 EC on Community nationals, the Court then considered that the 
interpretation of Article 39 EC adopted in Bosman could be transposed to Article 38 of 
the  Association  Agreement  with  Slovakia,  and  therefore  concluded  that  the  latter 
provision applies to a rule drawn up by a sporting association. Examining, finally, the 
scope of the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 38, the Court stated that 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality applies only to workers of 
Slovak nationality who are already lawfully employed in the territory of a Member State 
and solely with regard to conditions of work, remuneration or dismissal. However, since 
the sports rule at issue directly affects participation in league matches of a professional 
player, in other words the essential object of his activity, it relates to working conditions. 
80   Europe  Agreement  establishing  an  association  between  the  European  Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other part, 
concluded and approved on behalf of the Community by Decision 94/909/ECSC, EEC, 
Euratom of the Council and the Commission of 19 December 1994 (OJ 1994 L 359,, 
p. 1). 
81   First  indent  of  Article  37(1)  of  the  Europe  Agreement  establishing  an  association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic  of  Poland,  of  the  other  part,  concluded  and  approved  on  behalf  of  the 
Community  by  Decision  93/743/Euratom,  ECSC,  EC  of  the  Council  and  the 
Commission of 13 December 1993 (OJ 1993 L 348, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of Justice
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21. Finally, in the field of the Brussels Convention (Convention of 27 September 1968 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters), 
only one judgment will be mentioned. This is the judgment in Case C-116/02 Gasser
(judgment  of  9  December  2003,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR)  concerning  the 
interpretation  to  be  given  to  Article 21  of  the  Convention,  under  which,  where 
proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first 
seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of 
the court first seised is established, in two particular cases: first, where the jurisdiction 
of  the  court  second  seised  has  been  claimed  under  an  agreement  conferring 
jurisdiction  and,  second,  where,  in  general,  the  duration  of  proceedings  before  the 
courts  of  the  Contracting  State  in  which  the  court  first  seised  is  established  is 
excessively long. 
As regards the former case, the Court, having been asked whether the court second 
seised may, by way of derogation from Article 21, give judgment in the case without 
waiting for a declaration from the court first seised that it has no jurisdiction, answered 
that it may not, pointing out that the procedural rule in that article is based clearly and 
solely on the chronological order in which the courts involved are seised. 
As regards the latter case, the Court likewise refused to accept a derogation from the 
provisions of Article 21, stating that an interpretation whereby the application of that 
article should be set aside in such a case would be manifestly contrary both to the 
letter and spirit and to the aim of the Convention. Court of Justice  Composition
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B –  Composition of the Court of Justice
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1.  The Members of the Court of Justice
 
Vassilios Skouris
Born  1948;  graduated  in  law  from  the  Free  University,  Berlin 
(1970);  awarded doctorate in constitutional and administrative law 
at  Hamburg  University  (1973);  Assistant  Professor  at  Hamburg 
University  (1972-1977);  Professor  of  Public  Law  at  Bielefeld 
University  (1978);  Professor  of  Public  Law  at  the  University  of 
Thessaloniki  (1982);  Minister  of  Internal Affairs  (1989  and  1996); 
Member  of  the  Administrative  Board  of  the  University  of  Crete 
(1983-1987); Director of the Centre for International and European 
Economic Law, Thessaloniki (from 1997); President of the Greek 
Association for European Law (1992-1994); Member of the Greek 
National Research Committee (1993-1995); Member of the Higher 
Selection Board for Greek Civil Servants (1994-1996); Member of 
the Academic Council of the Academy of European Law, Trier (from 
1995); Member of the Administrative Board of the Greek National 
Judges’ College (1995-1996); Member of the Scientiﬁc Committee 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-1999); President of the Greek 
Economic and Social Council in 1998; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 8 June 1999; President of the Court of Justice since 7 October 
2003.
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias
Born  1946;  Assistant  lecturer  and  subsequently  Professor 
(Universities  of  Oviedo,  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  Autónoma  and 
Complutense of Madrid, Extremadura and Granada); Professor of 
Public  International  Law  at  Granada;  Member  of  the  Supervisory 
Board of the Max-Planck Institute of International Public Law and 
Comparative Law, Heidelberg; Doctor honoris causa of the University 
of Turin,  the  ‘Babes-Bolyai’  University  of  Cluj-Napoca  (Romania), 
the University of Saarland and the University of Oviedo; Honorary 
Bencher,  Gray’s  Inn  (London)  and  King’s  Inn  (Dublin);  Honorary 
Member  of  the  Society  of  Advanced  Legal  Studies  (London); 
Honorary  Member  of  the Academia Asturiana  de  Jurisprudencia; 
Judge at the Court of Justice from 31 January 1986; President of the 
Court of Justice from 7 October 1994 to 6 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Francis G. Jacobs, QC
Born  1939;  Barrister;  Ofﬁcial  in  the  Secretariat  of  the  European 
Commission of Human Rights; Legal Secretary to Advocate General 
J.-P. Warner; Professor of European Law (King’s College, London); 
Author of several works on European law; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 1988.
Claus Christian Gulmann
Born  1942;  Ofﬁcial  at  the  Ministry  of  Justice;  Legal  Secretary  to 
Judge  Max  Sørensen;  Professor  of  Public  International  Law  and 
Dean of the Law School of the University of Copenhagen; in private 
practice;  Chairman  and  member  of  arbitral  tribunals;  Member  of 
Administrative Appeal Tribunal; Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice from 7 October 1991 to 6 October 1994; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 7 October 1994.
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward
Born 1934; Advocate (Scotland); Queen’s Counsel (Scotland); Clerk, 
and subsequently Treasurer, of the Faculty of Advocates; President 
of the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the 
European Community; Salvesen Professor of European Institutions 
and Director of the Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh; Special 
Adviser to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities; Honorary Bencher, Gray’s Inn, London; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance from 25 September 1989 to 9 March 1992; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 10 March 1992.Members  Court of Justice
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Antonio Mario La Pergola
Born  1931;  Professor  of  Constitutional  Law  and  General  and 
Comparative  Public  Law  at  the  Universities  of  Padua,  Bologna 
and  Rome;  Member  of  the  High  Council  of  the  Judiciary  (1976-
1978);  Member  of  the  Constitutional  Court  and  President  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  (1986-1987);  Minister  for  Community  Policy 
(1987-1989);  elected  to  the  European  Parliament  (1989-1994); 
Judge at the Court of Justice from 7 October 1994 to 31 December 
1994; Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  from  1  January 
1995 to 14 December 1999; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
15 December 1999.
Jean-Pierre Puissochet
Born  1936;  State  Counsellor  (France);  Director,  subsequently 
Director-General, of the Legal Service of the Council of the European 
Communities (1968-1973); Director-General of the Agence nationale 
pour l’emploi (1973-1975); Director of General Administration, Ministry 
of Industry (1977-1979); Director of Legal Affairs at the OECD (1979-
1985); Director of the Institut international d’administration publique 
(1985-1987); Jurisconsult, Director of Legal Affairs in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (1987-1994); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 1994.
Philippe Léger
Born  1938; A  member  of  the  judiciary  serving  at  the  Ministry  for 
Justice (1966-1970); Head of, and subsequently Technical Adviser 
at, the Private Ofﬁce of the Minister for Living Standards in 1976; 
Technical Adviser at the Private Ofﬁce of the Minister for Justice 
(1976-1978); Deputy Director of Criminal Affairs and Reprieves at 
the Ministry of Justice (1978-1983); Senior Member of the Court of 
Appeal, Paris (1983-1986); Deputy Director of the Private Ofﬁce of 
the Minister for Justice (1986); President of the Regional Court at 
Bobigny (1986-1993); Head of the Private Ofﬁce of the Minister for 
Justice, and Advocate General at the Court of Appeal, Paris (1993-
1994);  Associate  Professor  at  René  Descartes  University  (Paris 
V)  (1988-1993); Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of  Justice  since 
7 October 1994.Members  Court of Justice
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Peter Jann
Born  1935;  Doctor  of  Law  of  the  University  of  Vienna  (1957); 
appointed  Judge  and  assigned  to  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice 
(1961); Judge in press matters at the Straf-Bezirksgericht, Vienna 
(1963-1966); spokesman of the Federal Ministry of Justice (1966-
1970)  and  subsequently  appointed  to  the  international  affairs 
department of that Ministry; Adviser to the Justice Committee and 
spokesman at the Parliament (1973-1978); appointed as Member 
of the Constitutional Court (1978); permanent Judge-Rapporteur at 
that court until the end of 1994; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
19 January 1995.
Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
Born  1949;  Judge  at  the  Consejo  General  del  Poder  Judicial 
(General Council of the Judiciary); Professor; Head of the Private 
Ofﬁce of the President of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial; 
ad hoc Judge to the European Court of Human Rights; Judge at the 
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) since 1996; Advocate General at 
the Court of Justice since 19 January 1995.
Melchior Wathelet
Born  1949;  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  Minister  for  National  Defence 
(1995); Mayor of Verviers; Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Justice 
and Economic Affairs (1992-1995); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister 
for Justice and Small Firms and Traders (1988-1991); Member of 
the Chamber of Representatives (1977-1995); degrees in law and in 
economics (University of Liège); Master of Laws (Harvard University, 
USA);  Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain; Judge at the 
Court of Justice from 19 September 1995 to 6 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Romain Schintgen
Born 1939; General Administrator at the Ministry of Labour; President 
of the Economic and Social Council; Director of the Société nationale 
de crédit et d’investissement and of the Société européenne des 
satellites; Government Representative on the European Social Fund 
Committee, the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for 
Workers and the Administrative Board of the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance from 25 September 1989 to 11 July 1996; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 12 July 1996.
Siegbert Alber
Born 1936; Member of the Bundestag (1969 to 1980); Member of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the Assembly 
of the Western European Union (WEU) (1970 to 1980); Member of 
the European Parliament (1977 to 1997); Member, then Chairman 
(1993  to  1994),  of  the  Committee  on  Legal Affairs  and  Citizens’ 
Rights and European Popular Party (EPP) Group Spokesman on 
Legal Affairs; Chairman of the delegation responsible for relations 
with the Baltic States and of the Subcommittees on Data Protection 
and on Poisonous or Dangerous Substances; Vice-President of the 
European  Parliament  (1984  to  1992);  honorary  professor  at  the 
Europa-Institut of the University of the Saarland; Advocate General 
at the Court of Justice from 7 October 1997 to 6 October 2003.
Jean Mischo
Born  1938;  studied  law  and  political  science  (universities  of 
Montpellier,  Paris  and  Cambridge);  member  of  the  Legal  Service 
of the Commission and subsequently principal administrator in the 
private  ofﬁces  of  two  Members  of  the  Commission;  Secretary  of 
Embassy  in  the  Contentious  Affairs  and  Treaties  Department  of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; 
Deputy Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the European 
Communities; Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Advocate General at the Court of Justice from 13 January 
1986 to 6 October 1991; Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Advocate General at the Court of Justice from 19 December 
1997 to 6 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Fidelma O’Kelly Macken
Born  1945;  Called  to  the  Bar  of  Ireland  (1972);  Legal  Advisor, 
Patent and Trade Mark Agents (1973-1979); Barrister (1979-1995) 
and Senior Counsel (1995-1998) of the Bar of Ireland; member of 
the Bar of England and Wales; Judge of the High Court in Ireland 
(1998); Lecturer in Legal Systems and Methods and ‘Averil Deverell’ 
Lecturer in Commercial Law, Trinity College, Dublin; Bencher of the 
Honourable Society of King’s Inns; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 6 October 1999.
Ninon Colneric
Born 1948; studied in Tübingen, Munich and Geneva; following a 
period of academic research in London, awarded a doctorate in law 
by the University of Munich; Judge at the Arbeitsgericht Oldenburg; 
authorised,  by  the  University  of  Bremen,  to  teach  labour  law, 
sociology of law and social law; Professor ad interim at the faculty 
of law of the universities of Frankfurt and Bremen; President of the 
Landesarbeitsgericht  Schleswig-Holstein  (1989);  collaboration,  as 
expert, on the European Expertise Service (EU) project for the reform 
of the labour law of Kirghizstan (1994-1995); Honorary Professor at 
the  University  of  Bremen  in  labour  law,  speciﬁcally  in  European 
labour law; Judge at the Court of Justice since 15 July 2000.
Stig von Bahr
Born  1939;  has  worked  with  the  Parliamentary  Ombudsman  and 
in the Swedish Cabinet Ofﬁce and ministries, inter alia as assistant 
under-secretary in the Ministry of Finance; appointed Judge in the 
Kammarrätten (Administrative Court of Appeal), Gothenburg, in 1981 
and Justice of the Regeringsrätten (Supreme Administrative Court) in 
1985; has collaborated on a large number of ofﬁcial reports, mainly 
on the subject of tax legislation and accounting; has been inter alia 
Chairman of the Committee on Inﬂation-Adjusted Taxation of Income, 
Chairman of the Accounting Committee and Special Rapporteur for 
the Committee on Rules for Taxation of Private Company Owners; 
has also been Chairman of the Accounting Standards Board and 
Member of the Board of the National Courts Administration and the 
Board of the Financial Supervisory Authority; has published a large 
number of articles, mainly on the subject of tax legislation; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.Members  Court of Justice
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Antonio Tizzano
Born  1940;  various  teaching  assignments  at  Italian  universities; 
Legal Counsel to Italy’s Permanent Representation to the European 
Communities  (1984-1992);  Member  of  the  Bar  at  the  Court  of 
Cassation and other higher courts; Member of the Italian delegation 
in international negotiations and at intergovernmental conferences 
including  those  on  the  Single  European  Act  and  the  Maastricht 
Treaty;  various  editorial  positions;  Member  of  the  Independent 
Group of Experts appointed to examine the ﬁnances of the European 
Commission  (1999);  Professor  of  European  Law,  Director  of  the 
Institute of International and European Law (University of Rome); 
Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.
José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues
Born  1940;  various  ofﬁces  within  the  judiciary  (1964-1977); 
Government  assignments  to  carry  out  and  coordinate  studies  on 
reform of the judicial system; Government Agent to the European 
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights  (1980-1984);  Expert  on  the  Human  Rights  Steering 
Committee of the Council of Europe (1980-1985); Member of the 
Review Commission of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure; Attorney General (1984-2000); member of the supervisory 
committee of the European Union anti-fraud ofﬁce (OLAF) (1999-
2000); Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.
Christiaan Willem Anton Timmermans
Born 1941; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities  (1966-1969);  ofﬁcial  of  the  European  Commission 
(1969-1977);  Doctor  in  Law  (University  of  Leiden);  Professor  of 
European Law at the University of Groningen (1977-1989); Deputy 
Justice at Arnhem Court of Appeal; various editorial positions; Deputy 
Director-General at the Legal Service of the European Commission 
(1989-2000);  Professor  of  European  Law  at  the  University  of 
Amsterdam; Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.Members  Court of Justice
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Leendert Adrie Geelhoed
Born 1942; Research Assistant, University of Utrecht (1970-1971); 
Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(1971-1974);  Senior  Adviser,  Ministry  of  Justice  (1975-1982); 
Member  of  the  Advisory  Council  on  Government  Policy  (1983-
1990);  various  teaching  assignments;  Secretary-General,  Ministry 
of  Economic  Affairs  (1990-1997);  Secretary-General,  Ministry  of 
General  Affairs  (1997-2000);  Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of 
Justice since 7 October 2000.
Christine Stix-Hackl
Born  1957;  Doctor  of  Laws  (University  of  Vienna),  postgraduate 
studies in European Law at the College of Europe, Bruges; member 
of the Austrian Diplomatic Service (from 1982); expert on European 
Union  matters  in  the  ofﬁce  of  the  Legal  Adviser  to  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  (1985-1988);  Legal  Service  of  the  European 
Commission (1989); Head of the ‘Legal Service - EU’ in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (1992-2000, Minister Plenipotentiary); participated 
in  the  negotiations  on  the  European  Economic Area  and  on  the 
accession of the Republic of Austria to the European Union; Agent 
of the Republic of Austria at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities from 1995; Austrian Consul-General in Zurich (2000); 
teaching  assignments  and  publications; Advocate  General  at  the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 2000.  Members  Court of Justice
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Allan Rosas
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws (1977) of the University of Turku (Finland); 
Professor of Law at the University of Turku (1978-1981) and at the 
Ǻbo Akademi  University  (Turku/Ǻbo)  (1981-1996);  Director  of  the 
latter’s Institute for Human Rights (1985-1995); various international 
and national academic positions of responsibility and memberships 
of learned societies; coordinated several international and national 
research projects and programmes, including in the ﬁelds of EU law, 
international law, humanitarian and human rights law, constitutional 
law and comparative public administration; represented the Finnish 
Government  as  member  of,  or  adviser  to,  Finnish  delegations  at 
various  international  conferences  and  meetings;  expert  functions 
in  relation  to  Finnish  legal  life,  including  in  governmental  law 
commissions and committees of the Finnish Parliament, as well as 
the UN, UNESCO, OSCE (CSCE) and the Council of Europe; from 
1995 Principal Legal Adviser at the Legal Service of the European 
Commission,  in  charge  of  external  relations;  from  March  2001, 
Deputy Director-General of the European Commission Legal Service. 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 17 January 2002.
Koen Lenaerts
Born 1954; lic.iuris, Ph.D. in Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); 
Master of Laws, Master in Public Administration (Harvard University); 
Lecturer (1979 to 1983), subsequently Professor of European Law, 
Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven  (since  1983);  Legal  Secretary  at 
the  Court  of  Justice  (1984  to  1985);  Professor  at  the  College  of 
Europe, Bruges (1984 to 1989); Member of the Brussels Bar (1986 
to 1989); Visiting Professor at the Harvard Law School (1989); Judge 
at the Court of First Instance of the European Communities from 
25 September 1989 to 6 October 2003; Judge at the Court of Justice 
from 7 October 2003. Members  Court of Justice
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Rosario Silva de Lapuerta
Born 1954; Bachelor of Laws (Universidad Complutense, Madrid); 
Abogado del Estado in Malaga; Abogado del Estado at the Legal 
Service of the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communication 
and, subsequently, at the Legal Service of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs;  Head Abogado del Estado of the State Legal Service for 
Cases before  the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
and  Deputy  Director-General  of  the  Community  and  International 
Legal Assistance Department (Ministry of Justice); Member of the 
Commission  think  tank  on  the  future  of  the  Community  judicial 
system;  Head  of  the  Spanish  delegation  in  the  “Friends  of  the 
Presidency”  Group  with  regard  to  the  reform  of  the  Community 
judicial  system  in  the  Treaty  of  Nice  and  of  the  Council  ad  hoc 
working party on the Court of Justice; Professor of Community law 
at the Diplomatic School, Madrid. Co-director of the journal “Noticias 
de la Unión Europea”; Judge at the Court of Justice since 7 October 
2003.
Juliane Kokott
Born  1957;  Law  studies  (Universities  of  Bonn  and  Geneva); 
Law  degree  (American  University,  Washington);  Doctor  in  Laws 
(Heidelberg  University,  1985;  Harvard  University,1990);  visiting 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley (1991); Professor 
of German and foreign public law, international law and European 
law  at  the  University  of  Düsseldorf  (1994);  deputy  judge  for  the 
Federal Government at the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); 
Deputy  Chair  of  the  Federal  Government’s  Advisory  Council  on 
Global  Change  (WBGU,  1996);  Professor  of  International  Law, 
International Business Law and European Law at the University of St 
Gallen (1999); Director of the Institute for European and International 
Business Law at the University of St Gallen (2000); Deputy Director 
of  the  Master  of  Business  Law  programme  at  the  University  of 
St Gallen (2001); Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2003.Members  Court of Justice
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Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro
Born  1967;  degree  in  law  (University  of  Lisbon,  1990);  assistant 
lecturer  (European  University  Institute,  1991);  Doctor  in  Laws 
(European  University  Institute,  Florence,  1996);  visiting  professor 
(College  of  Europe,  Natolin;  Ortega  y  Gasset  Institute,  Madrid; 
Catholic University, Portugal; Institute of European Studies, Macao); 
Professor (New University, Lisbon, 1997); Fulbright Visiting Research 
Fellow (Harvard University, 1998);  co-director of the Academy of 
International Trade Law; co-editor (Hart Series on European Law 
and Integration, European Law Journal)  and member of the editorial 
board  of  several  law  journals; Advocate  General  at  the  Court  of 
Justice since 7 October 2003.
Roger Grass
Born  1948;  Graduate  of  the  Institut  d’études  politiques,  Paris, 
and awarded higher degree in public law; Deputy Procureur de la 
République attached to the Tribunal de grande instance, Versailles; 
Principal Administrator at the Court of Justice; Secretary-General in 
the ofﬁce of the Procureur Général attached to the Court of Appeal, 
Paris; Private Ofﬁce of the Minister for Justice; Legal Secretary to 
the President of the Court of Justice; Registrar at the Court of Justice 
since 10 February 1994.Court of Justice  Changes in Composition
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2.  Changes in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2003
In 2003 the composition of the Court of Justice changed as follows:
On 6 October 2003, Mr Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, President of the Court of Justice, 
Mr Melchior Wathelet, Judge, and  Advocates General Siegbert Alber and Jean Mischo 
left the Court of Justice having completed their terms of ofﬁce. They were replaced 
respectively by Ms Rosario Silva de Lapuerta and Mr Koen Lenaerts as Judges and Ms 
Juliane Kokott and Mr Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro as Advocates General.
On 7 October 2003, the Judges elected, from among their number, Mr Vassilios Skouris, 
Judge, as President of the Court of Justice.Court of Justice  Order of Precedence
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3.  Order of precedence
from 1 January to 6 October 2003
G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias, President of the Court
J.-P. Puissochet, President of the Third and Sixth Chambers
M. Wathelet, President of the First and Fifth Chambers
R. Schintgen,  President of the Second Chamber
J. Mischo, First Advocate General
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Fourth Chamber
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
C. Gulmann, Judge 
D.A.O. Edward, Judge
A.M. La Pergola, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General
P. Jann, Judge 
D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General 
S. Alber, Advocate General
V. Skouris, Judge
F. Macken, Judge
N. Colneric, Judge
S. von Bahr, Judge
A. Tizzano, Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judge
L.A. Geelhoed, Advocate General
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
A. Rosas, Judge
R. Grass, RegistrarOrder of Precedence  Court of Justice
108
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1   The ﬁrst order of precedence in 2003 applied until 6 October (when certain Members, including Mr Rodríguez 
Iglesias, President of the Court, completed their terms of ofﬁce). The second did not apply until 10 October, the 
day of the election of the Presidents of the Chambers comprising three Judges.
from 10 October to 31 December 2003 1
V. Skouris, President of the Court
P. Jann, President of the First Chamber
C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Second Chamber
C. Gulmann, President of the Fifth Chamber
A. Tizzano, First Advocate General
J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, President of the Fourth Chamber
A. Rosas, President of the Third Chamber 
F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General
D.A.O. Edward, Judge
A. La Pergola, Judge
J.-P. Puissochet, Judge
P. Léger, Advocate General
D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General
R. Schintgen, Judge
F. Macken, Judge
N. Colneric, Judge
S. von Bahr, Judge
L.A. Geelhoed, Advocate General
C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General
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A —  Proceedings of the Court of First Instance in 2003 
by Mr Bo Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance 
The  statistics  relating  to  the  judicial  activity  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  in  2003 
provide confirmation of a steady increase in the number  of new cases (466, compared 
with 411 in 2002), a lack of change in the number of cases decided (339, compared 
The  increase  in  the  number  of  cases  brought  may  be  observed  in  every  field  of 
litigation.  In percentage terms, proceedings falling within two specific areas, namely 
staff  cases  and  intellectual  property  cases,  account  for  more  than  50%  of  the 
proceedings  brought  before  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (excluding  special  forms  of 
procedure).    With  100  new  cases  in  2003,  as  against  83  in  2002,  registration  of 
Community trade marks gives rise to an ever increasing number of actions. 
1. But it is 
staff cases, with 124 new actions this year, which rank first in the activity of the Court of 
First Instance. 
In addition to these data, there is a factor which is not quantifiable but has nevertheless 
now become apparent: cases brought before the Court of First Instance are becoming 
more and more complicated and require its Judges to carry out an analysis of ever 
increasing depth of cases drawn up by specialised lawyers. 
The above factors taken together � which have resulted in an increase in the number 
of  pending  cases,  now  verging  on  the  threshold  of  1  000  cases  �  fully  justify 
implementation of some of the reforms to the judicial system made possible by the 
Treaty  of  Nice,  in  particular  the  possibility  of  creating  judicial  panels  to  hear  and 
determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific 
areas (Article 225a EC). 
An initial step in this direction has already been taken by the Commission which, in 
November 2003, submitted a proposal for a Council decision establishing the European 
Civil Service Tribunal.  The legislative procedure is in progress. 
The average duration of cases decided in 2003 (excluding staff cases and intellectual 
property  cases)  is  comparable  to  that  of  the  previous  year,  despite  the  expedited 
treatment accorded to certain competition cases. 
1 It should be noted that as yet no action has been brought challenging a decision of a 
Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) made in the field of Community designs. 
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Finally, it may be observed that the number of applications for expedition decreased 
appreciably,  from  25  in  2002  to  13  in  2003.    If  applications  for  expedition  and 
applications for interim relief (39 applications for interim relief were lodged in 2003) are 
taken together, the situation is very similar to that in 2001 when 12 applications for 
expedition 
2  and  37  applications  for  interim  relief  were  lodged.    The  existence  of 
emergency cases as a branch of litigation is therefore now established. 
Developments in the case-law are set out below.  The account is divided into three 
distinct parts which in turn cover, without seeking to be exhaustive and necessarily 
reflecting the number of cases decided in each of the fields in question, proceedings 
concerning the legality of measures (I), actions for damages (II) and applications for 
interim relief (III). 
I.   Proceedings concerning the legality of measures 
Consideration of the substance of an action presupposes that the action is admissible.  
Cases which broached the question of the admissibility of actions for annulment (B) will 
therefore be covered before the essential aspects of substantive law (C to J).  The 
latter  are  grouped  according  to  subject  matter.    Not  every  field  falling  within  the 
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is included in the following account, which is 
therefore not exhaustive. 
Certain  questions  of  a  procedural  nature  will,  for  the first  time,  be  set  out  under  a 
specific heading (A), since the clarification of the law provided by certain decisions is 
worthy of emphasis. 
A.   Procedural aspects 
1.   Raising of a ground by the Court of its own motion 
In Case T-147/00 Laboratoires Servier v Commission [2003] ECR II-85 (under appeal, 
Case C-156/03 P), the Court annulled a Commission decision withdrawing marketing 
authorisation  for  certain  medicinal  products,  on  the  basis  of  a  ground  relating  to  a 
matter of public policy raised by it of its own motion.  The Court observed that the lack 
of competence of an institution which has adopted a contested measure constitutes a 
ground  for  annulment  for  reasons  of  public  policy,  which  must  be  raised  by  the 
Community judicature of its own motion.  The relationship between the power of the 
Community judicature to raise a ground of its own motion and the existence of a public-
policy interest underlying the ground was confirmed in Case T-183/00 Strabag Benelux 
v Council [2003] ECR II-135, paragraph 37 (under appeal, Case C-186/03 P), and in 
2 The possibility of ruling on the substance of a case under an expedited procedure has 
been  provided  for  by  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  since 
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Case T-308/01 Henkel v OHIM ņ LHS (UK) (KLEENCARE) (judgment of 23 September 
2003, not yet published in the ECR), paragraph 34. 
2.   Extent of the rights granted to interveners 
The Statute of the Court of Justice provides that an application to intervene is to be 
limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of First Instance state that the intervener is to accept the case 
as he finds it at the time of his intervention (Article 116(3)).  The question arose as to 
whether a party granted leave to intervene may raise a plea in law not raised by the 
party whom he supports. In its judgments in Case T-114/02 BaByliss v Commission
[2003]  ECR  II-1288  ("the  BaByliss  judgment")  and  Case  T-119/02  Royal  Philips 
Electronics  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-1442  ("the  Philips  judgment"),  the  Court 
answered  clearly  in  the  negative,  stating  that  while  the  intervener  may  advance 
arguments which are new or which differ from those of the party he supports, in order 
that  his  intervention  not  be  limited  to  restating  the  arguments  advanced  in  the 
application, it cannot be held that those provisions permit him to alter or distort the 
context of the dispute defined in the application by raising new pleas in law. 
3.  Costs 
It is exceptional for a costs issue to be mentioned in an annual report.  However, the 
message delivered by the Court in Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 
Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (judgment of 30 September 2003, 
not yet published in the ECR) ("the TACA judgment") is worthy of emphasis in the 
absence of a binding legal provision limiting the volume of pleadings and documents 
lodged in support of an action for annulment. 
Although the Court in this case granted the application for annulment in part, it ordered 
each party to bear its own costs on the ground that the length of the applicants' written 
pleadings needlessly added to the costs of the Commission.  The Court stated that the 
four applications lodged by the applicants and the annexes thereto were unusually long 
� each application totalled some 500 pages and the annexes made up approximately 
100 files � and that the pleas contained in the applications were for the most part 
unfounded and their number so great as to amount to an abuse. 
B.   Admissibility of actions brought under Article 230 EC 
Under  the fourth  paragraph  of  Article  230  EC, "any  natural  or  legal  person may  ... 
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision 
which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, 
is of direct and individual concern to the former". Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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1.   Measures against which an action may be brought 
In  order  to  ascertain  whether  a  measure  whose  annulment  is  sought  is  open  to 
challenge, it is necessary (i) to look to its substance and not to its form and (ii) to 
determine whether it produces legal effects binding on, and capable of affecting the 
interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position. 
It was in the light of those two rules that the Court was led, on a number of occasions, 
to find that measures were not open to challenge. 
First, the Court held that decisions by the Commission to commence legal proceedings 
against certain American cigarette manufacturers before a federal court in the United 
States of America did not constitute measures that were open to challenge.  In its 
judgment in Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T 380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01 Philip 
Morris International and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-1 (under appeal, Joined 
Cases  C-131/03  P  and  C  146/03  P),  the  Court  held  that  a  decision  to  bring  court 
proceedings does not in itself alter the legal position in question, but has the effect 
merely of opening a procedure whose purpose is to achieve a change in that position 
through a judgment.  While noting that the commencement of legal proceedings may 
give  rise  to  certain  consequences  by  operation  of  law,  the  Court  held  that  their 
commencement does not in itself determine definitively the obligations of the parties to 
the case and that that determination results only from the judgment of the court.  The 
Court stated that this finding applies both to proceedings before the Community Courts 
and  to  proceedings  before  courts  of  the  Member  States  and  even  of  non-member 
countries, such as the United States. 
Second, a case concerned whether a declaration of the President of the European 
Parliament at the plenary sitting of 23 October 2000 was a measure open to challenge.  
The declaration stated that, in accordance with Article 12(2) of the Act concerning the 
election of representatives to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage,
3
annexed to the Council Decision of 20 September 1976, "the ... Parliament takes note 
of the notification of the French Government declaring the disqualification of Mr Le Pen 
from holding office".  The Court held that the declaration was not open to challenge.  In 
its judgment of Case T-353/00 Le Pen v Parliament [2003] ECR II-1731 (under appeal, 
Case C-208/03 P), the Court found that the intervention of the European Parliament 
under the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the abovementioned Act was restricted 
to taking note of the declaration, already made by the national authorities, that the 
applicant's seat was vacant.  The Court accordingly held that the declaration of the 
President of the European Parliament was not intended to produce legal effects of its 
own,  distinct  from  those  of  the  decree  dated  31  March  2000  of  the  French  Prime 
Minister stating that the applicant's ineligibility brought to an end his term of office as a 
representative in the European Parliament. 
3 OJ 1976 L 278, p. 5.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Third, according to Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics v Commission (judgment of 17 
June 2003, not yet published in the ECR) a letter from the Commission refusing to act 
on an undertaking's complaint based on Articles 82 EC and 86 EC is not, in principle, a 
measure against which an action for annulment may be brought.  After recalling that 
the exercise of the Commission's power conferred by Article 86(3) EC to assess the 
compatibility of State measures with the Treaty rules is not coupled with an obligation 
on  the  part  of  the  Commission  to  take  action,  the  Court  held  that  legal  or  natural 
persons who request the Commission to take action under Article 86(3) EC do not, in 
principle, have the right to bring an action against a Commission decision not to use 
the powers which it has under that article.  The Court concluded in the present case 
that the applicant was not entitled to bring an action for annulment of the act by which 
the Commission decided not to use the powers conferred on it by Article 86(3) EC.  
However, since the applicant relied at the hearing on the judgment in Case T-54/99 
max.mobil  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR  II-313  (under  appeal,  Case  C-141/02  P), 
commented upon in the Annual Report 2002, the Court added that "if the contested act, 
in so far as it concerns infringement of Article 82 EC in conjunction with Article 86 EC, 
must be classified as a decision rejecting a complaint" as referred to in max.mobil v 
Commission, the applicant should, as complainant and addressee of that decision, be 
regarded as entitled to bring his action.  In the present case the question as to the 
admissibility of the action did not affect the outcome of the dispute since the Court held 
on the merits that the action was unfounded. 
Fourth,  the  orders  of  the  Court  of  9  July  2003  in  Case  T-219/01  Commerzbank  v
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, and in Case T-250/01 Dresdner Bank v
Commission and Case T-216/01 Reisebank v Commission, neither published in the 
ECR, result from challenges to decisions of the hearing officer taken pursuant to Article 
8  of  Commission  Decision  2001/462/EC,  ECSC  of  23  May  2001  on  the  terms  of 
reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings. 
4 By those decisions, 
several  banks  which  were  subject  to  administrative  investigation  to  establish  their 
participation  in  an  arrangement  contrary  to  Article  81  EC  were  refused  access  to 
information relating to the circumstances which had led to the termination of some of 
the administrative procedures initiated against other banks also proceeded against by 
the Commission. In each of the three cases the Court held that the decision of the 
hearing  officer  in  itself produced  only  limited  effects,  characteristic  of  a  preparatory 
measure in the course of an administrative procedure initiated by the Commission, and 
could not therefore justify the action being admissible before that procedure had been 
completed.  It followed that any infringement of rights of defence by the refusal capable 
of rendering the administrative procedure unlawful could properly be pleaded only in an 
action brought against the final decision finding that Article 81 EC had been infringed. 
Finally, in the field of State aid, the Court had the opportunity to clarify the case-law 
concerning  the  ability  to  challenge  decisions  to  initiate  the  formal  investigation 
procedure envisaged in Article 88(2) EC.  In contrast to decisions initiating the formal 
4 OJ 2001 L 162, p. 21.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
118
Court of First Instance  Proceedings
119
- 6 -
examination procedure in regard to measures that have been provisionally classified as 
new aid, which have independent legal effects vis-à-vis the final decision for which they 
are  a  preparatory  step  (judgments  in  Joined  Cases  T-195/01  and  T-207/01 
Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, Joined Cases T-269/99, 
T-271/99 and T-272/99 Territorio Histórico de Guipúzcoa and Others v Commission
[2002]  ECR  II-4217  and  Joined  Cases  T-346/99,  T-347/99  and  T-348/99  Territorio 
Histórico de Álava and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-4259; commented upon in 
the  Annual  Report  2002),  the  decision  initiating  the  formal  examination  procedure 
which  gave  rise  to  the  order  of  2  June  2003  in  Case  T-276/02  Forum  187  v
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, classified the Belgian scheme at issue �
the coordination centres scheme � as a scheme of existing aid.  After finding that such 
a decision does not have the independent legal effects deriving from the suspension of 
measures  provided  for  in  Article  88(3)  EC  in  regard  to  new  aid  and  that  the 
classification of the scheme at issue was provisional in nature, the Court concluded 
that since the contested decision did not produce any legal effect, it did not constitute a 
challengeable measure. 
2.  Legal interest in bringing proceedings 
An action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far 
as the applicant has an interest in seeing the contested measure annulled.  Although a 
legal interest in bringing proceedings is not expressly required by Article 230 EC, it is 
settled case-law that the applicant must prove that he has such an interest in bringing 
proceedings.    The  Court  of  First  Instance  states  that  this  is  an  essential  and 
fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings (order in Case T-167/01 Schmitz-
Gotha Fahrzeugwerke v Commission [2003] ECR II-1875) and that, in the absence of a 
legal  interest  in  bringing  proceedings,  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine  whether  the 
contested  decision  is  of  direct  and  individual  concern  to  the  applicant  within  the 
meaning  of  the  fourth  paragraph  of  Article  230  EC  (Case  T-326/99  Olivieri  v 
Commission and European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (judgment 
of 18 December 2003, not yet published in the ECR)). 
That interest must be a vested and present interest and is assessed as at the date 
when the action is brought.  If the interest which an applicant claims concerns a future 
legal  situation,  he  must  demonstrate  that  the  prejudice  to  that  situation  is  already 
certain.  Such an interest is not established by an applicant who seeks the annulment 
of a decision addressed to a Member State ordering it to recover State aid from various 
companies where, contrary to the applicant's assertions, the decision does not impose 
any  joint  and  several  obligation  on  him  to  repay  the  contested  aid  (Schmitz-Gotha 
Fahrzeugwerke, cited above). 
Nor does an applicant have a legal interest in bringing proceedings where he seeks the 
annulment of a Commission decision granting marketing authorisation for a medicinal 
product  and  it  is  established  that the  scientific information forwarded  by  him  to the Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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European  Agency  for  the  Evaluation  of  Medicinal  Products  has,  first,  justified  the 
reopening of the assessment procedure and, second, been examined and taken into 
account under that procedure (Olivieri, cited above). 
3.  Standing to bring proceedings 
An applicant is recognised as having standing to bring proceedings where he shows 
that he is directly and individually concerned by a contested measure not addressed to 
him. 
It  is  now  well-established  that  a  Community  measure  is  of  direct  concern  to  an 
individual where it directly affects his legal situation and its implementation is purely 
automatic  and  results  from  Community  rules  alone  without  the  application  of  other 
intermediate  rules.    Several  decisions  of  the  Court  in  2003  constitute  examples 
demonstrating the application of that settled case-law (order of 6 May 2003 in Case 
T-45/02 DOW AgroSciences v Parliament and Council, not yet published in the ECR; 
the  Philips  judgment;  and  Case  T-243/01  Sony  Computer  Entertainment  Europe  v
Commission and in Joined Cases T-346/02 and T-347/02 Cableuropa and Others v
Commission (judgments of 30 September 2003, neither yet published in the ECR)). 
The focus will therefore essentially be placed on applicants' individual concern.  It will 
be remembered that, following the judgment of 25 July 2002 in Case C-50/00 P Unión
de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677 in which the Court of Justice 
confirmed  its  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  individual  concern,  the  Court  of  First 
Instance took account of the Court of Justice's interpretation when it examined whether 
actions  for  annulment  were  admissible  and  thus  no  longer  followed  the  different 
interpretation which it had adopted in its judgment of 3 May 2002 in Case T-177/01 
Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365 (under appeal, Case C-263/02 P) (see 
the Annual Report 2002). 
The Court of First Instance has therefore assessed the concept of individual concern 
by reference to the formula laid down in Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] 
ECR 95.  Thus, in order for natural and legal persons to be regarded as individually 
concerned by a measure not addressed to them, it must affect their position by reason 
of  certain  attributes  peculiar  to  them,  or  by  reason  of  a  factual  situation  which 
differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the 
same way as the addressee. 
In order to provide a clear account, a distinction will be drawn according to whether the 
contested measure was genuinely a decision or a measure of general application. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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(a)   Decisions 
(a.1)  Decisions of approval in the field of concentrations of undertakings 
On several occasions the Court declared actions for annulment of decisions approving 
concentrations  brought  by  legal  persons  not  a  party  to  the  concentration  to  be 
admissible (the BaByliss judgment, Case T-374/00 Verband der freien Rohrwerke and 
Others v Commission (judgment of 8 July 2003, not yet published in the ECR) and 
Case T-158/00 ARD v Commission (judgment of 30 September 2003, not yet published 
in the ECR)). 
In  January  2002  the  Commission  approved,  without  opening  the  second  phase  of 
examination, the purchase by SEB of certain elements of Moulinex's business, subject 
to conditions.  BaByliss and Philips challenged that decision before the Court of First 
Instance.  In the BaByliss judgment, the Court examined the admissibility of the action 
and found that the decision, which was not addressed to BaByliss, was none the less 
of direct and individual concern to it.  In this connection, the Court took into account (i) 
that BaByliss actively participated in the procedure, as evidenced by written and oral 
contributions provided to the Commission; (ii) that BaByliss was a potential competitor 
on  oligopolistic  markets  characterised  by  substantial  barriers  to  entry  arising  from 
strong  brand  loyalty  and  by  the  difficulty  of  access  to  retail  trading;  and  (iii)  that 
BaByliss  was  interested  in  acquiring  Moulinex  or,  at  least,  some  of  its  assets,  as 
evidenced by several purchase offers.  It is thus accepted that a potential competitor of 
the  parties  to  a  concentration  is  entitled,  in  certain  circumstances,  to  seek  the 
annulment of a decision of approval in the case of oligopolistic markets. 
ARD,  a  company  operating  on  the  free-TV  market  in  Germany,  challenged  the 
Commission decision of 21 March 2000 approving subject to conditions, but without 
opening the second phase, the concentration by which BSkyB acquired, with KVV, joint 
control of KirchPay TV, a company operating on the pay-TV market in Germany.  In 
ARD v Commission, the Court held that ARD, in addition to being directly concerned by 
the contested decision, was individually concerned by it.  In this connection, the Court 
had regard, first, to the fact that ARD had actively participated in the administrative 
procedure, since it had been invited by the Commission to submit observations and the 
observations  submitted  by  it  had  partly  determined  the  content  of  the  contested 
decision and the nature of the commitments, and second, to the specific effect on the 
position  of  ARD,  which  was  not  present  on  the  markets  on  which  the  undertaking 
holding the monopoly saw its position strengthened by the concentration but only on 
neighbouring upstream or downstream markets. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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(a.2)  Referrals to national authorities in the field of concentrations of undertakings 
Article 9 of Regulation No 4064/89 
5 enables examination of a notified concentration to 
be referred to the competent authorities of a Member State in certain circumstances.  
In  two  judgments,  actions  for  annulment  of  a  decision  to  refer  examination  to  the 
national authorities pursuant to that provision were declared admissible.  The first case 
arose from the Commission's decision to refer the concentration between SEB and 
Moulinex to the French competition authorities so far as concerned the French markets 
for small electrical household appliances, with a view to the application of national law 
(the Philips judgment).  In the second case, examination of the concentration consisting 
in the merger of Vía Digital and Sogecable was referred to the Spanish authorities 
(Cableuropa and Others v Commission, cited above). 
It is apparent from these judgments that applicants may be distinguished individually in 
two sets of circumstances in particular. 
First, an applicant is regarded as individually concerned by the decision to refer where 
it would have been individually concerned by a decision of approval adopted by the 
Commission without a referral.  The Court thus determines whether, had a referral to 
the national authorities not been made, it would have been open to the applicant to 
challenge the assessment of the effects of the concentration on the relevant markets in 
the  Member  State  concerned  which  the  Commission  would  have  carried  out.    The 
status  of  competitor  (potential  competitor  in  the  BaByliss  judgment  and  actual 
competitor in Cableuropa and Others v Commission) and the active involvement of the 
applicant  in  the  course  of  the  procedure  preceding  the  reference  are  two  relevant 
criteria. 
Second, an applicant is regarded as individually concerned by the decision to refer 
where  that  decision  denies  it  the  benefit  of  the  procedural  guarantees  granted  by 
Regulation  No 4064/89  (Article  18(4))  to  third  parties  with  a  sufficient  interest 
(Cableuropa and Others v Commission).
5 Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89  of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of 
concentrations between undertakings (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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(b)   Measures of general application 
(b.1)   Regulations 
In its judgment in Sony Computer Entertainment Europe v Commission, cited above, 
the  Court  declared  admissible  an  action  for  annulment  of  a  Commission  regulation 
concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature.  The 
Court acknowledged that, as has been held previously, Commission regulations for the 
classification  of  specific  goods  in  the  Combined  Nomenclature  are  of  general 
application.  None the less it held, relying on a series of factors, that Sony Computer 
Entertainment  Europe  was  individually  concerned  by  such  a  regulation  since  it 
triggered  the  administrative  procedure  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  regulation 
concerning the tariff classification of the product imported by it into the Community �
the PlayStation
®2, it was the only undertaking whose legal position was affected as a 
result  of  adoption  of  the  regulation,  the  regulation  focused  specifically  on  the 
classification of the PlayStation
®2 imported by it, there were no other products with 
identical features at the time when the regulation entered into force, and the applicant 
was the sole authorised importer of the product into the Community. 
(b.2)   Directives 
Directive 2002/2 
6 introduces new labelling rules for compound feedingstuffs, designed 
to provide more detailed information on the composition of feedingstuffs.  An animal 
feed undertaking, Établissements Toulorge, sought the annulment of the directive and 
compensation for the  damage  allegedly  suffered  by  it.    By  order  in  Case  T-167/02 
Établissements  Toulorge  v  Parliament  and  Council  [2003]  ECR  II-1114,  the  Court 
dismissed the action for annulment as inadmissible on the ground that the applicant 
was not individually concerned by the directive. 
The  Court  stated  that  the  legislative  nature  of  directives  does  not  preclude  an 
interested business from being granted standing to challenge the legality of a directive, 
but nevertheless held that in the present case the applicant had not shown that it was 
individually  concerned  by  the  contested  directive.    The  disclosure  of  composition 
formulae of feedingstuffs did not adversely affect the applicant's particular situation but 
was  an  obligation  owed  in  identical  fashion  by  all  manufacturers  of  compound 
feedingstuffs.    Accordingly,  the  Court  dismissed  the  action  as  inadmissible  without 
examining whether the directive was of direct concern to the applicant. 
6 Directive 2002/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
amending Council Directive 79/373/EEC on the circulation of compound feedingstuffs and 
repealing Commission Directive 91/357/EEC (OJ 2002 L 63, p. 23).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The Court adopted the same reasoning in concluding that the founder of an internet 
site  was  not  individually  concerned  by  Directive  2002/58/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
7 (order of 6 
May 2003 in Case T-321/02 Vannieuwenhuyze-Morin v Parliament and Council, not yet 
published in the ECR). 
(b.3)  Decisions 
Despite the term used, a "decision" may be considered to be a measure of general 
application.  As was held in the order in DOW AgroSciences v Parliament and Council,
cited above, Decision No 2455/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 November 2001 establishing the list of priority substances in the field of water 
policy  and  amending  Directive  2000/60/EC 
8  cannot,  notwithstanding  its  title,  be 
considered to constitute a decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 
230  EC  since  it  was  adopted  by  the  Parliament  and the  Council  at the  end  of the 
codecision procedure (Article 251 EC) and is of the same general nature as Directive 
2000/60, altering the latter's wording by the insertion of an annex. 
The order dismisses as inadmissible the action brought by several companies active in 
the manufacture and marketing of two substances covered by the decision.  The Court 
held that such a decision could not be considered to be of individual concern to the 
applicants  which  did  not  plead  breach  of  an  exclusive  intellectual  property  right  in 
respect of the substances listed in the contested measure or of a specific right, did not 
establish that the decision caused them exceptional damage, and the special position 
of which did not have to be taken into account by the authors of the measure when 
adopting it. 
C.   Competition rules applicable to undertakings 
Competition has once again been the source of cases from which much can be learned 
in the field of the application of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and in that of concentrations 
between undertakings. 
7 OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37.
8 OJ 2001 L 331, p. 1.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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First of all, the lengthy TACA judgment, which followed the delivery of the judgments in 
Case T-395/94 Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-875, 
concerning the Trans-Atlantic Agreement ("the TAA"), see the Annual Report 2002;
and  Case  T-86/95  Compagnie  générale  maritime  and  Others  v  Commission  [2002] 
ECR II-1011, concerning the FEFC Agreement, see the  Annual Report 2002; Case 
T-213/00  CMA  CGM  and  Others  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-927,  concerning  the 
FETTCSA Agreement; under appeal, Case C-236/03 P; and the order of 4 June 2003 
in Case T-224/99 European Council of Transport Users and Others v Commission, not 
yet  published  in  the  ECR,  closed  the  series  of  cases  concerning  the  legality  of 
practices adopted by liner conferences in the light of Council Regulation No 4056/86 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC to maritime 
transport.
9 By the judgment in TACA (an abbreviation of the Transatlantic Conference 
Agreement,  an  agreement  concluded  in  July  1994  between  15  shipping  companies 
which were parties to the TAA, several provisions of which had been prohibited by the 
Commission in its decision of 19 October 1994 
10), the Court rejected all of the pleas 
raised by the applicants with respect to infringements of Article 81 EC and allowed in 
part those concerning infringements of Article 82 EC. Given that there are so many, the 
important points made in that judgment will be addressed under most of the following 
headings. 
1.   Points raised in the case-law on the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC 
(a)   Scope ratione personae 
The agreements and practices covered by Articles 81 EC and 82 EC are prohibited 
only if they have been concluded or implemented by one or more "undertakings". In its 
judgment in Case T-319/99 FENIN v Commission [2003] ECR II-360, under appeal, 
Case C-205/03 P, the Court stated that the concept of "undertaking" does not cover 
purchases of products which have been made with a view to using those products in 
connection with a non-economic activity. 
FENIN  (Federación  Nacional  de  Empresas  de  Instrumentación  Científica,  Médica, 
Técnica  y  Dental)  is  an  association  of  the  majority  of  the  undertakings  marketing 
medical goods and equipment in Spain from which the bodies running the national 
public health system ("the SNS") purchase medical goods and equipment which are 
9 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty to maritime transport (OJ 1986 
L 378, p. 4), Article 1 of which defines liner conference as a group of vessel-operating 
carriers which provides international liner services for the carriage of cargo on one or 
more particular routes and which operates under uniform or common freight rates.
10 Commission Decision 94/980/EC of 19 October 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant 
to Article [81] of the Treaty (IV/34.446 ņ Trans-Atlantic Agreement) (OJ 1994 L 376, 
p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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then  used  in  Spanish  hospitals.  On  26  August  1999,  the  Commission  rejected  a 
complaint made by FENIN alleging abuse of a dominant position which, according to 
FENIN, arose from the average delay of 300 days in the settlement of debts by the 
bodies running the SNS. 
In  the  judgment  given  on  the  action  for  annulment  brought  by  FENIN  against  the 
Commission's decision, the Court first of all stated that, in Community competition law, 
the  concept  of  undertaking  covers  any  entity  engaged  in  an  economic  activity, 
regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed. However, the Court 
explained that the characteristic feature of an economic activity is the offer of goods 
and services on a given market and not the business of purchasing them, as such. 
Consequently,  when  determining  the  nature  of  the  purchasing  activity,  it  would  be 
incorrect to dissociate it from the use to which the purchased goods are subsequently 
put,  since  the  nature  of  the  purchasing  activity  is  to  be  determined  according  to 
whether or not the subsequent use amounts to an economic activity. 
The Court went on to point out that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, 
bodies which fulfil an exclusively social function based on the principle of solidarity and 
which  are  non  profit  making  are  not  undertakings  (Joined  Cases  C-159/91  and 
C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637). 
Applying those principles to the facts of FENIN v Commission, the Court found that the 
SNS is funded by social contributions and that it provides services free of charge to its 
members on the basis of universal cover, with the result that it operates according to 
the principle of solidarity. The Court therefore ruled that the bodies of the SNS could 
not be regarded as undertakings for the purposes of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC either in 
terms of their management of the SNS or, consequently, in terms of their purchasing 
activities related to that management. The Court therefore dismissed the action. 
(b)  Competition proceedings and reasonable period 
Following  a  complaint  lodged  in  1991,  the  Commission,  by  decision  of  26  October 
1999, 
11  imposed  on  Nederlandse  Federatieve  Vereniging  voor  de  Groothandel  op 
Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie ("FEG and TU") fines amounting to EUR 
4.4 million and EUR 2.15 million for various infringements of Article 81 EC. More than 
eight years passed between the lodging of the complaint with the Commission and 
adoption of the contested decision. During the administrative procedure, FEG and TU 
objected to the excessive duration of the investigation. Referring to its obligation to 
adopt decisions in competition matters within a reasonable period (Case C-185/95 P 
11 Commission  Decision  2000/117/EC  of  26  October  1999  concerning  a  proceeding 
pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty ņ Case IV/33.884 ņ Nederlandse Federatieve 
Vereniging  voor  de  Groothandel  op  Elektrotechnisch  Gebied  and  Technische  Unie 
(FEG and TU) (OJ 2000 L 39, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 and Joined Cases T-213/95 and 
T-18/96  SCK  and  FNK  v  Commission  [1997]  ECR  II-1739),  the  Commission 
acknowledged  in  the  contested  decision  that  the  duration  of  the  administrative 
procedure had been "considerable" and reduced the level of the fines imposed by EUR 
100 000. 
Before the Court, FEG and TU submitted that the Commission's infringement of the 
principle that decisions  must be adopted within a reasonable period should lead to 
annulment of the contested decision or, at the very least, to a further reduction in the 
level of the fines. The applicants complained that it had been difficult to conduct their 
defence as a result of the time which had elapsed and the protracted uncertainty of 
their situation. 
By its judgment of 16 December 2003 in Joined Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00 Nederlandse 
Federatieve  Vereniging  voor  de  Groothandel  op  Elektrotechnisch  Gebied  and 
Technische Unie v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the Court rejected those 
complaints  and  held  that,  while  the  Commission  is  under  an  obligation to  adopt  its 
decisions within a reasonable period, the fact that that period is exceeded does not 
necessarily justify annulment of the decision terminating the procedure. Confirming the 
"PVC II" case-law (Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, 
T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij 
and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, commented on in the Annual Report 
1999),  the  Court  took  the  view  that  the  fact  that  the  Commission  exceeded  a 
reasonable period could constitute a ground of annulment only where that adversely 
affected the exercise by the undertakings concerned of their rights of defence. Since 
the  Commission  had  acknowledged  that  the  period  had  been  excessive,  the  Court 
examined whether, in this case, the rights of the defence had been adversely affected. 
The Court explained that, in order to do so, it was necessary to distinguish between the 
investigatory phase preceding the statement of objections and the developments after 
the  administrative  procedure.  Since  no  accusations  were  made  against  the 
undertakings  during  the  first  phase,  the  extension  of  that  phase  could  not  have 
adversely affected the rights of the defence. The Court ruled that the second phase, 
which covered the period of 23 months between the hearing of the parties and the 
contested decision, was considerable and attributable to the Commission's failure to 
act. 
However, the Court went on to find that the rights of the defence had not been affected 
by the duration of that phase of the procedure. In that connection, it stated, inter alia, 
that, so long as the limitation period laid down in Regulation No 2988/74 
12 has not 
expired, the protraction of the uncertainty alleged by the applicants as regards their 
12 Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 2988/74  of  26  November  1974  concerning  limitation 
periods  in  proceedings  and  the  enforcement  of  sanctions  under  the  rules  of  the 
European Economic Community relating to transport and competition (OJ 1974 L 319, 
p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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situation  and  as  regards  the  adverse  effects  on  their  reputation  is  inherent  in 
proceedings under Regulation No 17 and does not, in itself, prejudice the rights of the 
defence. 
The Court also dismissed the applications for a reduction in the fines on account of the 
length of the administrative procedure and, exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, found 
that the applicants had failed to adduce any factors which could justify a reduction in 
addition to that already granted by the Commission. 
(c)  Article 81 EC 
(c.1)  Prohibited agreements 
–  Horizontal agreements 
Horizontal price fixing agreements are expressly prohibited by Article 81(1) EC. The 
Commission decisions identifying and penalising such agreements were for the most 
part upheld. 
First of all, in the judgment in CMA CGM and Others v Commission, cited above, the 
Commission's decision of 16 May 2000 
13 was upheld in so far as it found that the 
agreement between shipping lines operating on the northern Europe/Far East trade, 
the Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement, which provided that 
discounts were not to be granted on published rates for charges and surcharges for 
certain  services,  constituted  an  infringement  of  Article  81(1)  EC  and  Article  2  of 
Regulation No 1017/68 
14 and that the conditions for an exemption of that agreement 
under Article 81(3) EC and Article 5 of Regulation No 1017/68  were not satisfied. Only 
the article of the decision relating to the fines was annulled. 
In this connection, it is sufficient to note that the Court, like the Commission before it, 
took the view that an agreement prohibiting the grant of discounts on charges and 
surcharges between the members of a liner conference and independent companies 
must be regarded as a collective horizontal price-fixing agreement prohibited not only 
by the express wording of Article 81(1)(a) EC and Article 2(a) of Regulation No 1017/68 
but also by the spirit of Regulation No 4056/86. 
13 Commission Decision 2000/627/EC of 16 May 2000 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.018 ņ Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges 
Agreement (FETTCSA)) (OJ 2000 L 268, p. 1).
14 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of 19 July 1968 applying rules of competition to 
transport  by  rail,  road  and  inland  waterway  (OJ,  English  Special  Edition  1968  (I), 
p. 302).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Moreover,  the  five  judgments  of  11  December  2003  in  Case  T-56/99  Marlines  v
Commission,  Case  T-59/99  Ventouris  v  Commission,  Case  T-61/99  Adriatica  di 
Navigazione v Commission, Case T-65/99 Strintzis Lines Shipping v Commission and 
Case T-66/99 Minoan Lines v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, essentially 
uphold the Commission decision of 1998 finding that there was an agreement contrary 
to Article 81 EC in the sector of maritime transport between Greece and Italy. 
15 In that 
decision, the Commission found that there was a series of agreements and practices 
fixing the prices for roll on roll off ferry services between the ports of Patras (Greece) 
and Ancona (Italy) and for transport by truck on the Patras to Bari (Italy) and Patras to 
Brindisi (Italy) routes. Fines amounting to a total of approximately EUR 9 million were 
imposed on the seven companies which participated in the infringements. Five of the 
seven companies penalised by the Commission brought actions for annulment of the 
decision  and  for  a  reduction  of  the  fines.  All  the  actions  were  dismissed,  save  in 
respect of the fines imposed on Ventouris and Adriatica, which were reduced on the 
ground that the Commission had erred in its assessment of the gravity and scope of 
the infringements committed by them. 
The Court found that the facts on which the Commission had relied had been duly 
established. Contrary to the claims made by the applicants, the Court found that the 
anti-competitive  conduct  in  question  had  not  been  imposed  on  them  by  the  Greek 
authorities and that, therefore, the applicants had not been deprived of the possibility of 
setting their tariff policy independently. The Court also confirmed that the agreements 
distorted competition on the common market. 
Moreover, the Court took the view that the Commission had not exceeded its powers 
by carrying out an investigation on the premises of a company other than that to which 
the investigation decision had been addressed. The Court took account of the fact that 
the premises were used by the addressee company for the conduct of its business and 
found that they could be treated as the business premises of the addressee company. 
The Court also held that the Commission had been right to impute the actions and 
initiatives of one company to another company with a distinct legal personality, since 
those two companies were, respectively, the principal and its trade representative and 
formed a single economic unit. 
–  Vertical restrictions 
As regards vertical restrictions, the Court annulled two decisions of the Commission in 
accordance with settled case-law laying down that a unilateral act without the express 
or tacit participation of another undertaking does not fall within Article 81(1) EC. 
15 Commission  Decision  1999/271/EC  of  9  December  1998  relating  to  a  proceeding 
pursuant to Article [81] of the EC Treaty ņ (IV/34.466 ņ Greek Ferries) (OJ 1999 L 109, 
p. 24).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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First,  in  its  judgment  of  3  December  2003  in  Case  T-208/01  Volkswagen  v
Commission,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR,  the  Court  annulled  the  Commission 
decision
16 by which the Commission found that Volkswagen had infringed Article 81 
EC by setting the sale price of the new Volkswagen Passat model on the basis of 
exhortations to its German dealers not to sell that model below the recommended sale 
price and to grant limited, or even no, discounts to customers. 
The Court referred, first of all, to the case-law according to which the Commission may 
not find that unilateral conduct on the part of a manufacturer, adopted in the context of 
its contractual relations with its dealers, in reality forms the basis of an anti-competitive 
agreement if it does not establish the existence of express or implied acquiescence by 
the dealers in the attitude adopted by the manufacturer. 
The Court went on to point out that, in the Volkswagen case, the Commission had 
failed  to  prove  actual  acquiescence  by  the  dealers  to  the  requests  made  by 
Volkswagen when they had become aware of them. The Commission had taken the 
view that such proof was unnecessary since, by signing the dealership agreement, the 
dealers had tacitly agreed to those requests in advance. 
Finally, the Court observed that the compatibility with Community competition law of 
the  dealership  agreement  signed  by  the  dealers  was  not  in  dispute.  The  Court 
therefore held that the Commission's argument amounted to claiming that a dealer who 
has signed a dealership agreement which complies with competition law is deemed, 
upon and by such signature, to have accepted in advance a later unlawful variation of 
that agreement, even though, by virtue precisely of its compliance with competition law, 
that agreement could not enable the dealer to foresee such a variation. Since it was not 
proven that there was a concurrence of wills between Volkswagen and its dealers, the 
Court  annulled  the  Commission  decision  imposing  a  fine  of  EUR  30.96  million  on 
Volkswagen. 
Those  same  principles  were  applied  again  in  Case  T-368/00  General  Motors 
Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission (judgment of 21 October 2003, not yet 
published in the ECR, under appeal, Case C-551/03 P) but in that case they led only to 
a reduction in the fine imposed by the Commission. 
Opel Nederland, which carries out the sale, import, export and wholesale trade in motor 
vehicles and associated spare parts of the Opel brand in the Netherlands, concluded 
dealership  agreements  with  approximately  150  authorised  dealers.  The  Community 
rules  on  the  distribution  of  motor  vehicles 
17  do  not  permit  manufacturers  or  their 
16 Decision 2001/711/EC of 29 June 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty (Case COMP/F-2/36.693 ņ Volkswagen) (OJ 2001 L 262, p. 14).
17 See, in particular, Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on 
the application of Article [81](3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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importers to prohibit dealers from supplying goods to final consumers, their authorised 
intermediaries  or  other  dealers  who  are  part  of  the  distribution  network  of  that 
manufacturer  or  importer.  In  accordance  with  those  principles,  the  Commission,  by 
decision of 20 September 2000, 
18 ordered Opel Nederland to pay a fine of EUR 43 
million  for  having  adopted  a  general  strategy  aimed  at  restricting  or  preventing  all 
export sales from the Netherlands, consisting of three measures, namely a restrictive 
supply policy, a restrictive bonus policy and a direct export ban. 
In its judgment, the Court essentially upheld the Commission's decision. However, the 
Court  took  the  view  that  the  Commission  had  failed  to  prove  to  the  requisite  legal 
standard that Opel Nederland had in fact communicated to its dealers the restrictive 
supply  measure  previously  adopted  by  its  management  so  that,  a  fortiori,  it  was 
likewise not established that that measure had become part of the contractual relations 
linking Opel Nederland to its dealers. 
Conversely, the Court found that the Commission had established to the requisite legal 
standard that Opel Nederland's restrictive bonus policy had been incorporated into a 
series  of  continuous  commercial  relations  governed  by  a  pre-established  general 
agreement and, consequently, was an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) 
EC and that, following the calls made by Opel Nederland, the dealers in question had 
undertaken not to make any more export sales. 
Although the infringement had rightly been treated as "very serious", the Court held 
that the basic amount of EUR 40 million should be reduced in view of the fact that it 
had not been established that there was a restrictive supply measure. As a result, the 
final amount of the fine was fixed at EUR 35 475 000. 
In Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission (judgment of 23 October 2003, 
not yet published in the ECR, under appeal, Case C-552/03 P) the Court gave a ruling 
on the compatibility with Articles 81 EC and 82 EC of agreements under which Van den 
Bergh  Foods  ("HB"),  the  principal  manufacturer  of  ice  cream  products  in  Ireland, 
supplied  Irish  ice  cream  retailers  with  freezer  cabinets for  ice  cream for  immediate 
consumption, on the condition that they be used exclusively for HB ice creams. By 
decision of 11 March 1998, 
19 the Commission found that those agreements infringed 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. 
distribution and servicing agreements (OJ 1985 L 15, p. 16), which was replaced, with 
effect from 1 October 1995, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 
1995 (OJ 1995 L 145, p. 25).
18 Commission  Decision  2001/146/EC  of  20  September  2000  relating  to  a  proceeding 
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/36.653 ņ Opel) (OJ 2001 L 59, p. 1).
19 Commission  Decision  98/531/EC  of  11  March  1998  relating  to  a  proceeding  under 
Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (Case Nos IV/34.073, IV/34.395 and IV/35.436 ņ Van 
den Bergh Foods Limited) (OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Ruling on a plea alleging manifest errors of assessment and infringement of Article 
81(1) EC, the Court found that the exclusivity clause in question was not, in formal 
terms, an exclusive purchasing obligation since it did not preclude retailers from selling 
products of HB's competitors, provided that HB's freezers were used exclusively for its 
products. The Court stated that it therefore had to ascertain, first, whether that clause 
in fact imposed exclusivity on some sales outlets, then whether the Commission had 
correctly  quantified  the  degree  of  foreclosure  arising  under  that  clause  and,  finally, 
whether the degree of foreclosure was sufficiently high to constitute an infringement of 
Article 81(1) EC. 
Relying  on  settled  case-law,  the  Court  also  observed  that,  in  order  to  assess  that 
degree  of  foreclosure,  it  is  necessary  to  examine,  first,  whether  all  the  similar 
agreements entered into in the relevant market and the other features of the economic 
and legal context of the agreements at issue show that those agreements cumulatively 
have  the  effect  of  denying  access  to  that  market  to  new  competitors  and,  second, 
where that is the case, whether the agreements at issue contribute to the cumulative 
effect produced (Case C-234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I-935, paragraphs 23 and 24, 
and Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1995] ECR II-1533, paragraph 99). 
The  Court  then  applied  those  principles  and  carried  out  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
effects of the clause in question. It found that, among other factors, the provision of a 
freezer without charge, the popularity of HB's ice cream, the breadth of its range of 
products  and  the  benefits  associated  with  the  sale  of  them  are  very  important 
considerations  in  the  eyes  of  retailers  when  they  consider  whether  to  install  an 
additional freezer cabinet in order to sell a second range of products or whether to 
terminate their agreement with HB. 
The Court also found that a significant proportion of retailers would be prepared to 
stock a wider range of products if there were no exclusivity clauses in the distribution 
agreements of ice cream manufacturers. 
Finally,  the  Court  observed  that,  even  though  the  agreements  concluded  by  HB 
involved only around 40% of all sales outlets on the market, the Commission had taken 
into consideration the effects on competition of all the agreements concerned, which, 
taking all manufacturers together, apply in 83% of the sales outlets on the relevant 
market, so that suppliers wishing to enter into the market might be dissuaded by the 
need first to acquire a stock of freezers. 
The Court concluded that the agreements concluded by HB were liable to have an 
appreciable effect on competition and contribute significantly to a foreclosure of the 
market. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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(c.2)   Exemptions 
The  conditions  for  exempting  an  anticompetitive  agreement  from  prohibition,  as 
assessed by the Commission, were examined by the Court in the judgment in CMA 
CGM and Others v Commission and in the TACA judgment. 
In support of their claim for annulment, CMA CGM and others raised several pleas 
alleging failure to define or error in the definition of the markets. 
The Court observed that a precise definition of all the relevant markets is not necessarily 
indispensable in determining whether an agreement satisfies the four conditions for the 
grant of individual exemption laid down by Article 81(3) EC and Article 5 of Regulation 
No 1017/68.  It is true that, in determining whether the fourth condition laid down by 
Article 81(3)(b) EC and Article 5(b) of Regulation No 1017/68 is met, the Commission 
must examine whether the agreement in question is liable to eliminate competition in 
respect of either a substantial part of the products in question or the transport market 
concerned.  However,  the  four  conditions  for  granting  exemption  are  cumulative  and 
therefore non-fulfilment of only one of those conditions suffices to make it necessary to 
refuse exemption. The Court therefore held that, since the Commission had established 
that the first three conditions for the grant of individual exemption were not satisfied and 
that it was unnecessary to rule on the fourth condition, it was under no obligation to 
define in advance all the relevant markets in order to establish whether the agreement in 
question qualified for individual exemption. In order to determine whether the first three 
conditions are satisfied it is necessary to have regard to the benefits flowing from the 
agreement,  not  specifically  on  the  relevant  market,  but  for  any  market  on  which  the 
agreement in question might have beneficial effects. 
The  background  to  the  TACA  judgment  is  the  conclusion  of  the  Trans-Atlantic 
Conference  Agreement  ("the  TACA"),  by  which  15  shipping  companies  which  were 
parties to the TAA  sought  to  respond  to  the  objections  which  the  Commission  had 
raised against the latter agreement. Two shipping companies which were not involved 
in transatlantic trade (Hanjin and Hyundai) subsequently became parties to the TACA. 
Like the TAA, the TACA covers eastbound and westbound transatlantic shipping routes 
between  northern  Europe  and  the  United  States  of  America.  The  TACA  contains 
provisions on the fixing of the price for maritime transport in the strict sense, on the 
fixing  of  the  price  for  inland  transport  operations  provided  as  part  of  intermodal 
transport services, on the determination of the conditions under which service contracts 
may be concluded with shippers and of the content of such contracts (service contracts 
are contracts by which a shipper undertakes to provide a minimum quantity of freight to 
be transported either by the conference (conference service contracts) or by one or 
several individual carriers (individual service contracts) over a fixed period of time in 
exchange for a fixed rate and for the provision of specific services), on the fixing of the 
remuneration of freight forwarders where they act as shippers' agents in organising the Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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transport of goods, negotiating the terms and conditions on which the transport takes 
place and completing administrative formalities. 
The  TACA  was  notified  to  the  Commission  with  a  view  to  obtaining  an  individual 
exemption under Article 81(3) EC. 
By  decision  of  16  September  1998 
20  ("the TACA  decision"),  the  Commission,  first, 
refused  to  grant  an  exemption  for  the  agreement  in  question  under  the 
abovementioned provisions, with the exception of the terms relating to the fixing of the 
price for maritime transport, which fell within the block exemption provided for in Article 
3  of  Regulation  No 4056/86;  second,  found  that  the  parties  to  the  TACA  held  a 
collective  dominant  position  on  the  relevant  market  and  that  they  had  abused  that 
dominant position and, third, imposed fines on each of the parties to the TACA for the 
two infringements of Article 82 EC which had been established. 
Before the Court, the applicants submitted, inter alia, that the refusal to exempt the 
TACA provisions, with the exception of those fixing prices for maritime transport, which 
were  covered  by  the  block  exemption  provided  for  in  Regulation  No 4056/86,  was 
unlawful. 
With respect, first of all, to the agreement fixing the price for inland transport services, 
the  Court  had  already  held,  in  its  judgment  in  Compagnie  générale  maritime  and 
Others v Commission, cited above, that such an agreement does not fall within the 
block exemption provided for in Regulation No 4056/86, since that exemption covers 
only the maritime transport sector, and is not eligible for an individual exemption, whilst 
other, less restrictive agreements such as an agreement applying the "no below cost 
rule" (rule laying down that the price of inland transport may not be lower than the costs 
of such transport) may be eligible. In view of those factors, the applicants withdrew 
their plea at the hearing. 
Second, with respect to the agreement determining the conditions under which service 
contracts may be concluded and their content, the Court found that, contrary to the 
applicants' claim, the TACA decision did not prohibit the shipping conferences, under 
Article  81  EC,  from  entering  into  conference  service  contracts  and  from  freely 
determining  the  content  of  those  agreements.  Since  the  majority  of  the  applicants' 
pleas  were  intended  to  challenge  the  existence  of  such  a  prohibition  in  the  TACA 
decision, they were rejected as being devoid of purpose. 
Finally, as regards the agreement on the remuneration of freight forwarders, the Court 
confirmed  that  such  a  horizontal  price-fixing  agreement  is  not  eligible  for  the  block 
20 Commission  Decision  1999/243/EC  of  16  September  1998  relating  to  a  proceeding 
pursuant to Articles [81] and [82] of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.134 ņ Trans-Atlantic 
Conference Agreement (OJ 1999 L 95, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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exemption  provided  for  in  Regulation  No 4056/86  for  agreements  laying  down  a 
uniform or common freight rate. The Court found, in particular, that the purpose of the 
agreement in question was not to remunerate maritime transport services but separate 
services which could not be regarded as equivalent to maritime transport services. 
(c.3)  Fines for infringement of Article 81 EC 
The  level  of fines  imposed  by  the  Commission for  infringement  of  Article  81  EC  is 
generally challenged by the penalised undertakings and the complaints raised relate, 
inter alia, to the method of calculation used for or the assessments of the gravity and 
duration  of  the  infringement,  the  extenuating  or  aggravating  circumstances  or 
cooperation with the Commission. Such challenges have enabled the Court to rule on 
the criteria taken into account in determining the level of fines. 
The Court's clarifications can be found, principally, in the "Lysine" cases (judgments of 
9 July 2003 in Cases T-220/00 Cheil Jedang v Commission, T-223/00 Kyowa Hakko 
Kogyo and Kyowa Hakko Europe v Commission, T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and 
Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission (under appeal, Case C 397/03 P) 
and T-230/00 Daesang and Sewon Europe v Commission, not yet published in the 
ECR). Some of the undertakings penalised for participating in a cartel on the lysine 
market  focused  their  actions  for  annulment  of  the  Commission  decision  of  7  June 
2000
21 on aspects of the determination of the level of the fines. By that decision, the 
Commission found that, during the period from July 1990 to June 1995, there had been 
a  series  of  agreements  between  undertakings  covering  the  whole  of  the  European 
Economic  Area  (EEA)  on  prices,  sales  volumes  and  the  exchange  of  individual 
information on sales volumes of synthetic lysine � an amino acid used as an additive in 
animal feedstuffs � and imposed on those undertakings fines amounting in total to 
around EUR 110 million. For that purpose, the Commission applied the method set out 
in the Guidelines for calculating fines 
22  and the 1996 Leniency Notice. 
23
Whilst a number of the Court's findings merely confirm principles already established 
(in  particular,  in  the  "district  heating"  cases;  see  the  Annual  Report  2002),  others 
helped  to  clarify  the  rules  on  applying  the  criteria  contained  in  the  Guidelines  and 
confirm  that  the  Commission's  assessment  of  the  degree  of  cooperation  by 
undertakings  during  the  administrative  procedure  are  subject  to  judicial  review. 
21 Commission Decision 2001/418/EC of 7 June 2000 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article  81  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  of  the  EEA  Agreement  (Case 
COMP/36.545/F3 ņ Amino Acids) (OJ 2001 L 152, p. 24).
22 Guidelines for calculating fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 
and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3).
23 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 1996 
C 207, p. 4). That notice of 1996 was, however, replaced in 2002 by Commission Notice 
on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Moreover, the Court was thereby able to define the scope of the principle of non bis in
idem, according to which a person who has already been tried cannot be the subject of 
further proceedings or be penalised for the same act. It should be noted that the level 
of the fines imposed on the applicant undertakings, which amounted to just over EUR 
81 million, was reduced to around EUR 74 million. 
From a general point of view, it may be noted from the "Lysine" cases that the facts on 
which the Commission relied when determining the level of the fine may not be called 
into question before the Court if the applicant expressly acknowledged them during the 
administrative  procedure  (judgment  in  Archer  Daniels  Midland,  cited  above).  It  is 
irrelevant whether such express acknowledgement has been rewarded with a reduction 
in  the  level  of  the  fine  on  the  ground  that  the  applicant  cooperated  with  the 
Commission.
Reference is likewise made to certain points made in the judgment in General Motors 
Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission, cited above, by which the contested 
decision was annulled in part and the level of the fine imposed consequently reduced. 
Finally, it should be noted that the level of the fines imposed by the Commission in the 
decision leading to the judgments, cited above, in Marlines v Commission, Ventouris v
Commission, Adriatica  di  Navigazione  v  Commission, Strintzis  Lines  Shipping  v
Commission and Minoan Lines v Commission was reduced only with respect to the 
shipping  companies  Ventouris  and  Adriatica,  the  gravity  and  scope  of  whose 
infringements had been incorrectly assessed by the Commission when determining the 
level of the fines. The Court found, essentially, that, since the Commission had, in its 
decision,  sanctioned  two  distinct  infringements  �  in  terms  of  the  various  shipping 
routes involved � it could not, for reasons of equity and proportionality, penalise with 
the same severity the undertakings which were found to have been involved in only 
one infringement (Ventouris and Adriatica in respect of the Patras to Bari and Patras to 
Brindisi  routes)  and  those  which  had  participated  in  both  cartels.  The  Court  took 
account of the size of those undertakings and the relative volume of trade on each of 
the routes concerned. 
–  The Guidelines 
Observing, first of all, that, under Regulation No 17, 
24 the Commission has a margin of 
discretion  when fixing fines,  in  order that  it may  direct  the  conduct  of undertakings 
towards compliance with the competition rules, that the Commission may adjust at any 
time the level of fines to the needs of Community competition policy (inter alia, Archer 
Daniels Midland) and that it has power to decide the level of fines so as to reinforce 
their deterrent effect, the Court nevertheless held that the Commission may not depart 
24 Council  Regulation  No 17  of  6  February  1962:  First  Regulation  implementing 
Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-1962 (I), p. 87).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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from guidelines which it has imposed on itself and which are intended to specify, in 
accordance with the Treaty, the criteria which it proposes to apply in the exercise of its 
discretion in assessing the gravity of an infringement (same judgment). In the judgment 
in CMA CGM and Others v Commission
25 the Court stated that the Commission may 
depart  from  guidelines  in  a  particular  regard  only  where  it  sets  out  expressly  the 
reasons justifying its decision for doing so, which is precisely what it had failed to do 
with respect to one of the sanctioned companies. 
As is clear from the Guidelines, the starting amount of fines is determined according to 
the  gravity  and  duration  of  the  infringement.  When  assessing  the  gravity  of  an 
infringement, 
26 the Commission is to take into account its nature, its actual impact on 
the  market,  where  this  can  be  measured,  and  the  size  of  the  relevant  geographic 
market. 
As  regards  the  nature of  the  infringement,  the  Court  confirmed,  in  the  judgment  in 
Archer Daniels Midland, that the setting by competing undertakings of price objectives 
for a product in the EEA and of sales quotas for that market must be classified as "very 
serious"  since  such  conduct  adversely  affects  the  undertakings'  independence. 
27
Similarly, it confirmed that an agreement aimed at the partitioning of the internal market 
is to be classified as very serious since it runs counter to the most fundamental aims of 
the Community (General Motors Nederland and Opel Nederland v Commission).
The judgment in Archer Daniels Midland also upheld the Commission's appraisal of the 
actual impact of the cartel on the relevant market, namely, in that case, an increase in 
prices to a level higher than they would otherwise have reached and a restriction on 
sales volumes. In that context, the Court stated that, in order to establish that pricing 
agreements  have  had  an  effect,  the  Commission  must  find  that  they  have  in  fact 
enabled the undertakings concerned to achieve a higher level of transaction price than 
that which would have prevailed had there been no cartel and take into account all the 
objective conditions in the relevant market, having regard to the economic context and 
legislative background. 
Another issue raised by the applicants related to the question whether the Commission 
may,  without  infringing  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  the  Guidelines,  rely  on 
25 In that judgment, the Court conceded that the Commission may rely on the Guidelines 
by  analogy  when  calculating  fines  imposed  under  Regulations  No 4056/86  and 
No 1017/68. 
26 According to the Guidelines, infringements are to be classed in one of three categories: 
"minor infringements", "serious infringements" and "very serious infringements".
27 In the judgment in CMA CGM and Others v Commission, the Court took the view that 
the classification of an agreement on prices as a "serious infringement" was a rather 
mild classification, which, in that case, could be explained by the lack of evidence of the 
effects on price levels and the probable short duration of the potential harmful effects of 
the infringement.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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worldwide turnover rather than turnover from the sale of the products concerned in the 
EEA.  The  Court  was  thus  asked  to  review  whether  the  Commission  had  correctly 
assessed one of the criteria set out in the Guidelines (Section 1.A, fourth paragraph), 
namely the effective economic capacity of the persons committing the infringement to 
cause  significant  damage  to  other  operators.  As  regards  assessments  involving  an 
appraisal of the influence of the undertakings concerned on the affected market, the 
Court found that,  unlike  market  shares, total  turnover  does  not  make  it  possible  to 
determine the influence which the undertakings may exert on that market. It found, 
moreover, that, although the Commission was under an obligation to do so, it was not 
clear  from  the  Commission's  decision  that  it  had  established  the  scale  of  the 
infringement committed by each of the undertakings, a fair indication of which is the 
proportion of turnover derived from sales of goods on the geographic market affected. 
However, that failure to comply with the Guidelines did not lead the Court to find, in the 
exercise  of  its  unlimited  jurisdiction,  that  there  had  been  any  infringement  by  the 
Commission of the principle of proportionality. The Court, which based its findings on 
data which were not contained in the Commission's decision, found that the taking into 
account of the applicant's turnover on the global lysine market did not constitute an 
infringement of the principle of proportionality since the proportion of turnover achieved 
from sales of lysine in the EEA was considered to be "significant" or "considerable", 
namely that it amounted to around 20% (judgments in Archer Daniels Midland, Kyowa 
Hakko  Kogyo  and  Kyowa  Hakko  Europe  v  Commission  and  Daesang  and  Sewon 
Europe  v  Commission,  cited  above,)  or  between  30  and  40%  (judgment  in  Cheil
Jedang v Commission, cited above) of the global turnover in question. 
As regards the taking into account of the duration of the infringement, the Court held 
that,  where  the  Commission  states  in  its  decision  that  it  has  increased  the  basic 
amount of the fine by 10% per annum, it cannot increase the basic amount by 30% in 
respect of an undertaking which participated in the cartel for less than three years. In 
view  of  the  criterion  applied  by  the  Commission,  the  Court,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
unlimited jurisdiction, reduced proportionately the increase in the fine imposed on Cheil 
Jedang (judgment in Cheil Jedang v Commission).
The Court nevertheless stated that, as it had ruled in General Motors Nederland and 
Opel Nederland v Commission, "the guidelines do not prejudge the assessment of the 
fine by the Community judicature", which has unlimited jurisdiction in that respect. 
–   Aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
The  Guidelines  state  that  aggravating  circumstances  (such  as  the  fact  that  an 
undertaking  played  a  leading  role  in  or  instigated  the  infringement)  or  mitigating 
circumstances (such as the fact that an undertaking played a passive role (see, in that 
regard, the judgment in Cheil Jedang v Commission)) surrounding the involvement of 
each undertaking may be taken into account in order to increase or reduce the basic 
amount. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
138
Court of First Instance  Proceedings
139
- 26 -
First of all, the scope of the section of the Guidelines concerning "non-implementation 
in  practice  of  agreements",  which  is  referred  to  as  a  mitigating  circumstance,  was 
defined not as covering cases where a cartel as a whole is not implemented but rather 
as covering the individual conduct of each undertaking (judgments in Archer Daniels 
Midland and Cheil Jedang v Commission). 
Moreover, the Court held that, given the wording of the Guidelines, any percentage 
increases or reductions decided upon to reflect aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
must be applied to the basic amount of the fine set by reference to the gravity and 
duration of the infringement and not to any increase already applied for the duration of 
the infringement or to the figure resulting from any initial increase or reduction to reflect 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Since the Commission had failed to do so, the 
Court applied that method and adjusted the level of the fines in Archer Daniels Midland 
and Daesang and Sewon Europe v Commission.
–  The Leniency Notice 
The conditions under which undertakings cooperating with the Commission during its 
investigation into a cartel may be exempted from fines or be granted reductions in the 
fines  which  would  otherwise  have  been  imposed  on  them  are  defined  in  the 
Commission's Leniency Notice of 1996. 
28
The amount of reductions in the levels of fines granted by the Commission under the 
Leniency Notice has given rise to several disputes, many undertakings claiming that 
their cooperation justified a greater reduction in the fine. 
Thus,  the  Court  reduced  the  fine  imposed  on  Daesang,  taking  the  view  that  the 
Commission had unjustly refused to grant a reduction to that undertaking, since none 
of  the  reasons  given  constituted  a  legal  justification  for  that  refusal.  It  stated  that 
cooperation  in  a  Commission  investigation  into  a  possible  infringement  of  the 
Community rules on competition which does not go beyond that which undertakings 
are required to provide under Article 11(4) and (5) of Regulation No 17 does not justify 
a  reduction  in  the  fine.  A  reduction  in  the  fine  is,  however,  justified  where  an 
undertaking provides the Commission with information well in excess of that which the 
Commission may require under Article 11 of Regulation No 17. The fact that a request 
for information has been addressed to the cooperating undertaking under Article 11(1) 
of Regulation No 17 cannot of itself exclude the possibility of a substantial reduction of 
between  50%  and  75%  of  the  fine  pursuant  to  Section  C  of  the  Leniency  Notice, 
particularly  as  a  request  for  information  is  a  less  coercive  measure  than  an 
28 Already  cited  at  footnote  21.  That  notice  of  1996  was  subsequently  replaced  by 
Commission  Notice  on  immunity  from  fines  and  reduction  of  fines  in  cartel  cases 
(OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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investigation  ordered  by  decision  (judgment  in  Daesang  and  Sewon  Europe  v 
Commission). 
The judgment in Archer Daniels Midland is also noteworthy as the Court, while finding 
that the applicant had failed to satisfy the conditions set out in the Leniency Notice for a 
further reduction in the fine, nevertheless took the view that the provision of certain 
information to the Commission had to be rewarded since it constituted a mitigating 
circumstance referred to in the Guidelines. It consequently granted an additional 10% 
reduction in the fine. 
–  The principle of non bis in idem
In  response  to  the  complaint  raised  by  several  applicants  that  the  Commission 
infringed  the  principle  prohibiting  multiple  penalties  for  the  same  infringement  by 
refusing to deduct from the fines which it had imposed the amount of the fines which 
had already been imposed on them in the United States and Canada, the Court ruled 
that the  Commission  does  not  act  in  breach  of  the  principle  of  non  bis  in  idem  by 
imposing fines on undertakings for participating in a cartel  which has  already been 
penalised  by  the  American  and  Canadian  authorities  (judgments  in  Kyowa  Hakko 
Kogyo and Kyowa Hakko Europe v Commission and Archer Daniels Midland).
The  Court  pointed  out  that,  in  the  field  of  competition,  that  general  principle  of 
Community law precludes an undertaking from being sanctioned by the Commission, 
or made the defendant to proceedings brought by the Commission, a second time in 
respect of anti-competitive conduct for which it has already been penalised or of which 
it has been exonerated by a previous decision of the Commission that is no longer 
amenable to appeal. 
However, it explained further that, as Community law stands, that principle does not 
preclude the possibility of concurrent sanctions, one a Community sanction and the 
other  a  national  one,  since  they  are  imposed  at  the  end  of  two  sets  of  parallel 
proceedings, each pursuing different ends. However, a general requirement of natural 
justice demands that, in determining the amount of a fine, the Commission must take 
account of any penalties that have already been borne by the undertaking in question 
in respect of the same conduct where these were imposed for infringement of the cartel 
law  of  a  Member  State  and  where,  consequently,  the  infringement  was  committed 
within the Community. 
In the light of the principles thus laid down, the Court ruled that the principle of non bis 
in idem cannot apply where the procedures conducted and the penalties imposed by 
the  Commission  on  the  one  hand  and  the  authorities  or  courts  of  a  non-member 
country on the other clearly pursue different ends. That conclusion is supported by the 
fact that, under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the scope of that principle is limited to Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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the  territory  of  a  single  state  and  that,  at  present,  there  is  no  principle  of  public 
international law that prevents authorities or courts of different States from trying and 
convicting the same person on the basis of the same facts. 
Moreover, although the Commission is, in accordance with a requirement of natural 
justice, under an obligation to take into account, when determining the amount of a 
fine, penalties already imposed on the same undertaking in respect of infringements of 
the cartel law of a Member State (which, consequently, have been committed within the 
Community),  that  is  the  result  of  the  particular  situation  arising  from  the  close 
interdependence between the national markets of the Member States and the common 
market  and  from  the  special  system  for  the  sharing  of  jurisdiction  between  the 
Community and the Member States with regard to cartels on the common market. That 
justification is clearly lacking in cases where the first decision imposing penalties on an 
undertaking was adopted by the authorities or courts of a non-member State in respect 
of infringements of that state's rules on competition and the Commission is therefore 
under no obligation, when determining the amount of a fine to be imposed on that 
undertaking for infringement of Community competition law, to take account of such a 
decision. 
–   Reasonable period and limitation 
As the Court observed in its judgment in CMA CGM and Others v Commission, it is a 
general principle of Community law, related to the principle of sound administration, 
that  the  Commission  must  act  within  a  reasonable  time  when  adopting  decisions 
following  administrative  procedures  relating  to  competition  policy.  Thus,  the 
Commission may not defer defining its position indefinitely and, in the interests of legal 
certainty and of ensuring adequate judicial protection, the Commission is required to 
adopt a decision or to send a formal letter, if such a letter has been requested, within a 
reasonable time. In the judgment in CMA CGM and Others v Commission, the Court 
also  observed  that  an  unreasonable  length  of  the  procedure,  particularly  where  it 
infringes the rights of defence of the parties concerned, justifies the annulment of a 
decision establishing an infringement of the rules of competition. However, the Court 
stated for the first time that the same does not apply where what is disputed is the 
amount of the fines imposed by that decision, since the Commission's power to impose 
fines is governed by Regulation No 2988/74, 
29 which lays down a limitation period for 
that purpose. That regulation established a comprehensive system of rules governing 
in detail the periods within which the Commission is entitled, without undermining the 
fundamental requirement of legal certainty, to impose fines on undertakings which are 
the  subject  of  procedures  under  the  Community  competition  rules.  Article  2(3)  of 
29 Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 2988/74  of  26  November  1974  concerning  limitation 
periods  in  proceedings  and  the  enforcement  of  sanctions  under  the  rules  of  the 
European Economic Community relating to transport and competition (OJ 1974 L 319, 
p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Regulation No 2988/74 provides that the limitation period expires in any event after 10 
years  where  it  is  interrupted  pursuant  to  Article  2(1)  of  that  regulation,  so  that  the 
Commission cannot put off a decision on fines indefinitely without incurring the risk of 
the  limitation  period  expiring.  In  the  light  of  those  rules,  there  is  no  room  for 
consideration of the Commission's duty to exercise its power to impose fines within a 
reasonable  period.  That  institution  is  not,  however,  precluded  from  exercising  its 
discretion to reduce, on grounds of fairness, the level of fines where it considers the 
administrative procedure to have been excessively long, even though it ended within 
the limitation period. 
It is apparent from the same judgment that the five-year limitation period laid down in 
Regulation  No 2988/74  may  be  interrupted  by  a  request  for  information  within  the 
meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 17, provided that that request is necessary 
for the investigation or proceedings relating to the infringement. Since the Commission 
had failed to show that certain requests were necessary, the Court was compelled to 
find that it had imposed fines on 16 May 2000 even though the five-year limitation 
period provided for in the relevant provisions, which had begun on 24 March 1995, had 
expired. It therefore annulled the decision in so far as it imposed fines. 
(d)   Article 82 EC 
(d.1)  Dominant positions and abuse 
In  2003,  the  Court  gave  a  ruling  in  four  judgments  on  the  basic  conditions  for 
application of Article 82 EC. 
First, in the judgment in Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, the Court found that the 
agreements referred to above, which constituted an infringement of Article 81 EC, also 
infringed Article 82 EC on account of HB's dominant position on the Irish market for 
single-wrapped ice creams for immediate consumption. 
Second,  in  its  judgment  of  17  December  2003  in  Case  T-219/99  British  Airways  v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the Court clarified several points relating to 
the general conditions for applying Article 82 EC. 
The Court stated, first of all, that Article 82 EC applies both to undertakings whose 
dominant position is established in relation to their suppliers and to those undertakings 
which are capable of being in a dominant position in relation to their customers. 
The  Court  then  explained  that  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  committed  on  the 
dominated product market but the effects of which are felt on a separate market on 
which the undertaking concerned does not hold a dominant position may fall within 
Article 82 EC provided that separate market is sufficiently closely connected to the first. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Third, in its judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission,
not yet published in the ECR, and, subsequently, in the judgment in British Airways v 
Commission,  cited  above,  the  Court  clarified  a  number  of  points  relating  to  the 
circumstances in which a commercial practice of granting discounts, adopted by an 
undertaking in a dominant position, may be regarded as an abuse. 
The judgment in Michelin v Commission was concerned with a decision of 20 June 
2001
30 by which the Commission penalised Michelin for having abused its dominant 
position on the French market for replacement tyres and on the market for retreads. 
The Commission sanctioned Michelin's commercial and pricing policy in France with 
regard to dealers, which was based on a complex system of rebates, discounts and/or 
various financial benefits. Certain rebates relating to quality ("quantity rebates") and 
certain rebates fixed according to the quality of the dealer's service to users ("service 
bonus"), which were not "invoice rebates" but were paid in the calendar year following 
the financial year, were specifically regarded as abusive. An "agreement on business 
cooperation and assistance service" between Michelin and its dealers (known as "the 
Michelin Friends Club") was likewise penalised. 
Ruling on the action brought by Michelin, the Court examined each of the business 
practices which the Commission had treated as an abuse in its decision. 
In assessing, first of all, the rebates granted by Michelin, the Court relied on its own 
case-law and that of the Court of Justice on loyalty rebates 
31 and observed generally 
that, in determining whether a quantity rebate system is abusive, it is necessary to 
consider all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and rules governing the grant of 
the rebate, and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage not based on any 
economic  service  justifying  it,  the  rebates  tend  to  remove  or  restrict  the  buyer's 
freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors from access to the market, 
to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties or to 
strengthen the dominant position by distorting competition. 
On the basis of those principles, the Court examined the rebates granted by Michelin 
and found that the discount in question was calculated on the dealer's entire turnover 
with Michelin and that the reference period applied for the purpose of the discount was 
one year. The Court held that a quantity rebate system in which there is a significant 
variation  in  the  discount  rates  between  the  lower  and  higher  steps,  which  has  a 
30 Commission Decision 2002/405/EC of 20 June 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant 
to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (COMP/E-2/36.041/PO ņ Michelin) (OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1).
31 Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker 
Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Commission [1979] ECR 461, Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, 
Case  C-163/99  Portugal  v  Commission  [2001]  ECR  I-2613  and  Case  T-65/89  BPB 
Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] ECR II-389.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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reference period of one year and in which the discount is fixed on the basis of total 
turnover  achieved  during  the  reference  period  has  the  characteristics  of  a 
loyalty-inducing discount system. 
Moreover,  relying  on  settled  case-law  according  to  which  discounts  granted  by  an 
undertaking  in  a  dominant  position  must  be  based  on  an  economically  justified 
countervailing advantage in order not to be prohibited under Article 82 EC, 
32 the Court 
examined whether that was so in Michelin v Commission and found that Michelin had 
submitted  no  specific  evidence  in  that  regard.  The  Court  concluded  that  the 
Commission  was  therefore  correct  to  find  that  the  system  applied  by  the  applicant 
infringed Article 82 EC. 
Second, the Court assessed the "service bonus" applied by Michelin, which was an 
additional  incentive  offered  by  Michelin  to  dealers  to  improve  their  equipment  and 
after-sales service based on a system of "points" granted in return for compliance with 
certain commitments. The Court ruled that a discount system which is applied by an 
undertaking in a dominant position, and which, as in the Michelin case, leaves that 
undertaking a considerable margin of discretion as to whether the dealer will obtain the 
discount, must be considered unfair and constitutes an abuse by an undertaking of its 
dominant position on the market within the meaning of Article 82 EC. The Court also 
held that, in addition to being unfair, that bonus had a loyalty-inducing effect since it 
included, inter alia, the grant of additional "points" where the dealer purchased new 
Michelin  products  of  a  specific  percentage  determined  by  reference  to  the  regional 
market share of those products. Finally, the Court found that the Commission was also 
entitled to find that the fact that dealers could earn an extra "point" if they returned used 
Michelin  tyres  to  Michelin  for  retreading  encouraged  them  to  favour  retreading  by 
Michelin and, consequently, had the effect of promoting tied sales. 
Finally, the Court considered the "Michelin Friends Club", which is composed of tyre 
dealers wishing to enter into a closer partnership with Michelin. In accordance with its 
terms, Michelin participated in the financial outlay of dealers notably by contributing 
towards  investment  and  training.  In  return,  dealers  were  to  comply  with  certain 
commitments as regards market shares, carry a certain stock of Michelin tyres and 
promote that brand. The Commission found that that agreement accorded Michelin an 
exceptionally far-reaching right to monitor the activities of the members and comprised 
practices having a tied-sales effect. The Court held that the Commission was right to 
find  that  various  aspects  of  the  club  constituted  abusive  practices  on  the  part  of 
Michelin. 
32 Judgments  in  Case  322/81  Michelin,  cited  above,  paragraph  85,  Portugal  v 
Commission, cited above, paragraph 52, and Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission
[1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 114.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Furthermore, in response to a plea alleging a failure to examine the actual economic 
effect  of  that  conduct,  the  Court  stated  that,  for  the  purposes  of  establishing  an 
infringement of Article 82 EC, it is unnecessary to show that the conduct in question 
had a specific effect. It is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking 
in a dominant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct 
is capable of having that effect. 
The Court made the same point in its judgment in British Airways v Commission. On 14 
July  1999,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision 
33  in  which  it  found  that  BA  was  a 
purchaser in a dominant position on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency 
services.  Travel  agents  supply  airlines  with  certain  promotional  services  and 
administrative assistance in return for which the airlines pay commissions to the agents 
based on ticket sales. 
BA had concluded with a number of travel agents agreements comprising, inter alia, a 
performance award calculated on the basis of the volume of sectors flown on BA and a 
sliding scale based on the extent to which travel agents increased their income made 
on sales of BA tickets. 
Having  found  that  there  was  an  undeniable  close  connection  between  the  services 
performed by travel agents in the United Kingdom and the transport services provided 
on the United Kingdom air transport market and that BA held a dominant position on 
the market for air travel agency services, the Court found that the bonus system which 
was the subject of the Commission's decision was indeed abusive. 
The Court held, first, that the system put in place by BA was discriminatory. The Court 
found that attainment by United Kingdom travel agents of their BA tickets sales growth 
targets led to an increase in the rate of commission not only on BA tickets sold after the 
target  was  reached  but  also  on  all  BA  tickets  handled  by  the  agents  during  the 
reference period in question, which could result in different rates of commission being 
applied to an identical amount of revenue generated by the sale of BA tickets by two 
travel agents. 
Second, the Court concluded from its own case-law and that of the Court of Justice on 
rebates that, generally, any "fidelity-building" rebate system applied by an undertaking 
in a dominant position tends, in breach of Article 82 EC, to prevent customers from 
obtaining  supplies  from  competitors,  irrespective  of  whether  the  rebate  system  is 
discriminatory,  and  that  the  same  applies  to  a  loyalty-inducing  performance  reward 
scheme adopted by a purchaser in a dominant position in relation to its suppliers of 
services. 
33 Commission Decision 2000/74/EC of 14 July 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 
82 of the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 — Virgin/British Airways) (OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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In British Airways v Commission, the Court found that the rebates granted by BA were 
loyalty  inducing.  Given  their  progressive  nature  with  a  very  noticeable  effect  at  the 
margin, the increased commission rates paid were capable of rising exponentially from 
one reference period to another. Moreover, BA's five main competitors on the United 
Kingdom market for air travel agency services were not in a position to grant the same 
advantages to travel agents since they could not attain a sufficient level of revenue to 
establish  a  similar  reward  scheme  and counteract  the  exclusionary  effect  operating 
against them on the United Kingdom market for air travel agency services. 
The Court went on to find that BA had failed to demonstrate that the loyalty-inducing 
character of its performance reward schemes was based on an economically justified 
consideration and, in particular, that its performance reward schemes constituted the 
consideration for efficiency gains or cost savings resulting from the sale of BA tickets 
after attainment of those objectives. 
Fourth, the TACA judgment gives some further clarification as to the possibility of a 
collective dominant position. On that point, the applicants submitted, essentially, that, 
despite the fact that the TACA operated by applying uniform or common rates, the 
parties to the TACA were engaged in internal competition which precluded them from 
holding  a  collective  dominant  position.  The  Court  found  that  there  was  some 
competition between the parties to the TACA not only in terms of services but also in 
terms  of  prices,  particularly  as  a  result  of  the  service  contracts  (which  granted  a 
discount  on  the  tariff  in  return  for  the  provision  of  minimum  quantities)  and  of 
independent actions. Nevertheless, the Court found that that competition was relatively 
limited and that it was insufficient to call into question the collectivity arising from the 
application of the uniform or common tariff and from the other links between the parties 
to the TACA created by the shipping conference agreement. 
As regards the question whether the position held by the parties to the TACA was a 
dominant one, the Court found that, irrespective of the data used (that of the applicants 
or that of the Commission), the size of the market shares held by the parties to the 
TACA over the period in question, namely at least 56% for three consecutive years, 
gave rise to a "strong presumption" of a dominant position. The Courts stated that, 
contrary  to  what  the  applicants  had  claimed,  the  dominance  threshold  required  for 
Article 82 EC to apply to a collective position is the same as in the case of an individual 
position. Although the Court found that the Commission's assessment of the potential 
competition and the prices charged under the TACA was not free of errors, it held that 
the presumption of a dominant position based on the market share of the parties to the 
TACA was nevertheless sufficiently confirmed by other factors identified in the TACA 
decision, such as, in particular, the difference in the size of market share compared 
with that of the main competitors, the fact that the parties to the TACA held 70% of 
available capacity, the "leadership" of the parties to the TACA in pricing matters (their 
competitors being "followers" in that regard) and the ability of the parties to the TACA 
to discriminate between shippers by way of prices based on the value of the goods. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The members of the TACA were accused of having abused their collective dominant 
position in two ways from 1994 to 1996: first, by placing restrictions on the availability 
and  content  of  the  service  contracts  ("the  first  abuse")  and,  second,  by  taking 
measures to induce potential competitors to become members of the TACA rather than 
entering transatlantic trade as independent lines, thus altering the competition structure 
on the relevant market ("the second abuse"). 
The Court first of all confirmed, for the most part, the first abuse, not, however, without 
first  having  to  define  the  exact  scope  of  that  abuse,  particularly  following  the 
explanations given by the Commission at the hearing. The Court thus found that the 
first abuse covered not only the practices restricting the availability of the individual 
service  contracts  and  their  content  (which  were  also  regarded  as  restricting 
competition) but also practices relating to the conference service contracts, namely the 
obligation to comply with the rules laid down in the TACA with respect to duration, 
multiple clauses, contingency clauses and the level of liquidated damages. 
The reasons put forward by the applicants to justify the practices constituting the first 
abuse were rejected by the Court, with the exception of that relied on to justify the 
disclosure of the terms of individual service contracts. 
The Court conceded that the law of the United States imposed on the parties to the 
TACA an obligation to notify their individual service contracts to the Federal Maritime 
Commission, which published the "essential terms" of those contracts. The Court found 
that, as a result of that publication, the content of the individual service contracts had 
become public and, therefore, was available to both shippers and shipping lines. That 
being so, the parties to the TACA could not, in the Court's view, be taken to task for 
having  agreed  to  "disclose"  the  content  of  those  contracts.  Under  the  case-law, 
exchanges of public information cannot infringe the Treaty competition rules. 
By contrast, the Court held that US law could not be relied on to justify other practices 
constituting the first abuse, such as the prohibition of individual service contracts or the 
prohibition of contingency clauses. It stated that those practices were not imposed but 
merely permitted or even made easier by that law, which cannot preclude application of 
the Treaty competition rules. 
With respect to the second abuse, the Court first of all observed that, although the 
strengthening  of  a  dominant  position  may,  according  to  the  Continental  Can  case-
law, 
34 constitute an abuse, that was not the abuse complained of in the TACA case 
since  the  Commission  did  not  criticise  the  parties  to  the  TACA  for  accepting  new 
conference  members  but  solely  for  adopting  measures,  some  specific  and  others 
general,  to  induce  potential  competitors  to  join  the  TACA.  The  specific  measures 
34 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission
[1973] ECR 215.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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adopted  by  the  TACA  consisted  of  the  disclosure  by  the  parties  to  the  TACA  of 
confidential information to Hanjin and the expression by those parties of a collective 
willingness to build up a slot capacity for Hanjin on the traffic in question, and of the 
authorisation granted to Hyundai to participate immediately in the current conference 
service contracts. The general measures consisted of the conclusion of a large number 
of dual-rate service contracts and the fact that the former structured members of the 
TAA (essentially the traditional members of the conference) did not compete to enter 
into service contracts in relation to a certain category of freight. 
As  regards  the  specific  measures,  the  Court  found,  after  having  examined  the 
circumstances in which Hanjin and Hyundai became members of the TACA, that the 
Commission  had  failed  to  prove  to  the  requisite  legal  standard  that  it  was  those 
measures which led those two shipping lines to join the conference and not their own 
business  considerations.  The  Court  stated,  in  particular,  that  the  Commission  had 
failed to explain why the specific measures in question were not practices enabling 
Hanjin and Hyundai to exercise activities covered by the block exemption for shipping 
conferences  and,  therefore,  to  become  members  of  the  TACA  under  the  same 
conditions as the existing members. 
The Court found in that regard that the Commission had infringed the rights of defence 
of the parties to the TACA by using, in support of its complaints, inculpatory documents 
obtained after the administrative hearing, without giving the parties an opportunity to 
comment  on  them.  The  Court  held  that,  although  the  documents  in  question  were 
produced by the TACA (they were documents drawn up by the TACA or the parties 
thereto which had been provided by the parties to the TACA themselves in response to 
requests for information) and, therefore, the parties were aware of their content, the 
Commission should have given them an opportunity to comment on the relevance and 
probative value of those documents because neither the statement of objections nor 
the  terms  of  the  requests  for  information  which  led  to  the  production  of  those 
documents nor their content enabled the parties to the TACA reasonably to infer the 
conclusions which the Commission would draw from them. Consequently, the Court 
excluded those documents as evidence of the specific measures and held that, since 
those measures could be established only by the documents in question, they had not 
been properly proven. 
As regards the general measures, the Court found that, in order to be regarded as 
measures  "inducing"  potential  competitors  to  join  the  TACA,  the  effect  of  such 
measures must have been to lead potential competitors to become members of the 
conference. A measure described as an inducement to join the conference which is not 
followed by any new membership would show that that measure was not in fact an 
inducement to join the conference. In the TACA case, the Court found that there was 
no evidence in the case-file on the basis of which it could be concluded that the only 
two shipping lines to have joined the conference during the period of the infringements, 
namely  Hanjin  and  Hyundai,  had  taken  that  decision  as  a  result  of  the  general 
measures referred to in the decision. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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On those grounds, the Court annulled the TACA decision in so far as it accused the 
parties to the TACA of having abusively altered the market structure. 
(d.2)  Fines 
Once again, reference must be made to the TACA judgment. Although the Commission 
did not impose a fine in respect of the infringements of Article 81 EC, it did impose 
fines, amounting to EUR 273 million in total, on each of the parties to the TACA for the 
two infringements of Article 82 EC. Having regard to the finding relating to the second 
abuse, only the fines imposed in respect of the first abuse, other than for the mutual 
disclosure of the content of the individual service contracts, had to be examined by the 
Court. 
–  Immunity from fines 
First of all, the Court considered whether the fines were covered by the immunity from 
fines provided for in Article 19 of Regulation No 4056/86. 
Having examined the wording and the purpose of that article, the Court rejected the 
Commission's argument that immunity is relevant only to infringements of Article 81 EC 
and not to those of Article 82 EC. Although the Court conceded that immunity must be 
strictly interpreted, it held that Article 19 of Regulation No 4056/86 expressly provides 
that immunity may be granted in cases of infringements of Article 82 EC. It is true that 
immunity may be relied on only in respect of acts which have been notified with a view 
to  obtaining  an  exemption  under  Article  81(3) EC  and  only  "within  the  limits  of  the 
activity described in the notification". However, that does not mean that immunity may 
be granted only in respect of infringements of Article 81 EC. The Court observed that, 
according to the case-law, agreements restricting competition which have been notified 
with a view to obtaining an exemption may, where dominant undertakings are involved, 
be treated by the Commission as abusive practices. 
The Court held, moreover, that the grant of immunity for infringements of Article 82 EC 
is compatible with the objective pursued by that provision since a dominant undertaking 
which notifies agreements liable to be treated as abusive practices itself gives notice of 
a possible infringement of Article 82 EC and thus makes the Commission's task easier. 
In the TACA case, since all the abusive practices constituting the first abuse had been 
notified to the Commission, the Court held that the fines imposed in that respect had to 
be annulled. 
However, the Court noted that that immunity did not apply to the total amount of the 
fines imposed for the first abuse. The fines were imposed not only under Regulation 
No 4056/86 but, in so far as the inland aspects of the practices relating to the service 
contracts were concerned, also under Regulation No 1017/68. In its judgment in Case Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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T-18/97  Atlantic  Container  Line  and  Others  v  Commission  [2002]  ECR  II-1125,  the 
Court ruled that Regulation No 1017/68 does not provide for a scheme of immunity and 
that no such scheme can be inferred from any general principle of Community law. 
The  Court  therefore  examined  the  legality  of  the  part  of  the  fines  imposed  under 
Regulation No 1017/68. 
–  Division into groups 
The  TACA  decision  was  one  of  the  first  decisions  to  apply  the  Guidelines  on  the 
calculation of fines published by the Commission. The Court stated, first of all, that the 
method followed in this case to calculate the level of the fines was consistent with the 
applicable legal framework. 
As in the case leading to the judgment in CMA CGM and Others v Commission, the 
Commission had fixed the level of the fines after having divided the parties to the TACA 
into four distinct groups. In doing so, the Commission intended to take account of the 
considerable differences in size between the parties to the TACA. 
In  its  judgment  in  CMA  CGM  and  Others  v  Commission,  the  Court  found  that  the 
Commission's division of the parties into four groups was not objectively justified and 
lacked  consistency.  In  that  case,  the  division  of  the  applicants  into  groups  was 
regarded as being in breach of the principle of non-discrimination or, at the very least, 
as inadequately justified. 
However, in the TACA judgment, the Court found that the Commission was justified in 
dividing  the  parties  to  the  TACA  into  groups  since  that  division  was  coherent,  the 
Commission having distinguished each of those groups starting with the size of the 
largest of the TACA parties and making successive reductions by half of that size. 
–  Extenuating circumstances 
Nevertheless, the Court, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, found that no fine 
should have been imposed in the TACA case in respect of the practices covered by the 
first abuse. 
The Court rejected the Commission's argument that the parties to the TACA could not 
rely on any extenuating circumstances. The Court observed that: 
–  the parties to the TACA had cooperated with the Commission by notifying all the 
practices  in  question  even  though  such  notification  was  not  compulsory  under 
Regulations No 4056/86 and No 1017/68 for the grant of an exemption; Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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–  the  TACA  decision  was  the  first  decision  in  which  the  Commission  directly 
assessed the lawfulness of the practices on service contracts adopted by shipping 
conferences; 
–  the legal treatment that should be reserved for such practices raised complex legal 
issues, which is shown by the difficulty in determining the precise scope of the 
decision in that regard; 
–  the  abuse  resulting  from  the  practices  on  service  contracts  did  not  constitute  a 
classic abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC; 
–  the parties to the TACA were legitimately entitled to believe that the Commission 
would  not  fine  them,  particularly  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  in  several  previous 
decisions  in  which  a  notified  agreement  had  been  treated  as  an  abuse  by  the 
Commission, no fine had been imposed. 
2.   Regulation No 4064/89 
(a)   Actions for annulment of authorisation decisions 
–  The BaByliss and Philips cases 
In January 2002, the Commission approved, without initiating the second phase of the 
examination procedure, the purchase by SEB of certain assets of Moulinex, subject to 
the condition, inter alia, that SEB grant an exclusive licence to sell all the household 
electrical appliances under the Moulinex trade mark for a period of five years in nine 
Member States in which competition problems had been identified and that SEB be 
prohibited from using that trade mark for a further three years. The decision did not 
relate to the French market, the Commission having granted the French authorities' 
request for a partial referral. 
BaByliss  and  Philips  contested  the  Commission's  conditional  authorisation  decision 
before the Court. The judgments in BaByliss and Philips have enriched the case-law on 
a number of matters. 
Essentially, the judgments in BaByliss and Philips, first, confirm that the Commission is 
entitled  to  accept,  during  Phase  I  of  the  procedure,  the  lodging  of  commitments 
submitted by the parties to a concentration within the three-week time-limit prescribed 
by the applicable rules (Article 18(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of 1 
March 1998 on the notifications, time-limits and hearings provided for in Regulation Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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No 4064/89 
35) but subsequently amended after expiry of that period. The time-limit is 
binding on the parties to the concentration and is intended to prevent commitments 
from being submitted at a time which does not leave the Commission a sufficient period 
within which to assess them and consult third parties. However, the time-limit is not 
binding  on  the  Commission.  Consequently,  where  it  considers  that  it  has  the  time 
necessary to examine the changes made to the commitments after the time-limit and 
that there is sufficient time remaining to make assessments and consult third parties, it 
must  be  in  a  position  to  approve  the  concentration  in  the  light  of  the  amended 
commitments. 
Second, the Court clarified the conditions for initiating the Phase II procedure. It held 
that  the  Commission  has  no  discretion  as  regards  the  initiation  of  the  Phase  II 
procedure where it encounters serious doubts as to the compatibility of a concentration 
with  the  common  market.  It  nevertheless  enjoys  a  certain  margin  of  discretion  in 
identifying and evaluating the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether 
or  not  they  present  serious  doubts  or,  where  commitments  have  been  proposed, 
whether they continue to present them (Philips judgment). 
The  Court  stated  that,  given  the  complex  economic  assessments  which  the 
Commission  is  required  to  carry  out  in  exercising  its  discretion  in  examining  the 
commitments proposed by the parties to the concentration, the applicant must, in order 
to obtain annulment of a decision approving a concentration on the ground that the 
commitments are insufficient to dispel the serious doubts, show that the Commission 
has  committed  a  manifest  error  of  assessment  (Philips  judgment).  However,  in 
exercising its power of judicial review, the Court must take into account the specific 
purpose of the commitments entered into during the Phase I procedure, which, unlike 
the  commitments  entered  into  during  the  Phase  II  procedure,  are  not  intended  to 
prevent the creation or strengthening of a dominant position but, rather, to dispel any 
serious doubts in that regard. It follows that the commitments entered into during the 
Phase I procedure must constitute a direct and sufficient response capable of clearly 
excluding the serious doubts expressed. Consequently, where the Court is called on to 
consider whether, having regard to their scope and content, the commitments entered 
into during the Phase I procedure are such as to permit the Commission to adopt a 
decision of approval without initiating the Phase II procedure, it must examine whether 
the Commission was entitled, without committing a manifest error of assessment, to 
take  the  view  that  those  commitments  constituted  a  direct  and  sufficient  response 
capable of clearly dispelling all serious doubts expressed (Philips judgment). 
The cases  in question  raised  the  issue  of  whether  the  Commission  was  entitled to 
regard the commitments as sufficient to overcome the competition problems created by 
the  concentration.  Whilst  the  Court  was  unable,  on  the  basis  of  the  pleas  and 
35 OJ 1998 L 61, p. 1.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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arguments  submitted  by  Philips,  to  find  that  there  had  been  a  manifest  error  of 
assessment, the Court upheld in part the line of argument put forward by BaByliss. 
In  the  judgment  in  BaByliss,  the  Court  confirmed  that  commitments  which  are 
behavioural,  such  as  a  trade  mark  licence,  may  be  capable  of  overcoming  the 
problems created by a concentration and that, in the BaByliss case, the duration of the 
commitments  was  sufficient  to  enable  the  licensees  to  compete  effectively  with  the 
entity emerging from the concentration after the licence period. However, the Court 
found that, where no commitments are submitted, the Commission may not conclude 
that no serious doubts are raised on certain geographic markets. It first examined the 
way  in  which  the  assessment  criteria  (dominance  threshold,  absence  of  significant 
overlap, position of the merged entity in relation to its competitors and range effect) 
which had been used to rule out any serious doubts on each of the geographic markets 
in respect of which it did not impose commitments (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Finland and 
the United Kingdom) had been applied by the Commission to all the other markets 
affected by the concentration and found that two of the four criteria applied for that 
purpose were insufficiently precise (absence of significant overlap and range effect). 
Second, it held that the Commission had erred in its assessment of the markets which 
were not covered by the commitments. It therefore upheld BaByliss's action in part and 
annulled the decision in so far as it concerned the markets in Spain, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. 
– The ARD case
By decision of 21 March 2000, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the 
merger by which BSkyB and KVV acquired joint control of KirchPay TV, a company 
active on the pay-TV market in Germany. That decision was taken without initiating the 
Phase II procedure. 
ARD, a company active on the free-television market, brought an action for annulment 
of that decision. 
The applicant submitted that the numerous commitments accepted by the Commission 
during  the  Phase  I  procedure  were  insufficient  to  dispel  all  the  serious  doubts 
described in the contested decision. In its judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case 
T-158/00 ARD v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the Court confirmed that, 
given  the  complex  economic  assessments  which  the  Commission  has  to  carry  out 
when appraising the commitments proposed by the parties to the concentration, the 
applicant must, in order to obtain annulment of a decision approving a concentration on 
the ground that the commitments are insufficient to dispel the serious doubts, show that 
the Commission has committed a manifest error of appraisal. It also stated that the 
Commission enjoys a broad discretion in assessing whether it is necessary to obtain 
commitments in order to dispel the serious doubts raised by a concentration and that 
failure to take into consideration commitments suggested by a third party does not lead Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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to annulment of the contested decision where the Commission could reasonably find 
that  the  commitments  accepted  in  the  decision  dispel  the  serious  doubts.  The 
applicant's line of argument was therefore rejected in its entirety. 
ARD also claimed that, since the Commission had expressed serious doubts as to the 
compatibility of the concentration with the common market, it was under an obligation 
to initiate the Phase II procedure. The Court pointed out that a finding that there are 
serious doubts does not preclude the possibility of dispelling those doubts by way of 
the proposed commitments. Above all, it rejected the analogy which the applicant had 
suggested between the consequences for interested third parties of a failure to initiate 
the formal examination procedure provided for in Article 88(2) EC in the field of State 
aid and the consequences for interested third parties of a failure to initiate the Phase II 
procedure  under  Article  6(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 4064/89.  The  procedures  for 
examination by the Commission under Article 6 of Regulation No 4064/89 cannot be 
regarded as equivalent to those under Article 88 EC. In particular, the Court stated, first 
of all, that interested third parties have no right to participate in the initial phase of State 
aid proceedings. It pointed out, next, that, if the Commission finds, in the course of the 
examination provided for in Article 88 EC, that the plan involves aid within the meaning 
of Article 87(1) EC and that there are therefore doubts as to its compatibility with the 
common  market,  it  is  required  to  initiate  the  formal  procedure,  whereas,  if  the 
Commission finds that a concentration raises serious doubts, it is under no obligation to 
initiate the second phase if the modifications to the concentration or the commitments 
offered by the undertakings concerned eliminate those doubts. 
Finally, the Court confirmed that the Commission is entitled to accept, during Phase I, 
the  lodging  of  commitments  submitted  by  the  parties  to  a  concentration  within  the 
three-week  time-limit  prescribed  by  the  applicable  rules  (Article  18(1)  of  Regulation 
No 447/98)  but  subsequently  amended  after  expiry  of  that  period.  The  time-limit  is 
binding on the parties to the concentration but not on the Commission. Consequently, 
where it considers that it has the time necessary to examine them, it must be in a 
position to approve the concentration in the light of those commitments, even where 
amendments are made after expiry of the three-week time limit. 
36
– The Verband der freien Rohrwerke eV and Others case
By  decisions  of  5  September  2000  and  14  September  2000,  the  Commission 
approved, on the basis of Regulation No 4064/86 and Article 66(2) CS respectively, the 
acquisition by Salzgitter of control of Mannesmannröhren Werke. Verband der freien 
36 In contrast to the judgments in Philips and BaByliss, the Court held only that the time-
limit  must  be  sufficient  to  enable  the  Commission  to  examine  the  commitments 
proposed,  without  stating  that  the  remaining  period  must  be  sufficient  to  allow  it  to 
consult third parties. It is therefore implied that a failure to consult third parties on the 
latest amended versions of the commitments is permissible.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Rohrwerke  eV,  an  association  of  undertakings,  brought,  together  with  two  of  its 
members, an action for annulment of those two decisions. While the action brought 
under Article 33 CS was dismissed as inadmissible, the action brought under Article 
230  EC  was  dismissed  as  unfounded  (judgment  of  8  July  2003  in  Case  T-374/00 
Verband  der  freien  Rohrwerke  and  Others  v  Commission,  not  yet  published  in  the 
ECR). The Court held that the Commission had not committed any manifest error when 
assessing the impact of the concentration in question. 
(b)   Actions  for  annulment  of  decisions  to  refer  a  concentration  to  a  national 
authority 
Under  Article  9  of  Regulation  No 4064/89,  a  notified  concentration  may,  subject  to 
certain conditions, be referred to the competent national authorities of a Member State. 
On  two  occasions,  the  Court  gave  a  ruling  on  the  legality  of  decisions  to  refer  to 
national authorities. The background to the first case was the Commission's decision to 
refer  the  concentration  between  SEB  and  Moulinex  to  the  French  competition 
authorities in so far as the French markets for small household electrical appliances 
was concerned, with a view to the application of national law (Philips judgment). In the 
second case, the examination of a concentration consisting of a merger between Vía 
Digital  and  Sogecable  was  referred  to  the  Spanish  authorities  (judgment  of  30 
September 2003 in Joined Cases T-346/02 and T-347/02 Cableuropa and Others v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR). 
Essentially,  the  Court  was  asked  to  examine  whether  the  conditions  for  a  referral 
(under  Article  9(2)(a))  were  satisfied  and  whether  the  Commission  was  entitled  to 
decide to refer (under Article 9(3)) the examination of the effects of the concentration to 
the national authorities instead of dealing with the matter itself. 
Under  those  provisions,  the  Commission  may  decide  to  refer  the  examination  of  a 
concentration to the national authorities where two cumulative conditions are satisfied: 
the  concentration  must  threaten  to  create  or  strengthen  a  dominant  position  which 
significantly  impedes  effective  competition  on  a  market  within  the  Member  State 
concerned and that market must present the characteristics of a distinct market. 
– The Philips case
The  Court  found  that  those  two  conditions  were  satisfied.  As  regards  the  threat  to 
create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition will 
be significantly impeded on a market within the Member State concerned, the Court 
pointed out that the new entity would have an unrivalled range of products and portfolio 
of  trade  marks  in  France.  As  regards  the  existence  of  a  distinct  market,  the  Court 
observed that France was indeed such a market, particularly in view of the differences Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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in prices, the different trade marks and the national distribution, supply and logistic 
structures. 
The  Court  took  the  view  that  the  Commission  had  properly  exercised  the  broad 
discretion which it enjoys in deciding on a referral, after finding that the Commission 
"cannot  decide  to  make  such  a  referral  if,  when  the  Member  State's  request  for  a 
referral  is  examined,  it  is  clear,  on  the  basis  of  a  body  of  precise  and  coherent 
evidence, that such a referral cannot safeguard or restore effective competition on the 
relevant markets" and stating that review by the Community judicature of that question 
"must  be  restricted  to  establishing  whether  the  Commission  was  entitled,  without 
committing a manifest error of assessment, to consider that the referral to the national 
competition authorities would enable them to safeguard or restore effective competition 
on the relevant market so that it was unnecessary to deal with the case itself". While 
the  Court  found  that  referrals  to  the  Member  States  in  cases  where  the  goods  in 
question  relate  to  distinct  national  markets  might  undermine  the  "one-stop-shop" 
principle  (exclusive  control  by  the  European  authorities),  that  risk  was  regarded  as 
being  inherent  in  the  referral  procedure  currently  provided  for  in  Regulation 
No 4064/89. 
Consequently, the Court dismissed in its entirety the action brought by Philips against 
the referral decision. 
– The Cableuropa case
As in the preceding case, the Court held that the two conditions necessary for referral 
of the examination of the concentration to the national authorities were satisfied. 
When  examining  the  Commission's  assessment  of  the  second  condition,  the  Court 
stated that the question whether there is a distinct market must be determined on the 
basis of, first, a definition of the relevant product or service market and, second, a 
definition of the relevant geographic market. In the Cableuropa case, the Court ruled 
that  the  Commission  had  not  committed  any  manifest  error  of  assessment  in 
considering the relevant markets to be distinct markets with a national dimension. It 
thus rejected the appellants' arguments (based on the strong European presence of 
the parties to the concentration and of their parent companies in relation to both the 
telecommunications and pay-TV activities; the cross-border dimension of the markets 
for audiovisual rights to sports broadcasts and for certain films; the irrelevance of the 
linguistic factor to the definition of the geographic scope of the markets for pay-TV, 
broadcasting  of  audiovisual  rights  and  telecommunications;  and  the  cross-border 
dimension of the telecommunications market and the market for internet networks and 
associated services). 
The  Court  held  that  the  Commission  had  not  committed  any  manifest  error  when 
exercising  the  broad  discretion  which  it  enjoys  in  deciding  whether  to  refer  a Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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concentration. In accordance with the rule laid down in the Philips judgment, it ruled 
that it was reasonable for the Commission to decide to refer the concentration since 
there  was  no  precise  and  coherent  evidence  suggesting  that  a  referral  might 
undermine  the  maintenance  of  effective  competition  on  the  relevant  markets  and 
pointed out that the Spanish authorities had identified the precise competition problems 
raised by the concentration. 
The Court found, moreover, that a complete referral to a national competition authority 
of a concentration the effects of which are limited to markets of a national dimension 
does not run counter to the principle that concentrations with a Community dimension 
are, where the relevant markets cover a substantial part of the common market, to be 
referred to national authorities only in exceptional cases. 
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the action brought against the Commission's decision 
relating to the merger of Vía Digital and Sogecable. 
(c)   Actions for annulment of decisions to refuse approval 
Proposals for commitments and their acceptance or refusal can be an important source 
of case-law. Another source of case-law is the implementation of commitments which 
have already been accepted by the Commission. In certain cases, such implementation 
requires, in particular, that the purchasers of the divested assets have to be approved. 
For that purpose, the Commission establishes that the purchaser is independent of the 
parties to the concentration, that it could become a competitor on the market and that, 
prima  facie,  the  purchase  of  assets  by  that  purchaser  does  not  raise  competition 
problems. 
Refusal to approve the choice of prospective purchasers may give rise to a dispute. 
Thus, in the TotalFina/Elf case, the Commission refused to approve the purchasers 
originally proposed by the parties to the concentration. 
The declaration that the concentration involving the repurchase of the undertaking Elf 
Aquitaine by TotalFina was compatible with the common market was made subject to 
the condition of compliance with certain commitments. 
37 Those commitments required 
TotalFina  Elf  to  divest  70  service  stations  on  French  motorways  within  a  specified 
time-limit. In September 2000, the Commission decided to refuse to approve two of the 
purchasers proposed by TotalFina Elf within the framework of the proposed "package" 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  not  in  a  position  to  maintain  or  develop  effective 
competition on the relevant market. One of the two purchasers rejected, SG2R trading 
37 Commission Decision 2001/402/EC of 9 February 2000 declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.1628 ņ TotalFina/Elf) (OJ 2001 
L 143, p. 1).Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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under the name "Le Mirabellier", brought an action before the Court for annulment of 
the  Commission's  decision  and  lodged  an  application  for  interim  relief  with  the 
President of the Court. Both the application for interim relief and the main action were 
dismissed (order of the President of the Court in Case T-342/00 R Petrolessence and 
SG2R v Commission [2001] ECR II-67 and judgment in Case T-342/00 Petrolessence 
and SG2R v Commission [2003] ECR II-1163). 
In their plea alleging that the Commission had erred in its assessment of the applicants' 
suitability,  the  applicants  contested  the  merits  of  the  arguments  put  forward  to 
substantiate  the  finding  that  they  were  not  capable  of  competing  effectively  on  the 
relevant market. 
In  response,  the  Court  began  by  observing  that  the  basic  provisions  of  Regulation 
No 4064/89,  in  particular  Article  2  thereof,  which  relates  to  the  appraisal  of 
concentrations, confer on the Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect 
to assessments of an economic nature. It follows that review by the Community Courts 
of  complex  economic  assessments  made  by  the  Commission  in  exercising  the 
discretion  conferred  on  it  by  Regulation  No 4064/89  must  be  limited  to  ensuring 
compliance with the rules of procedure and the statement of reasons, as well as the 
substantive accuracy of the facts, the absence of manifest errors of assessment and of 
any misuse of power. In particular, it is not for the Court of First Instance to substitute 
its own economic assessment for that of the Commission. 
In the context of the system of merger control established by Regulation No 4064/89, 
the  Commission  must  assess,  using  a  prospective  analysis  of  the  relevant  market, 
whether the concentration which has been referred to it will lead to a situation in which 
effective  competition  in  that  market  is  significantly  impeded  by  the  undertakings 
involved in the concentration. In addition, the Commission may, pursuant to Article 8 of 
that regulation, attach conditions and obligations to its decision on the compatibility of a 
concentration. 
In  Petrolessence  and  SG2R  v  Commission,  the  Court  held  that  the  applicants  had 
failed to establish that the Commission's appraisal of their suitability was manifestly 
incorrect.  It  thus  confirmed  that  the  Commission  may  refuse  to  accept  purchasers 
where it appears that they  will be unable to achieve the objective of the corrective 
measures. 
(d)   Right to be heard 
Regulation No 4064/89 confers on third parties the right to be heard (Article 18(4)). 
They  may  therefore  lodge  written  observations  with  the  Commission,  particularly  in 
response  to  the  publication  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union  of  the 
notification of a concentration falling under Regulation No 4064/89 or in response to a 
request made to them by the Commission (see Article 16 of Regulation No 447/98). In Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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particular,  they  may  be  given  the  opportunity  to  submit  their  observations  on  the 
commitments  which  have  been  proposed  by  the  notifying  parties  with  a  view  to 
showing  that  the  concentration  neither  creates nor  strengthens  a dominant  position 
which significantly impedes competition on the relevant market. 
In the case leading to the judgment in ARD v Commission, cited above, the applicant 
had just 24 hours in which to comment on the initial commitments. The Court took the 
view that such a time-limit was not capable of affecting the legality of the decision. 
38
The judgment in ARD v Commission also points out that, in Phase II, Article 18(4) of 
Regulation No 4064/89 does not require the Commission to send to qualifying third 
parties,  for  prior  comment,  the  final  terms  of  the  commitments  given  by  the 
undertakings on the basis of the objections raised by the Commission following, inter 
alia,  receipt  of  the  third  parties'  comments  on  the  commitments  proposed  by  the 
undertakings (Case T-290/94 Kaysersberg v Commission [1997] ECR II-2137). That is 
therefore a fortiori the case with decisions taken at the end of Phase I. The failure to 
consult ARD, as a qualifying third party already heard by the Commission during the 
same  procedure,  on  one  of  the  amendments  to  the  initial  engagements  was  not 
therefore such as to render the decision unlawful. 
D.   State aid 
1.  Constituent elements of State aid 
According to consistent case-law, investment by the public authorities in the capital of 
an undertaking does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC in the 
case where, in similar circumstances, a private investor operating under normal market 
conditions and on a scale comparable to that of bodies managing the public sector 
might have been persuaded to provide the capital in question (Case C-142/87 Belgium
v Commission [1990] ECR I-959). 
Two judgments provided the Court with an opportunity to define in greater detail the 
notion of a “private investor operating under normal market conditions”. 
The  judgment  in  Joined  Cases  T-228/99  and  T-233/99  Westdeutsche  Landesbank 
Girozentrale and Land  Nordrhein-Westfalen  v Commission [2003] ECR II-445, dealt 
with the consequences of a Law of 18 December 1991 by which the German Land of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen had transferred to the Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 
which  is  a  public-law  banking  institution,  the  Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt,  a 
38 It is therefore perfectly understandable that the Court held, in response to BaByliss's 
claim  that  the  time-limit  of  12  days  in  which  it  was  to  lodge  its  observations  was 
insufficient, that such a time-limit is "manifestly more than sufficient".Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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separate public-law body wholly owned by the Land. This transfer had not resulted in 
any increase in the Land's holding but brought a return fixed at 0.6% per annum after 
tax.  In  a  decision  of  8 July  1999, 
39  the  Commission  had  taken  the  view  that  this 
transaction  constituted  unlawful  State  aid  that  was  incompatible  with  the  common 
market inasmuch as an investor operating within a market economy would have sought 
appropriate remuneration for that capital and that a return in line with market value 
ought to have been fixed at 9.3% per annum after tax. 
The  Court  first  of  all  rejected  the  applicants'  contention  that  Article  295 EC,  which 
provides  that  the  EC Treaty  “shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the  rules  in  Member  States 
governing the system of property ownership”, limits the scope of the concept of State 
aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. 
40
Second, the Court pointed out that, in order to determine whether a State measure 
constitutes  aid, the  profitability  or  otherwise  of the  beneficiary  undertaking  is  not  in 
itself, in principle, conclusive as that issue must, rather, be taken into account for the 
purpose of determining whether the public investor behaved in the same way as a 
market economy investor or whether the beneficiary undertaking received an economic 
advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. 
Applying,  third,  the  concept  of  a  private  investor  operating  under  normal  market 
conditions, the Court formed the view that, in order to determine whether ņ and, if so, 
to what extent ņ the beneficiary undertaking was receiving an economic advantage 
which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions, the Commission may 
use as a criterion the average return noted in the sector concerned. The Court did, 
however, take pains to point out that use of this analytical tool does not release the 
Commission from its obligation to provide adequate reasons for its final decision and to 
carry out a full analysis of all the factors that are relevant to the transaction at issue and 
its context and, in particular, to take into account the possibility that the aid in question 
might  satisfy  the  conditions  for  exemption  under  Article  86(2)  EC.  In  the  present 
instance,  the  Court  took  the  view  that  the  Commission  had  not  provided  sufficient 
grounds for its choice of two of the elements taken into account in its calculation of the 
appropriate rate of return, that is to say, the value of the basic rate of return and the 
increase  applied  to  that  rate  for  the  purpose  of  applying  it  to  the  particular 
characteristics of the transaction. The Court accordingly took the view that, in view of 
the fact that those factors were of essential importance in the Commission's decision, 
that decision had to be annulled. 
39   Commission Decision 2000/392/EC of 8 July 1999 on a measure implemented by the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  for Westdeutsche  Landesbank  ņ  Girozentrale  (WestLB) 
(OJ 2000 L 150, p. 1). 
40   See also the Court's judgment of 5 August 2003 in Joined Cases T-116/01 and T-118/01 
P&O European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR, paragraph 152. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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The  judgment  of  5 August  2003  in  Joined  Cases  T-116/01  and  T-118/01  P&O 
European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v Commission, not yet 
published in the ECR, (under appeal, Case C-442/03 P) constitutes one of the sequels 
to  the  Court's  judgment  in  Case  T-14/96  BAI  v  Commission  [1999]  ECR II-139,  by 
which the Court annulled a Commission decision holding that an agreement signed 
between the Diputación Foral de Vizcaya (the Regional Council of Biscay) and the 
Ministry of Trade and Tourism of the Basque Government, of the one part, and P&O 
European  Ferries  (“P&O  Ferries”),  of  the  other,  did  not  constitute  State  aid.  That 
agreement related to the establishment of a ferry service by which the authorities which 
were  signatories  to  the  agreement  acquired  travel  vouchers  for  use  on  the  Bilbao-
Portsmouth ferry route. 
After reopening the procedure in order to take account of developments subsequent to 
the Court's judgment, the Commission found that, while the Diputación indicated that it 
was seeking, by its purchase of travel vouchers, to facilitate or subsidise trips for some 
of those living within its jurisdiction, the total number of vouchers obtained had not 
been fixed on the basis of its real needs and therefore did not correspond to the social 
needs which had been relied on. 
41
The Court confirmed that analysis by ruling that the mere fact that a Member State 
purchases  goods  and  services  under  market  conditions  is  not  sufficient  for  that 
transaction to constitute a commercial transaction concluded under conditions which a 
private investor would have accepted if it transpires that the Member State in question 
did  not  genuinely  need  those  goods  and  services.  Finding,  further,  that  numerous 
factors together led to the conclusion that the Diputación had not entered into the new 
agreement in order to meet actual needs, the Court ruled that the Commission had 
acted correctly in law in classifying the agreement in dispute as State aid. 
The Court also stated in this judgment that the fact that the Commission had initially 
adopted  a  positive  decision  approving  the  aid  at  issue  could  not  have  induced  the 
beneficiary of that aid to entertain any legitimate expectation, since that decision was 
challenged  in  proper  time  before,  and  subsequently  annulled  by,  the  Community 
Courts. 
2.   Procedural matters 
In its two judgments in Case T-366/00 Scott v Commission [2003] ECR II-1766 (under 
appeal, Case C-276/03 P) and Case T-369/00 Département du Loiret v Commission
[2003] ECR II-1793, the Court set out in detail the conditions governing the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules 
41 Commission  Decision  2001/247/EC  of  29 November  2000  on  the  aid  scheme 
implemented  by  Spain  in  favour  of  the  shipping  company  Ferries  Golfo  de  Vizcaya 
(OJ 2001 L 89, p. 28). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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for  the  application  of  Article  [88 EC], 
42  which  establishes  the  procedural  rules  in 
matters of State aid. In those two judgments, the Court pointed out that procedural 
rules, in contrast to substantive rules, are generally regarded as being applicable to all 
proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force. Regard being had to the 
fact that the rules laid down by Regulation No 659/1999, including the rule on limitation 
periods set out in Article 15, are procedural in nature, the Court concluded that those 
rules apply to all administrative procedures in matters of State aid pending before the 
Commission at the time when Regulation No 659/1999 entered into force, that is to 
say, on 16 April 1999. 
The Court stated further that a request for information sent by the Commission to the 
authorities of a Member State interrupts the 10-year limitation period, in regard also to 
the beneficiary, even if the latter was unaware of the existence of that request. 
E.  Trade protection measures 
In the course of 2003 the Court delivered two judgments in cases concerning trade 
protection measures. 
In its judgment of 23 October 2003 in Case T-255/01 Changzhou Hailong Electronics & 
Light Fixtures and Zhejiang Yankon v Council, not yet published in the ECR, the Court 
specified the conditions under which the normal value of a product within the meaning 
of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 384/96  of  22  December  1995  on  protection  against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community 
43 may be 
calculated according to the rules of a market economy in the case where the imports in 
question are from the People's Republic of China. 
Note  should  also  be  taken  of  the  judgment  of  8 July  2003  in  Case  T-132/01 
Euroalliages and Others v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, concerning the 
conditions under which a trade protection measure which is about to expire may or 
must  be  maintained  and  concerning  the  extent  of  the  Court's  control  over  the 
Commission's  appraisal  of  the  “Community  interest”  for  the  purposes  of  Regulation 
No 384/96. 
In  this  latter  case,  the  applicants  had  sought  the  annulment  of  a  Commission 
decision
44 terminating antidumping proceedings in respect of imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela, in which the 
42 OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1. 
43   OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1. 
44 Commission  Decision  2001/230/EC  of  21  February  2001  terminating  the  antidumping 
proceeding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, the People's Republic 
of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela (OJ 2001 L 84, p. 36). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Commission had taken the view that maintenance of the measures in question after 
their expiry would be contrary to the Community's interests, even if the expiry of those 
measures  risked  favouring  the  continuation  or  reappearance  of  dumping  and  the 
resultant damage. 
The Court ruled that the conditions for maintaining an antidumping measure which was 
approaching its expiry were, mutatis mutandis, the same as those for the introduction 
of new measures. After establishing that Regulation No 384/96 did not confer on the 
complainant Community industry any right to the introduction of protection measures, 
including in the case where dumping and resulting damage had been established, the 
Court concluded that the same applied in regard to the maintenance of a measure 
approaching expiry, even where the probability of continuation or reappearance of the 
dumping and the resultant damage had been established. 
The Court then went on to state that the Commission's assessment of the Community 
interest presupposed an appraisal of complex economic situations and proceeded from 
a choice of political economy, with the result that it was not for the Community Courts 
to substitute their assessment for that of the institutions competent to make that choice. 
That  said,  it  was  for  the  Community  Courts  to  examine,  in  particular,  whether  the 
Commission  had  complied  with  the  procedural  rules  of  Regulation  No 384/96.  In 
conducting that examination, the Court stated that, for the purpose of assessing the 
Community interest, the Commission has not only the right but also the duty to carry 
out a full appraisal of the position of the market concerned by the measures and of the 
other markets on which the effects of those measures are felt, which means that it may 
take into account any element liable to be relevant to its appraisal, irrespective of its 
source, subject to the condition that it has satisfied itself as to the representative and 
stable character of that element. 
F.   Community trade marks 
The registration of Community trade marks now constitutes a fertile source of litigation. 
100 actions brought in 2003 sought annulment of decisions delivered by the Boards of 
Appeal  of  the  Office  for  Harmonisation  in  the  Internal  Market  (Trade  Marks  and 
Designs) (“the Office”). 
Although lower than the number of cases brought within this area, the number of cases 
closed by the Court is increasing inasmuch as 47 cases were disposed of (24 by way 
of judgment and the remainder by way of order) as against 29 in 2002. It may be noted 
that the cases in which judgment was delivered were in the main “inter partes” cases, 
thus  indicating  that  litigation  has  its  origin  primarily  in  the  opposition  proceedings 
conducted before the Office on the initiative of individual parties. 
For  purposes  of  clear  presentation,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that,  according  to 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 40/94  of  20  December  1993  on  the  Community  trade Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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mark, 
45 a Community trade mark is to be refused registration inter alia if it is devoid of 
any distinctive character (Article 7(1)(b)), if it is descriptive (Article 7(1)(c)) (these being 
absolute grounds for refusal), or in the case of opposition based on the existence of an 
earlier mark protected in a Member State or protected as a Community trade mark 
(Article 8) (relative grounds for refusal). A Community trade mark may also be declared 
invalid by the Office upon application made in that regard pursuant to Article 51(1) of 
Regulation No 40/94. 
1.   Absolute grounds for refusal of registration 
On ten occasions the Court ruled by way of judgment on the legality of decisions taken 
by  the  Boards  of  Appeal  relating  to  absolute  grounds  for  refusal  of  registration, 
annulling two decisions (judgments of 6 March 2003 in Case T-128/01 DaimlerChrysler
v OHIM (vehicle grille) [2003] ECR II-703, and of 3 December 2003 in Case T-305/02 
Nestlé  Waters  France  v  OHIM (bottle  shape),  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR)  but 
upholding all of the others (judgments of 5 March 2003 in Case T-194/01 Unilever v 
OHIM (ovoid tablet) [2003] ECR II-386, of 30 April 2003 in Joined Cases T-324/01 and 
T-110/02 Axions and Belce v OHIM (brown cigar shape and gold ingot form) [2003] 
ECR  II-1900,  of  3 July  2003  in  Case  T-122/01  Best  Buy  Concepts  v  OHIM  (BEST 
BUY);  of  9 July  2003  in  Case  T-234/01  Stihl  v  OHIM  (combination  of  the  colours 
orange  and  grey);  of  15 October  2003  in  Case  T-295/01  Nordmilch  v  OHIM 
(OLDENBURGER);  of  26 November  2003  in  Case  T-222/02  HERON  Robotunits  v 
OHIM (ROBOTUNITS); of 27 November 2003 in Case T-348/02 Quick v OHIM (Quick);
and of 3 December 2003 in Case T-16/02 Audi v OHIM (TDI), not yet published in the 
ECR). 
With regard to procedural aspects, the Court held that, as the purpose of the action 
before it was to review the legality of decisions taken by the Boards of Appeal of the 
Office,  evidence  adduced  for  the  first  time  before  the  Court  was  inadmissible 
(DaimlerChrysler v OHIM (vehicle grille), cited above). 
With regard to substance, the Court had the opportunity to rule that a word, the form of 
a product, the shape or packaging of a product, or a colour or combination of colours 
could be registered as Community trade marks on condition, inter alia, that these are 
not signs that are normally used for the marketing of the goods or services in question. 
In  this  regard,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  a  trade  mark's  distinctiveness  must  be 
assessed by reference to the goods or services for which registration of the sign is 
sought and to the perception of the target public, which comprises consumers of those 
goods or services. Furthermore, a minimum degree of distinctive character is sufficient 
to render inapplicable the ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 
No 40/94. 
In the light of those principles, the Court ruled that a trade mark representing the front 
grille of a motor vehicle was to be considered capable of leaving an impression on the 
45 OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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memory  of  the  target  public  as  an  indication  of  commercial  origin  and  thus  of 
distinguishing and setting apart motor vehicles bearing that grille from those of other 
undertakings in view of the fact that, by reason of its unusual character, it could not be 
regarded as the image that naturally comes to mind as the typical representation of a 
contemporary  grille.  The  Court  for  that  reason  annulled  the  contested  decision 
(DaimlerChrysler v OHIM (vehicle grille), cited above). In Nestlé Waters France v OHIM
(bottle shape), cited above, the Court adopted a similar approach in concluding that the 
shape of a bottle, by reason of its particular appearance, was capable of holding the 
attention of the public concerned and was for that reason distinctive in character. 
By contrast, in upholding the decisions of the Boards of Appeal, the Court ruled that the 
following  did  not  have  a  distinctive  character:  an  ovoid  shape  for  preparations  for 
dishwashers (Unilever v OHIM (ovoid tablet), cited above); a three-dimensional shape 
representing  a  brown  cigar  and  a  three-dimensional  form  representing a  gold  ingot 
designed for chocolate (Axions and Belce v OHIM (brown cigar shape and gold ingot 
form), cited above); the verbal mark BEST BUY for, inter alia, business management 
consultancy services (Best Buy Concepts v OHIM (BEST BUY), cited above); and a 
combination of orange and grey for mechanical appliances (Stihl v OHIM (combination 
of the colours orange and grey), cited above). 
The  Court  expressed  the  view  on  several  occasions  that  the  distinctness  of  a  sign 
cannot be derived solely from a marketing concept, whether it be a “range effect”, by 
which it is suggested to the consumer that several products have the same commercial 
origin because they are generally marketed together (Stihl v OHIM (combination of the 
colours orange and grey), cited above), or by reason of the high price charged for the 
products (Axions and Belce v OHIM (brown cigar shape and gold ingot form), cited 
above). 
So far as concerns the decisions of the Boards of Appeal confirming the descriptive 
character  of  certain marks  in  respect  of  which  registration  was  sought, all  of these 
decisions  were  upheld  by  the  Court  on  the  ground  that  the  trade  mark  requested 
consisted exclusively of a word indicating or capable of indicating to the relevant public 
the geographical origin of certain goods (Nordmilch v OHIM (OLDENBURGER), cited 
above) or because it might serve to designate one of the possible intended purposes of 
the  goods  covered  (HERON  Robotunits  v  OHIM  (ROBOTUNITS),  cited  above),  or 
alternatively because it indicated a quality of the goods in question, in casu the rapidity 
with which meals could be prepared and served (Quick v OHIM (Quick), cited above) or 
the fundamental characteristic of cars and repair services (Audi v OHIM (TDI), cited 
above). 
Finally, Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation No 40/94 provides that registration must be refused 
for  a  mark  that  is  contrary  to  public  policy  and  to  accepted  principles  of  morality. 
According to the Court, that provision does not cover the situation in which a trade 
mark applicant acts in bad faith (Case T-224/01 Durferrit v OHIM (NU-TRIDE) [2003] 
ECR II-1592). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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2.   Relative grounds for refusal of registration 
It  is  first  of  all  necessary  to  point  out  that  an  agreement  concluded  between  the 
applicant for a Community trade mark and the opposing party, which has been notified 
to the Office and consists of a withdrawal of opposition to the registration of the mark, 
will lead the Court to conclude that there is no need to adjudicate on the matter (orders 
in  Case  T-7/02  Zapf  Creation  v  OHIM  ņ  Jesmar  (Colette  Zapf  Creation)  [2003] 
ECR II-271 and Case T-8/02 Zapf Creation v OHIM ņ Jesmar (Colette Zapf Creation 
Kombi  Collection)  [2003]  ECR II-279,  and  order  of  3 July  2003  in  Case  T-10/01 
Lichtwer Pharma v OHIM ņ Biofarma (Sedonium), not yet published in the ECR). 
Next, the case-law confirmed the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of 
concluding  that  there  is  a  likelihood  of  confusion  or,  if  relevant,  a  likelihood  of 
association  (Article  8(1)(b)  of  Regulation  No 40/94)  and  established  whether  the 
Boards of Appeal had taken proper account of those factors. Thus, addressing the 
comparisons made between, on the one hand, the products concerned and, on the 
other, between the signs in question (regarding an appraisal of their visual, auditory or 
conceptual similarities), the Court ruled, as the Boards of Appeal had already decided, 
that there was indeed a risk of confusion in the public mind between the mark applied 
for and an earlier protected mark (Case T-99/01 Mystery Drinks v OHIM ņ Karlsberg 
Brauerei (MYSTERY) [2003] ECR II-43; judgments of 3 July 2003 in Case T-129/01 
José Alejandro v OHIM ņ Anheuser-Busch (BUDMEN); of 4 November 2003 in Case 
T-85/02 Pedro Díaz v OHIM ņ Granjas Castelló (CASTILLO); of 25 November 2003 in 
Case  T-286/02  Oriental  Kitchen  v  OHIM  ņ  Mou  Dybfrost  (KIAP  MOU),  not  yet 
published in the ECR) or, on the contrary, that there was no such risk (Durferrit v OHIM 
(NU-TRIDE),  cited  above;  judgments  of  9 July  2003  in  Case  T-162/01  Laboratorios 
RTB v OHIM ņ Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS) and of 22 October 
2003  in  Case  T-311/01  Éditions  Albert  René  v  OHIM  ņ  Trucco  (Starix),  not  yet 
published in the ECR) or no risk of association (Durferrit v OHIM (NU-TRIDE), cited 
above). 
By contrast, the judgment of 14 October 2003 in Case T-292/01 Phillips-Van Heusen v 
OHIM ņ Pash Textilvertrieb und Einzelhandel (BASS), not yet published in the ECR, 
altered, pursuant to Article 63(3) of Regulation No 40/94 ņ and for the first time ņ, the 
decision of a Board of Appeal annulling the decision of the Opposition Division and 
upheld the opposition for a category of products. In contrast to the Board of Appeal, the 
Court took the view that there was no risk of confusion between the verbal sign BASS, 
registration  of  which  as  a  Community  trade  mark  was  sought,  and  the  verbal  sign 
PASH, already registered as a trade mark in Germany, both of which were used for 
clothes. The Court accordingly altered the decision of the Board of Appeal in such a 
way that the action brought before the Office by the opposing party was dismissed. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that submissions made by the Office that the 
Court should “take into account the parties' pleadings” were inadmissible inasmuch as Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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the Office, which was formally the defendant before the Court, did not express any 
views on either the applicant's claims or on the fate of the contested decision (Mystery 
Drinks v OHIM ņ Karlsberg Brauerei (MYSTERY), cited above). 
3.   Applications for a declaration of invalidity brought before the Office 
The invalidity of a Community trade mark may be absolute or relative depending on the 
grounds in justification. 
The absolute grounds for invalidity of a Community trade mark are set out in Article 51 
of  Regulation  No 40/94.  The  origin  of  the  case  which  led  to  the  judgment  in  Case 
T-237/01 Alcon v OHIM ņ Dr Robert Winzer Pharma (BSS) [2003] ECR II-415 (under 
appeal, Case C-192/03 P), was a decision of the Cancellation Division of the Office 
declaring a Community trade mark invalid on the basis of Article 7(1)(d) of Regulation 
No 40/94, which precludes ņ as an absolute ground for refusal ņ registration of trade 
marks consisting exclusively of signs or indications which have become customary in 
the current language or in bona fide and established commercial practices. The Board 
of Appeal had dismissed the appeal brought against that decision. The Court, in its 
turn, dismissed the action seeking annulment of the Board of Appeal's decision and 
confirmed, in its ruling, that the term “BSS” had become customary in medical circles 
and that BSS as a trade mark had not acquired a distinctive character through use 
within a substantial part of the European Union. 
The relative grounds for invalidity of a Community trade mark are set out in Article 52 of 
Regulation No 40/94. By judgment of 9 July 2003 in Case T-156/01 Laboratorios RTB v 
OHIM ņ  Giorgio  Beverly  Hills  (GIORGIO  AIRE),  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR,  the 
Court  dismissed  an  action  brought  by  the  company  Laboratorios  RTB  against  a 
decision of the Board of Appeal annulling a decision taken by the Cancellation Division 
of the Office and dismissing the application for annulment of a Community trade mark. 
The Court thereby upheld the submission that no evidence of genuine use of earlier 
marks  during  the  five-year  period  prior  to  the  application  for  annulment  had  been 
adduced ņ specifying in that regard the level of proof required for genuine use to be 
established for legal purposes ņ and that there was no likelihood of confusion between 
the  Community  mark  GIORGIO  AIRE  for  toiletries  and  the  earlier  Spanish  marks 
featuring the words “giorgi line” and “miss giorgi” for identical articles. 
4.   Formal issues 
Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94 requires decisions of the Office to state the reasons 
on which they are based. 
46 In Audi v OHIM (TDI), cited above, the Court took the view 
46 See also Rule 50(2)(h) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 
implementing Regulation No 40/94 (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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that the Board of Appeal was under an obligation to state why the evidence adduced by 
Audi  did  not  allow  the  conclusion  that  the mark  applied for  had  become  distinctive 
through use. However, it went on, the finding that the Board of Appeal of the Office had 
failed in its duty to set out reasons was not sufficient to entail the annulment of that 
Board's decision in view of the fact that a fresh decision of the Office would necessarily 
lead to the same result as the first decision. 
The second sentence of Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94 provides that decisions of 
the Office may be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties have had an 
opportunity to present their comments. Breach of that provision by an examiner of the 
Office, however, does not oblige the Board of Appeal to annul the decision taken by 
that examiner in the absence of any substantive illegality (Audi v OHIM (TDI), cited 
above). 
Furthermore, as held in the judgment in Case T-174/01 Goulbourn v OHIM ņ Redcats 
(Silk Cocoon) [2003] ECR II-791, the Court ruled that procedural equity and the general 
principle  of  protection  of  legitimate  expectations  require  that  that  provision  be 
construed as meaning that the Board of Appeal is obliged to indicate at the outset to 
the party concerned that it intends to take into account a fact which, having been relied 
on by the other party after expiry of the period prescribed for that purpose in opposition 
proceedings, was not taken into account in the decision of the Opposition Division, in 
order that the party concerned might be in a position to determine whether it would at 
all be appropriate to submit substantive observations on that fact. Such an obligation 
exists even if the other party had relied anew on that fact in its pleadings before the 
Board of Appeal. Inasmuch as it had failed to comply with that obligation, the decision 
of the Board of Appeal was annulled. 
5.   Operational continuity of the departments of the Office 
For an application in opposition to be successful, the owner of the earlier trade mark 
must,  where  appropriate,  be  able  to  demonstrate  “genuine  use”  (Article  43(2)  of 
Regulation No 40/94). A question arose as to whether a Board of Appeal, before which 
an  application  had  been  brought  by  a  party  whose  opposition  had  previously  been 
dismissed  by  the  competent Office  department  on  the ground  of  want  of  evidence, 
could  lawfully  form  the  view  that  it  was  not  required  exhaustively  to  examine  the 
decision taken by that department. In response to that question, the Court held, in its 
judgment  of  23 September  2003  in  Case  T-308/01  Henkel  v  OHIM  ņ  LHS  (UK) 
(KLEENCARE), not yet published in the ECR, that its case-law to the effect that there 
is  continuity,  in  terms  of  their  functions,  between  the  examiner  and  the  Boards  of 
Appeal may also be applied appropriately to the relationship between the other Office 
departments  taking  decisions  at  first  instance,  such  as  the  Opposition  Divisions, 
Cancellation Divisions, and the Boards of Appeal, and that consequently the powers of 
the  Office's  Boards  of  Appeal  imply  that  they  must  re-examine  decisions  taken  by 
departments at first instance. From this the Court concluded that, even if the party who Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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had brought the appeal before the Board of Appeal had not raised a specific ground of 
appeal, that Board was none the less “bound to examine whether or not, in the light of 
all the relevant matters of fact and of law, a new decision with the same operative part 
as the decision under appeal may be lawfully adopted at the time of the appeal ruling”. 
It followed that the Board of Appeal was required to base its decision on all the matters 
of fact and law which the party in question had introduced in the proceedings before 
the department which had ruled at first instance or, subject only to  Article 74(2) of 
Regulation No 40/94, 
47 on the appeal. In casu, the Court found against the Board of 
Appeal  which  had  itself  failed  to  examine  the  evidence  which  the  applicant  had 
produced in the proceedings before the Opposition Division. 
G.   Access to documents 
Regulation  (EC)  No 1049/2001  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
30 May  2001  regarding  public  access  to  European  Parliament,  Council  and 
Commission  documents 
48  provides  for  a  right  of  access  to  documents  held  by  an 
institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession. 
In  a  case  brought  by  an  individual  against  the  Commission,  the  Court  examined 
whether the Commission could lawfully refuse access to documents which were in its 
possession but which had been drawn up by the Italian authorities. The Court pointed 
out  in  this  regard  that  the  institutions  may  be  required,  in  appropriate  cases,  to 
communicate  documents  originating  from  third  parties,  including,  in  particular,  the 
Member  States.  The  Court  noted,  however,  that  the  Member  States  are  subject  to 
special treatment inasmuch as Article 4(5) of Regulation No 1049/2001 confers on a 
Member State the power to request an institution not to disclose documents originating 
from that State without its prior agreement. In that case, as the Italian authorities had 
opposed communication to the applicant of the documents emanating from them, the 
Commission  had  been  entitled  to  reject  the  application  for  access  (judgment  of 
17 September 2003 in Case T-76/02 Messina v Commission, not yet published in the 
ECR). 
This was the only case decided in 2003 which concerned the legality of decisions to 
refuse access taken pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001. 
H.   Public health 
Authorisations  for  the  marketing  of  certain  substances,  or  the  withdrawal  of  such 
authorisations, were matters which gave rise to proceedings before the Court. 
47 Article  74(2)  of  Regulation  No 40/94  provides:  “The  Office  may  disregard  facts  or 
evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned”. 
48 OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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Whereas the judgment in Case T-147/00 Laboratoires Servier v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-85  (under  appeal,  Case  C-156/03 P)  annulled  a  Commission  decision 
concerning the withdrawal of authorisations for the marketing of medicinal products for 
human  use  containing  certain  substances  on  grounds  identical  to  those  in  Joined 
Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00 
Artegodan and Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-4945 (commented on in the Annual 
Report  2002),  the  judgment  of  21 October  2003  in  Case  T-392/02  Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals  v  Council,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR,  dismissed  the  action 
challenging the legality of a Council regulation which had the effect of setting aside 
authorisation of nifursol, a substance used in animal feedingstuffs. 
49
In that case, the applicant's main argument was that the risk to human health which 
formed the basis of the contested regulation was merely hypothetical. In its appraisal of 
that  argument,  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  precautionary  principle  is  a  general 
principle  of  Community  law  which  obliges  the  authorities  concerned  to  take,  in  the 
specific  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  on  them  by  the  relevant  legislation, 
appropriate  measures  to  prevent  potential  risks  to  public  health,  safety  and  the 
environment by attaching greater importance to the requirements associated with the 
protection  of  those  interests  than  to  economic  interests.  Within  the  area  of  public 
health, this principle, in line with what is now well-established case-law, means that 
where uncertainties exist as to the existence or scope of risks to human health, the 
institutions may adopt precautionary measures without having to wait for the reality and 
gravity of those risks to be demonstrated in full. 
So far as concerns the scope of discretion enjoyed by the competent institution, the 
Court noted that, in cases where the scientific evaluation did not make it possible to 
establish with sufficient certainty whether a risk exists, recourse or non-recourse to the 
precautionary principle will depend on the level of protection chosen by the competent 
authority in the exercise of its discretion, regard being had to the priorities which it 
defines with regard to the objectives which it pursues in accordance with the relevant 
Treaty  rules  and  rules  of  secondary  law,  subject  to  the  proviso,  however,  that  this 
choice  must  be  in  accordance,  first,  with  the  principle  that  the  protection  of  public 
health,  safety  and  the  environment  takes  precedence  over  economic  interests  and, 
second, with the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. 
As implementation of the precautionary principle is subject to limited judicial control, the 
Court ruled that no manifest error had been committed in the appraisal of the scientific 
opinions  and  that  it  could  for  that  reason  have  been  lawfully  concluded  that  the 
withdrawal  of  authorisation  for  nifursol  was  justified  by  the  existence  of  serious 
49 Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 1756/2002  of  23  September  2002  amending  Council 
Directive 70/524/EEC concerning additives in feedingstuffs as regards withdrawal of the 
authorisation of an additive and amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 2430/1999 
(OJ 2002 L 265, p. 1). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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indications giving rise to reasonable doubts as to its harmlessness. In that context, the 
Court  noted  that  the  precautionary  principle  is  intended  to  obviate  potential  risks, 
whereas, in contrast, risks that are purely hypothetical ņ based on mere conjectures 
without any scientific basis ņ cannot be taken into account. 
In  its  judgment  of  18 December  2003  in  Case  T-326/99  Olivieri  v  Commission  and 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, not yet published in the 
ECR, which dismissed on grounds of inadmissibility an action seeking the annulment of 
a Commission decision authorising the marketing of a medicinal product (see above), 
the Court pointed out that the Commission, assisted by the European Agency for the 
Evaluation  of  Medicinal  Products,  must  verify  that  the  information  provided  by  an 
applicant  for  marketing  authorisation  is  correct  and  adequately  and  sufficiently 
demonstrates the quality, safety and efficacy of the medicinal product in question. 
I.   Community funding 
For the period 2000 to 2006, the financial and structural actions referred to in Article 
159 EC are to be governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds. 
50 The Court, however, did not 
in 2003 give rulings in any disputes concerning implementation of the new rules. The 
judgments  delivered  by  the  Court  related  essentially  to  the  legality  of  Commission 
decisions reducing, suspending or withdrawing financial assistance on the basis of the 
legislative  rules  preceding  Regulation  No 1260/1999,  that  is  to  say,  Regulation 
No 2052/88 
51 and Regulation No 4253/88. 
52
In  general,  the  pleas  in  law  most  frequently  relied  on  in  support  of  forms  of  order 
seeking  annulment  of  Commission  decisions  reducing  or  withdrawing  financial 
assistance  are  derived  from,  first,  errors  in  the  appraisal  of  the  facts,  second, 
infringement of the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence and, third, 
infringement of the principle of proportionality. 
With  regard  to  the  plea  concerning  errors  of  appraisal  in  regard  to  irregularities 
identified by the Commission, the Court, at the conclusion of a detailed examination, 
declared that plea to be partially founded in its judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case 
50 OJ 1999 L 161, p. 1. 
51 Council Regulation (EEC)  No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988  on the  tasks of the Structural 
Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves 
and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments (OJ 1988 L 185, p. 9). 
52 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of 
the  different  Structural  Funds  between  themselves  and  with  the  operations  of  the 
European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments (OJ 1988 L 374, 
p. 1). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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T-196/01 Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v Commission, not yet published in 
the ECR, which led the Court to annul the decision to withdraw assistance from the 
Guidance  Section  of  the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund 
(“EAGGF”). 
Respect for the rights of the defence in all open proceedings against a person which 
are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person is a fundamental 
principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules 
governing the proceedings in question. That principle requires that the addressees of 
decisions  which  significantly  affect  their  interests  should  be  placed  in  a  position  in 
which they may effectively make known their views. When infringement of that principle 
is pleaded in actions brought before the Court, the latter is obliged to examine whether 
the applicants were provided with a proper opportunity to set out their views prior to the 
adoption of the decisions the legality of which they dispute in regard to all of the heads 
of  complaint  laid  against  them.  While  the  Court  rejected  a  plea  of  this  kind  in  its 
judgment in Case T-217/01 Forum des migrants de l'Union européenne v Commission
[2003] ECR II-1566 (under appeal, Case C-369/03 P), it took the view, in its judgment 
of  9 July  2003  in  Case  T-102/00  Vlaams  Fonds  voor  de  Sociale  Integratie  van 
Personen met een Handicap v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, that, as the 
applicant in that case submitted, it had not been placed in a position in which it could 
submit its observations on a key element for the purpose of establishing the existence 
and extent of an alleged overpayment of assistance from the European Social Fund 
prior to the adoption of the decision reducing that assistance. 
Concerning the plea in law alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality laid 
down in Article 5 EC, it was argued that the irregularities committed did not justify the 
reduction or withdrawal of the financial assistance. According to well-established case-
law, the infringement of obligations whose observance is of fundamental importance to 
the proper functioning of a Community system may be penalised by forfeiture of a right 
conferred by Community legislation, such as entitlement to Community assistance. It 
followed  that  the  discontinuance  of  financial  assistance  was  not,  in  principle, 
disproportionate where it was established that the beneficiary of that aid had infringed 
an  obligation  fundamental  to  the  proper  operation  of  the  Community  system  in 
question, such as the EAGGF. The Court thus ruled that the withdrawal of EAGGF 
assistance was justified in the light of that principle in the case where the recipient had 
failed to comply with fundamental obligations by not being involved in economic activity 
and by providing inaccurate information in its application for aid (judgment in Joined 
Cases T-61/00 and T-62/00 APOL and AIPO v Commission [2003] ECR II-639) or by 
suspending the activity of a production line and using a separate production line for the 
processing of a product excluded from the aid (judgment of 11 December 2003 in Case 
T-305/00  Conserve  Italia  v  Commission,  not  yet  published  in  the  ECR).  Such 
withdrawal is also justified where the recipient of the aid misled the Commission as to 
the  commencement  of  work  and  began  that  work  before  the  date  on  which  the 
application for  aid  was received  by  that  institution,  in  violation  of  the  relevant  rules 
(judgment  in  Case T-186/00 Conserve  Italia  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-723)  and Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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where  unjustified  expenditure  was  charged  against  the  project  (judgment  in  Case 
T-340/00 Comunità montana della Valnerina v Commission [2003] ECR II-814 (under 
appeal, Case C-240/03 P)). 
By contrast, in its judgment of 11 December 2003 in Case T-306/00 Conserve Italia v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the Court annulled a Commission decision 
reducing  EAGGF  assistance.  The  Court  took  the  view  that  the  method  used  for 
calculating the reduction in aid was in clear breach of the principle of proportionality 
inasmuch  as  it  failed  to  take  proper  account  of  the  relationship  between  the 
seriousness of the breach committed by the applicant and the reduction adopted, it 
being pointed out that the breach in question consisted in the commencement of the 
work which was the subject of the assistance before the date on which the application 
had been received by the Commission. 
It should also be pointed out that, in the absence of any indication ņ whether in the 
relevant  legislation  or  in  the  decision granting funding ņ  that the recipient  of  aid  is 
financially liable to the Community for the whole of a project, the completion of which 
falls  to  several  parties,  the  principle  of  proportionality  is  infringed  where  the 
Commission, having established irregularities in the performance of that project, sought 
from  the  person  designated  as  the  recipient  reimbursement  of  the  full  amount  of 
assistance already paid without limiting that claim to the section of the project which 
was  to  be  carried  out  by  that  person  (Comunità  montana  della  Valnerina  v 
Commission, cited above). 
Furthermore, in its judgment in Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v Commission,
cited above (see also judgment in Case T-125/01 José Martí Peix v Commission [2003] 
ECR  II-868,  paragraphs  96  to  114,  (under  appeal,  Case  C-226/03 P);  judgment  in 
Joined  Cases  T-44/01,  T-119/01  and  T-126/01  Eduardo  Vieira  and  Others  v 
Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-1216,  paragraphs  165  to  180,  (under  appeal,  Case 
C-254/03 P);  judgment  of  17 September  2003  in  Case  T-137/01  Stadtsportverband 
Neuss v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, paragraphs 125 to 134), the Court 
expressed the view that, although Article 24 of Regulation No 4253/88 does not specify 
particular time-limits, the Commission was under an obligation, in the procedure for the 
withdrawal of financial assistance, to reach its decision within a reasonable period. In 
casu, although it took the view that the administrative procedure had been very long, 
the Court found that the plea alleging infringement of the principle that decisions must 
be taken within a reasonable period was unfounded, regard being had to its “PVC II” 
case-law 
53 (see the Annual Report 1999), to the effect that infringement of the principle 
that decisions must be taken within a reasonable period, assuming that infringement to 
have  been  established,  would  not  justify  the  automatic  annulment  of  the  contested 
53 Judgment in Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94, T-314/94, T-315/94, 
T-316/94,  T-318/94,  T-325/94,  T-328/94,  T-329/94  and  T-335/94  Limburgse  Vinyl 
Maatschappij and Others v Commission [1999] ECR II-931. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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decision,  and  to  the  complexity  of  the  case  in  conjunction  with  the  uncooperative 
attitude shown by the applicant. 
J.   Community staff cases 
The numerous decisions delivered in 2003 in Community staff cases dealt with a wide 
range of legal issues which included access to the European public service by way of 
competition  (judgment  of  23 January  2003  in  Case  T-53/00  Angioli  v  Commission;
judgment  of  27 March  2003  in  Case  T-33/00  Martínez  Páramo  v  Commission;
judgment  of  25 June  2003  in  Case  T-72/01  Pyres  v  Commission;  judgment  of 
17 September 2003 in Case T-233/02 Alexandratos and Panagiotou  v  Council; and 
judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case T-214/02 Martínez Valls v Parliament, not yet 
published in the ECR), the appointment of senior officials (judgment of 18 September 
2003 in Case T-73/01 Pappas v Committee of the Regions; judgment of 5 November 
2003 in Case T-240/01 Cougnon v Court of Justice, not yet published in the ECR), the 
promotion  of  officials  or  reports  concerning  them,  the  conditions  for  receiving 
allowances under the Staff Regulations of officials, cover in respect of risks relating to 
accidents or illness, disciplinary measures incurred through non-compliance with the 
Staff Regulations and transfer to the Community scheme of pension rights acquired 
prior to entry into the service of the Communities (judgment of 30 January 2003 in 
Joined  Cases  T-303/00,  T-304/00  and  T-322/00  Caballero  Montoya  and  Others  v 
Commission, not yet published in the ECR). 
Among all of these decisions, it should be noted that the Court on several occasions 
dismissed actions for annulment of staff reports which had been drawn up late but 
ordered  the  Commission  to  compensate  those  officials  who  had  been  adversely 
affected by the late establishment of their reports (judgments of 7 May 2003 in Case 
T-278/01  den  Hamer  v  Commission  and  Case  T-327/01  Lavagnoli  v  Commission;
judgment of 30 September 2003 in Case T-296/01 Tatti v Commission; judgments of 
23 October  2003  in  Case T-279/01  Lebedef  v  Commission,  Case T-24/02  Lebedef-
Caponi v Commission and Case T-25/02 Sautelet v Commission, not yet published in 
the ECR). On this first aspect, the Court pointed out that a staff report cannot, in the 
absence  of  exceptional  circumstances,  be  annulled  for  the  sole  reason  that  it  was 
drawn up late. While a delay in drawing up a staff report may give rise to a right to 
reparation on the part of the official concerned, that delay cannot affect the validity of 
the staff report or, consequently, justify its annulment. On the second aspect, the Court 
stressed that the delay in drawing up staff reports is a source of non-material damage 
for an official and that, in the absence of special circumstances justifying the delay 
found to have occurred, the administration commits a service-related fault of such a 
kind as to render it liable. The Court stated in its above judgments in den Hamer v 
Commission and Lavagnoli v Commission that the case-law which, in the light of the 
wording of Article 43 of the Staff Regulations, allows the Commission a reasonable 
period within which to draw up the staff reports of its officials cannot apply from that 
point in time at which provisions that are binding on the Commission, such as general 
implementing provisions, make the reporting procedure subject to specific time-limits Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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and  that  consequently  any  exceeding  of  that  time-limit  which  that  institution  has 
imposed on itself must in principle be attributed to it. 
The  pursuit  of  multiple  outside  activities  without  prior  permission  of  the  appointing 
authority justifies the disciplinary sanction of removal of the official in question from her 
or his post, as held in the judgment of 16 January 2003 in Case T-75/00 Fichtner v 
Commission  (ECR-SC  II-51,  under  appeal,  Case  C-116/03 P).  In  the  course  of  its 
assessment, the Court pointed out that, under the third paragraph of Article 12 of the 
Staff  Regulations,  the  official  concerned  is  required  to  seek  permission  from  the 
appointing authority, regardless of the outside activity which he proposes to pursue, 
and to refrain from pursuing such an activity without valid permission. The Court also 
took  the  view  that  the  confirmed  failures  to  comply  with  Article  12  of  the  Staff 
Regulations, which had been practically continuous over a period of almost ten years, 
provided grounds for that conduct to be classified as particularly serious and justified 
the finding that the sanction of removal from post was not disproportionate. 
Delivered  by  a  Chamber  consisting  of  five  judges,  infrequent  in  staff  cases,  the 
judgment  of  30 January  2003  in  Case  T-307/00  C  v  Commission  (ECR-SC  II-221), 
declared the fourth paragraph of Article 80 of the Staff Regulations to be unlawful 
54
and  accordingly  annulled  a  decision  based  on that  article.  Faced  with  the question 
whether the administration was entitled to reject an application for an orphan's pension 
on the ground that the provisions of the Staff Regulations refer only to the death of a 
spouse and therefore do not cover the case of the death of an unmarried partner, the 
Court first of all expressed the opinion that, in view of the purpose served by the fourth 
paragraph of Article 80 of the Staff Regulations, the situation of an unmarried official 
whose child has lost his or her other parent, who was not an official or a member of the 
temporary staff of the Communities and who in fact contributed to the child's upkeep 
pursuant to a legal obligation resulting from the recognition of paternity, is comparable 
to those situations which do come within the scope of that article. The Court went on to 
express the view that the exclusion of unmarried officials from the scope of Article 80 
was not justified in so far as the additional expense incurred by an official who loses his 
or her spouse also arises in the case of the death of the other parent who is not the 
official's spouse but has recognised the child and is by virtue of that fact under a legal 
obligation of maintenance. From this the Court concluded that the fourth paragraph of 
Article  80  of  the  Staff  Regulations  drew  an  unjustified  distinction  and  infringed  the 
principle of equal treatment. 
54   The fourth paragraph of Article 80 of the Staff Regulations provides: 
“Where the spouse, not being an official or member of the temporary staff, of an official or 
of a former official in receipt of a retirement pension or an invalidity pension dies, the 
children being dependent within the meaning of Article 2 of Annex VII on the surviving 
spouse  shall  be  entitled  to  an  orphan's  pension  in  accordance  with  Article  21  of 
Annex VIII.”Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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II.   Actions for damages 
55
For  the  Community  to  incur  non-contractual  liability  under  Article  288 EC,  three 
conditions  must  be  fulfilled:  the  conduct  alleged  against  the  Community  institutions 
must  be  unlawful;  there  must  be  actual  damage;  and  there  must  be  a  causal  link 
between that conduct and that damage. 
The concurrence of those three conditions allowing the non-contractual liability of the 
Community to be incurred was regarded as established by the Court in its judgment in 
Joined Cases T-344/00 and T-345/00 CEVA and Pharmacia entreprises v Commission
[2003] ECR II-229 (under appeal, Case C-198/03 P). The Court took the view that the 
damage resulting from the impossibility of marketing certain veterinary products which 
faced the applicant pharmaceutical companies was the direct consequence of inaction 
on the Commission's part which amounted to a manifest and serious infringement of 
the principle of sound administration. 
In  all  of  the  other  decisions,  the  Court  took  the  view  that  one  or  more  of  those 
conditions had not been satisfied (see, inter alia, judgment in Case T-333/01 Meyer v 
Commission [2003] ECR II-117 (under appeal, Case C-151/03 P); judgment in Case 
T-61/01  Vendedurias  de  Armadores  Reunidos  v  Commission  [2003] ECR II-327; 
judgments in Case T-56/00 Dole Fresh Fruit International v Council and Commission
[2003]  ECR II-579,  and  Case  T-57/00  Banan-Kompaniet  and  Skandinaviska 
Bananimporten  v  Council  and  Commission  [2003]  ECR II-609,  judgment  in  Case 
T-273/01  Innova  Privat-Akademie  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR  II-1095,  judgments  in 
Joined  Cases  T-93/00  and  T-46/01  Alessandrini  and  Others  v  Commission  [2003] 
ECR II-1639 (under appeal, Case C-295/03 P) and Case T-195/00 Travelex Global and 
Financial  Services  and  Interpayment  Services  v  Commission  [2003]  ECR II-1681, 
judgment of 2 July 2003 in Case T-99/98 Hameico Stuttgart and Others v Council and 
Commission; and judgment of 17 December 2003 in Case T-146/01 DLD Trading v 
Council, not yet published in the ECR). 
With regard to the first of the three conditions mentioned above ņ the unlawfulness of 
the conduct alleged against the Community institutions ņ the case-law requires it to be 
shown  that  there  has  been  a  sufficiently  serious  breach  of  a rule  of  law  protecting 
individuals. As to the condition that the breach must be sufficiently serious, it follows 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the criterion to be applied is that of a 
manifest and grave disregard by a Community institution of the limits imposed on its 
discretion, it being stated that in the case where that institution has only a considerably 
reduced margin of discretion, or even no discretion at all, the mere infringement of 
Community  law  may  suffice  to  establish  that  there  has  been  a  sufficiently  serious 
breach. 
The above judgments in Dole Fresh Fruit International v Council and Commission and 
Banan-Kompaniet and Skandinaviska Bananimporten v Council and Commission are 
particularly  noteworthy  as  the  Court  there  ruled  for  the  first  time  that  an  illegality 
55 Excluding Community staff cases.Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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capable of resulting in the annulment or invalidity of a measure will not necessarily 
constitute a sufficiently serious breach, with the result that the inference may be drawn 
that it is not every illegality that is capable of rendering the Community liable. 
In the event, the Court took the view that there was no doubt as to the fact that a legal 
rule had been breached, inasmuch as the Court of Justice had established the illegality 
and invalidity of the provisions in issue, and that the principle of non-discrimination, in 
breach  of  which  those  provisions  had  been  adopted,  was  a  general  principle  of 
Community  law  for  the protection  of  individuals.  It  thus  remained  to  be  determined 
whether, in view of the broad discretion which the institutions enjoyed in these cases by 
virtue of the international dimension and the complex economic assessments involved 
in the introduction or amendment of the Community import scheme for bananas, the 
Council  and  the  Commission  had,  in  adopting  the  provisions  under  challenge, 
manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of their discretion. At the conclusion of its 
examination  of  all  these  matters,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  principle  of  non-
discrimination  had  not  been  infringed  in  a  sufficiently  serious  way  and  accordingly 
dismissed the actions. 
With regard to the condition that there must be a causal link, the Court took the view 
that this condition is satisfied if there is a direct link of cause and effect between the 
measure for which the institution concerned is criticised and the damage alleged. In the 
absence  of  evidence  by  the  applicant  that  such  a  link  exists,  the  action  must  be 
dismissed (judgment in DLD Trading v Council, cited above). 
Although the principle of no-fault liability has not been established in Community law, 
the Court pointed out once again that, if this were to be recognised, a precondition for 
such liability would be the cumulative satisfaction of three conditions, that is to say, the 
reality of the damage allegedly suffered, the causal link between that damage and the 
act alleged against the Community institutions, and the special and unusual nature of 
that  damage.  The  above  judgments  in  Travelex  Global  and  Financial  Services  and 
Interpayment Services v Commission and in Hameico Stuttgart and Others v Council 
and Commission, in which those conditions are set out, merely held that the damage 
alleged had not been shown to have actually occurred. 
III.  Applications for interim relief 
The purpose served by the procedure for interim relief is to make it possible to avoid, 
whether through suspension of application of the contested act (Article 242 EC) or by 
the granting of any other interim measure (Article 243 EC), irremediable damage to a 
party's  interests.  In  2003,  39  applications  for  interim  relief  were  lodged  with  the 
Registry, while 31 cases were concluded. It should be noted that one of these cases 
was concluded by the “judge responsible for granting interim relief”, whose function is Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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provided  for  by  the  Court's  Rules  of  Procedure, 
56  as  most  recently  amended  on 
21 May 2003. 
57
The granting of interim relief is conditional on several conditions being satisfied: there 
must  be  a  prima  facie  case  in  the  action  to  which  the  application  for  interim  relief 
relates (“fumus boni juris”) and there must be an element of urgency. In addition, the 
balancing  of  the  interests  involved,  to  be  made  by  the  judge  dealing  with  the 
application, must come down on the side of the party seeking the interim relief. 
By orders of 1 August 2003 in Case T-198/01 R II Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v 
Commission and in Case T-378/02 R Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission
and  of  31 October  2003  in  Case  T-253/03 R  Akzo  Nobel  Chemicals  and  Akcros 
Chemicals v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, the President of the Court 
formed the view that those conditions had been satisfied and ordered interim relief. 
None of the other decisions given in 2003 acceded to the requests made. 
Case  T-198/01 R II  follows  on  from  the  order  in  Case  T-198/01 R  Technische
Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission [2002] ECR II-2153 (see the Annual Report 2002)
granting suspension of operation of the Commission's decision ordering Germany to 
recover from the recipient company State aid that had been declared incompatible with 
the  common  market.  This  suspension  was  limited  in  time  and  was  subject  to 
compliance  by  the  applicant  with  certain  conditions,  including  reimbursement  of  an 
initial portion of the disputed aid. On expiry of this first period, the applicant sought an 
extension of the measures granted. These were ordered to be granted again, subject to 
compliance with a number of conditions. 
The  proceedings  between  the  companies  Akzo  Nobel  Chemicals  and  Akcros 
Chemicals, on the one hand, and the Commission, on the other, arose following an 
inspection carried out on the premises of those companies with a view to securing 
evidence of possible anti-competitive practices. The applicant companies essentially 
submitted that the documents seized by the Commission's agents in the course of that 
investigation were covered by professional confidentiality protecting correspondence 
with legal advisers (“legal professional privilege”) and that the Commission could not 
therefore have access to such material. In the light of that challenge, the Commission's 
agents seized a number of documents and deposited them in a sealed envelope which 
they then removed. With regard to other documents, the Commission took copies and 
placed them on the file. The Commission subsequently adopted a decision stating its 
intention to open the envelope containing the first documents. 
By  his  order  in  Akzo  Nobel  Chemicals  and  Akcros  Chemicals  v  Commission, cited 
above, the President of the Court ordered that decision to be suspended. 
56 Article 106 of the Court's Rules of Procedure. 
57 OJ 2003 L 147, p. 22. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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He first of all expressed the view that the pleas raised by the applicants constituted a 
prima facie case in law. He stated his opinion that the plea alleging infringement of 
professional  privilege  in  regard  to  the  first  documents  raised  very  important  and 
complex questions concerning the possible need to extend, to a certain degree, the 
scope  of  professional  privilege  as  currently  delimited  by  the  case-law.  In  casu,  the 
question  raised  was  whether  the  scope  of  professional  privilege,  which  at  present 
covers communication with an outside lawyer or any document reporting the text or 
content of such communication, could be extended to documents drawn up for the 
purpose of consultation with a lawyer. Second, the President expressed the view that, 
in so far as it concerned the documents copied by the Commission, the plea alleging 
infringement of professional privilege also raised the issue of principle as to whether 
the  protection  afforded  to  correspondence  between  independent  lawyers  and  their 
clients 
58  could  be  extended  to  cover  also  written  communications  with  a  lawyer 
employed by an undertaking on a permanent basis. Third, the President of the Court 
stated  that  it  could  not  be  ruled  out  that,  in  the  course  of  its  examination,  the 
Commission had failed to comply with the procedure defined in the above judgment in 
AM & S v Commission by having consulted, even if only summarily, the documents 
which the applicants claimed were covered by professional privilege. 
The President of the Court then went on to express the view that the applicants had 
demonstrated  that  it  was  necessary  to  suspend  implementation  of  the  contested 
decision in order to prevent their suffering serious and irreparable damage. On this 
point, the President found inter alia that the fact that the Commission was aware of the 
information  in  the  documents  contained  in  the  sealed  envelope  would  as  such 
constitute a substantial and irreversible breach of the applicants' right to respect for the 
confidentiality protecting those documents. 
Finally, the President ruled that the general interest and the Commission's interest in 
ensuring compliance with the rules of competition could not take precedence over the 
applicants' interest in ensuring that the documents contained in the sealed envelope 
would not be disclosed. 
In  conclusion,  mention  should  be  made  of  the  order  of  15 May  2003  made  by  the 
President of the Court in Case T-47/03 R Sison v Council, not yet published in the 
ECR.  The  background  to  that  case  was  provided  by  the  Council  decision  of 
12 December 2002 updating the list of persons covered by Regulation No 2580/2001 
59
providing  for  the  freezing  of  funds  and  assets  of  individuals  or  groups  involved  in 
terrorist activities and which included on that occasion on that list the name of Jose 
Maria  Sison.  The  latter,  who  is  a  Philippines  national  resident  in  the  Netherlands, 
58 Protection recognised by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case 155/79 AM & S v 
Commission [1982] ECR 1575. 
59   Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 2580/2001  of  27  December  2001  on  specific  restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism 
(OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70). Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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brought an action before the Court seeking annulment of that decision and applied in 
parallel for interim relief. The latter application was dismissed on the ground of want of 
urgency. The President of the Court expressed the view that, in regard to financial 
harm,  it  had  not  been  established  that  the  applicable  legislation  would  not  enable 
Mr Sison to avoid suffering serious and irreparable damage in so far as the national 
authorities could, on an ad hoc basis and in accordance with specified arrangements, 
authorise the use of certain funds to meet the essential needs of the persons included 
on that list. With regard to the non-material harm alleged, it was pointed out that the 
purpose of proceedings for interim relief is not to ensure reparation for damage but 
rather to guarantee the full effectiveness of the ruling to be given on the merits. Proceedings  Court of First Instance
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B –  Composition of the Court of First Instance
(Order of precedence as at 7 October 2003)
First row, from left to right:
R.  García-Valdecasas  y  Fernández,  Judge;  J.  Pirrung,  President  of  Chamber;  P.  Lindh,  President  of 
Chamber; B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court; J. Azizi, President of Chamber; H. Legal, President of 
Chamber; V. Tiili, Judge.
Second row, from left to right:
F. Dehousse, Judge; N.J. Forwood, Judge; A.W.H. Meij, Judge; M. Jaeger, Judge; J.D. Cooke, Judge; 
P. Mengozzi, Judge; M. Vilaras, Judge; M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judge; H. Jung, Registrar.Court of First Instance  Members
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1.  The Members of the Court of First Instance
  (in order of their entry into ofﬁce)
Bo Vesterdorf
Born  1945;  Lawyer-linguist  at  the  Court  of  Justice; Administrator 
in  the  Ministry  of  Justice;  Examining  Magistrate;  Legal  Attaché 
in  the  Permanent  Representation  of  Denmark  to  the  European 
Communities; Temporary Judge at the Østre Landsret; Head of the 
Administrative Law Division in the Ministry of Justice; Head of Division 
in the Ministry of Justice; University Lecturer; Member of the Steering 
Committee on Human Rights at the Council of Europe (CDDH), and 
subsequently  Member of the Bureau of the CDDH; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since 25 September 1989; President of the 
Court of First Instance since 4 March 1998.
Rafael García-Valdecasas y Fernández
Born 1946; Abogado del Estado (at Jaén and Granada); Registrar to 
the Economic and Administrative Court of Jaén, and subsequently 
of Cordoba; Member of the Bar (Jaén and Granada); Head of the 
Spanish State Legal Service for Cases before the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities; Head of the Spanish delegation in the 
working group created at the Council of the European Communities 
with  a  view  to  establishing  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  the 
European Communities; Judge at the Court of First Instance since 
25 September 1989.
Koen Lenaerts
Born 1954; lic.iuris, Ph.D. in Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); 
Master of Laws, Master in Public Administration (Harvard University); 
Lecturer (1979 to 1983), subsequently Professor of European Law, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (since 1983); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice (1984 to 1985); Professor at the College of Europe, 
Bruges (1984 to 1989); Member of the Brussels Bar (1986 to 1989); 
Visiting Professor at the Harvard Law School (1989); Judge at the 
Court of First Instance from 25 September 1989 to 6 October 2003.Members  Court of First Instance
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Virpi Tiili
Born 1942; Doctor of Laws of the University of Helsinki; assistant 
lecturer  in  civil  and  commercial  law  at  the  University  of  Helsinki; 
Director  of  Legal  Affairs  and  Commercial  Policy  at  the  Central 
Chamber of Commerce of Finland; Director General of the Ofﬁce for 
Consumer Protection, Finland; Judge at the Court of First Instance 
since 18 January 1995.
Pernilla Lindh
Born 1945; Law graduate of the University of Lund; Judge (assessor), 
Court of Appeal, Stockholm; Legal Adviser and Director General at 
the Legal Service of the Trade Department at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Judge at the Court of First Instance since 18 January 1995.
Josef Azizi
Born  1948;  Doctor  of  Laws  and  Bachelor  of  Sociology  and 
Economics of the University of Vienna; Lecturer and senior lecturer 
at the Vienna School of Economics and the Faculty of Law of the 
University of Vienna; Ministerialrat and Head of Department at the 
Federal Chancellery; Member of the Steering Committee on Legal 
Co-operation  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (CDCJ);  Representative 
ad  litem  before  the  Verfassungsgerichtshof  (Constitutinal  Court) 
in  proceedings  for  review  of  the  constitutionality  of  federal  laws; 
Coordinator responsible for the adaptation of Austrian Federal law 
to Community law; Judge at the Court of First Instance since 18 
January 1995.Members  Court of First Instance
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Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos
Born 1950; Professor, Law Faculty, Coimbra, and at the Law Faculty 
of  the  Catholic  University,  Oporto;  Jean  Monnet  Chair;  Course 
Director (French language) at The Hague Academy of International 
Law  (1984)  and  Visiting  Professor  in  the  Faculty  of  Law,  Paris  I 
University (1995); Portuguese Government delegate to the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, the International 
Commission on Civil Status and the Council of Europe Committee on 
Nationality; member of the Institute of International Law; Judge at the 
Court of First Instance from 18 September 1995 to 31 March 2003.
John D. Cooke
Born 1944; called to the Bar of Ireland 1966; admitted also to the Bars 
of England & Wales, of Northern Ireland and of New South Wales; 
Practising barrister 1966 to 1996; admitted to the Inner Bar in Ireland 
(Senior Counsel) 1980 and New South Wales 1991; President of the 
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community 
(CCBE) 1985 to 1986; Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law, University 
College  Dublin;  Fellow  of  the  Chartered  Institute  of  Arbitrators; 
President of the Royal Zoological Society of Ireland 1987 to 1990; 
Bencher of the Honourable Society of Kings Inns, Dublin; Honorary 
Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn, London; Judge at the Court of First Instance 
since 10 January 1996.
Marc Jaeger
Born  1954;  lawyer;  attaché  de  justice,  delegated  to  the  Public 
Attorney’s  Ofﬁce;  Judge,  Vice-President  of  the  Luxembourg 
District Court; teacher at the Centre universitaire de Luxembourg 
(Luxembourg  University  Centre);  member  of  the  judiciary  on 
secondment,  Legal  Secretary  at  the  Court  of  Justice  from  1986; 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 11 July 1996.Members  Court of First Instance
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Jörg Pirrung
Born 1940; academic assistant at the University of Marburg; civil 
servant  in  the  German  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice  (Section  for 
International Civil Procedure Law, Section for Children’s Law); Head 
of the Section for Private International Law in the Federal Ministry of 
Justice; Head of a Subdivision for Civil Law; Judge at the Court of 
First Instance since 11 June 1997.
Paolo Mengozzi
Born 1938; Professor of International Law and holder of the Jean 
Monnet  Chair  of  European  Community  law  at  the  University  of 
Bologna; Doctor honoris causa of the Carlos III University, Madrid; 
visiting  professor  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  (Bologna 
Center),  the  Universities  of  St.  Johns  (New  York),  Georgetown, 
Paris II, Georgia (Athens) and the Institut universitaire international 
(Luxembourg); co-ordinator of the European Business Law Pallas 
Program of the University of Nijmegen; member of the consultative 
committee  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  on 
public procurement; Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
during the Italian tenure of the Presidency of the Council; member of 
the working group of the European Community on the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and director of the 1997 session of The Hague 
Academy of International Law research centre devoted to the WTO; 
Judge at the Court of First Instance since 4 March 1998.
Arjen W. H. Meij
Born 1944; Justice at the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (1996); 
Judge  and  Vice-President  at  the  College  van  Beroep  voor  het 
Bedrijfsleven (Administrative Court for Trade and Industry) (1986); 
Judge  Substitute  at  the  Court  of Appeal  for  Social  Security,  and 
Substitute  Member  of  the Administrative  Court  for  Customs Tariff 
Matters; Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (1980); Lecturer in European Law in the Law Faculty of 
the University of Groningen and Research Assistant at the University 
of Michigan Law School; Staff Member of the International Secretariat 
of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce (1970); Judge at the Court 
of First Instance since 17 September 1998.Members  Court of First Instance
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Mihalis Vilaras
Born  1950;  lawyer  (1974-1980);  national  expert  with  the  Legal 
Service  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  then 
Principal  Administrator  in  Directorate  General  V  (Employment, 
Industrial Relations, Social Affairs); Junior Ofﬁcer, Junior Member 
and, since 1999, Member of the Greek Council of State; Associate 
Member of the Superior Special Court of Greece; Member of the 
Central  Legislative  Drafting  Committee  of  Greece  (1996-1998); 
Director  of  the  Legal  Service  in  the  General  Secretariat  of  the 
Greek Government; Judge at the Court of First Instance since 17 
September 1998.
Nicholas James Forwood
Born 1948; graduated 1969 from Cambridge University (Mechanical 
Sciences and Law); called to the English Bar in 1970, thereafter 
practising  in  London  (1971-1979)  and  also  in  Brussels  (1979-
1999); called to the Irish Bar in 1981; appointed Queen’s Counsel 
in 1987, and Bencher of the Middle Temple 1998; representative of 
the Bar of England and Wales at the Council of the Bars and Law 
Societies of the EU (CCBE) and Chairman of the CCBE’s Permanent 
Delegation  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice;  Governing  Board 
member of the World Trade Law Association and European Maritime 
Law  Organisation;  Judge  at  the  Court  of  First  Instance  since  15 
December 1999.
Hubert Legal
Born  1954;  Maître  des  Requêtes  at  the  French  Conseil  d’État 
from 1991 onwards; graduate of the École normale supérieure de 
Saint-Cloud and of the École nationale d’administration; Associate 
Professor  of  English  (1979-1985);  rapporteur  and  subsequently 
Commissaire du Gouvernement in proceedings before the judicial 
sections  of  the  Conseil  d’État  (1988-1993):  legal  adviser  in  the 
Permanent  Representation  of  the  French  Republic  to  the  United 
Nations in New York (1993-1997); Legal Secretary in the Chambers 
of Judge Puissochet at the Court of Justice (1997-2001); Judge at 
the Court of First Instance since 19 September 2001.Members  Court of First Instance
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Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro
Born  1956;  studied  in  Lisbon,  Brussels  and  Strasbourg;  Member 
of  the  Bar  in  Portugal  and  Brussels;  independent  researcher  at 
the Institut d’études européennes de l’université libre de Bruxelles 
(Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels); Legal 
Secretary  to  the  Portuguese  Judge  at  the  Court  of  Justice,  Mr 
Moitinho de Almeida (1986 to 2000), then to the President of the 
Court of First Instance, Mr Vesterdorf (2000 to 2003); Judge at the 
Court of First Instance since from 1 April 2003.
Franklin Dehousse
Born  1959;  Law  degree  (University  of  Liege,  1981);  research 
fellow (Fonds national de la recherche scientiﬁque); legal advisor 
to the Chamber of Representatives; Doctor of Laws (University of 
Strasbourg, 1990); Professor (Universities of Liege and Strasbourg; 
College of Europe; Institut royal supérieur de Défense; Université de 
Montesquieu, Bordeaux; Collège Michel Servet of the Universities 
of  Paris;  Faculties  of  Notre-Dame  de  la  Paix,  Namur);  Special 
Representative  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs;  Director  of 
European Studies of the Royal Institute of International Relations; 
assesseur  at  the  Council  of  State;  consultant  to  the  European 
Commission;  member  of  the  Internet  Observatory;  chief  editor  of 
Studia  Diplomatica;  Judge  at  the  Court  of  First  Instance  since  7 
October 2003.
Hans Jung
Born 1944; Assistant, and subsequently Assistant Lecturer, at the 
Faculty of Law (Berlin); Rechtsanwalt (Frankfurt am Main); Lawyer-
linguist  at  the  Court  of  Justice;  Legal  Secretary  at  the  Court  of 
Justice in the Chambers of President Kutscher and subsequently in 
the Chambers of the German judge; Deputy Registrar of the Court 
of Justice; Registrar of the Court of First Instance since 10 October 
1989.Members  Court of First Instance
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2.    Changes in the composition of the Court of First Instance in 2003
In 2003 the composition of the Court of First Anstance changed as follows:
On 31 March, Judge Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos left the Court of First Instance. 
He was replaced by Mrs Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro as Judge.
On 6 October, Judge Koen Lenaerts, appointed to the Court of Justice, left the Court of 
First Instance. He was replaced by Mr Franklin Dehousse as Judge.Court of First Instance  Order of Precedence
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3.  Order of precedence
from 1 January to 31 March 2003
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
R. García-Valdecasas y Fernández, President of Chamber
K. Lenaerts, President of Chamber
V. Tiili, President of Chamber
N.J. Forwood, President of Chamber
P. Lindh, Judge
J. Azizi, Judge
R.M. Moura Ramos, Judge
J.D. Cooke, Judge
M. Jaeger, Judge
J. Pirrung, Judge
P. Mengozzi, Judge
A.W.H. Meij, Judge
M. Vilaras, Judge
H. Legal, Judge
H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of Precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 1 April to 30 September 2003
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
R. García-Valdecasas y Fernández, President of Chamber
K. Lenaerts, President of Chamber
V. Tiili, President of Chamber
N.J. Forwood, President of Chamber
P. Lindh, Judge
J. Azizi, Judge
J.D. Cooke, Judge
M. Jaeger, Judge
J. Pirrung, Judge
P. Mengozzi, Judge
A.W.H. Meij, Judge
M. Vilaras, Judge
H. Legal, Judge
M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judge
H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of Precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 1 to 6 October 2003
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
P. Lindh, President of Chamber
J. Azizi, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, President of Chamber
H. Legal, President of Chamber
R. García-Valdecasas y Fernández, Judge
K. Lenaerts, Judge
V. Tiili, Judge
J.D. Cooke, Judge
M. Jaeger, Judge
P. Mengozzi, Judge
A.W.H. Meij, Judge
M. Vilaras, Judge
N.J. Forwood, Judge
M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judge
H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of Precedence  Court of First Instance
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from 7 October to 31 December 2003 
B. Vesterdorf, President of the Court of First Instance
P. Lindh, President of Chamber
J. Azizi, President of Chamber
J. Pirrung, président de chambre
H. Legal, President of Chamber
R. García-Valdecasas y Fernández, Judge
V. Tiili, Judge
J.D. Cooke, Judge
M. Jaeger, Judge
P. Mengozzi, Judge
A.W.H. Meij, Judge
M. Vilaras, Judge
N.J. Forwood, Judge
M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judge
F. Dehousse, Judge
H. Jung, RegistrarOrder of Precedence  Court of First Instance
196
Court of First Instance  Former Members
197
4.  Former Members of the Court of First Instance
José Luis da Cruz Vilaça (1989-1995), President from 1989 to 1995
Donal Patrick Michael Barrington (1989-1996)
Antonio Saggio (1989-1998), President from 1995 to 1998
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (1989-1992)
Heinrich Kirschner (1989-1997)
Christos Yeraris (1989-1992)
Romain Alphonse Schintgen (1989-1996)
Cornelis Paulus Briët (1989-1998)
Jacques Biancarelli (1989-1995)
Koen Lenaerts (1989-2003)
Christopher William Bellamy (1992-1999)
Andreas Kalogeropoulos (1992-1998)
André Potocki (1995-2001)
Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos (1995-2003)
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A —    Ofﬁcial visits and functions at the Court of Justice
and the Court of First Instance in 2003
A —  Official  visits  and  functions  at  the  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Court 
of First Instance in 2003 
13 January   Mrs  Juliet  Wheldon  and  Mr  John  Collins  of  the  Treasury 
Solicitor's Department, United Kingdom 
16 January   Delegation from the Board of Administration of the Association 
of Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions 
of the European Union 
29 January  HSH  Prince  Radu  of  Hohenzollern-Veringen,  Special 
Representative of the Romanian Government for Integration, 
Cooperation and Sustainable Development 
30 January   Mr  Mátyás  Szilágyi,  Chargé  d’Affaires  ad  interim  at  the 
Hungarian Embassy in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
4 February  Mr Bruno Machado, President of the Boards of Appeal of the 
Office  for  Harmonisation  in  the  Internal  Market  (OHIM), 
Alicante 
13 February  The  Right  Rev.  Dr  Finlay  Macdonald,  Moderator  of  the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
13 February  HE  Kazuo  Asakai,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary,  Head  of  Mission  of  Japan  to  the  European 
Union in Brussels 
27 February  HE  Aldebrhan Weldegiorgis,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  State  of  Eritrea  to  the  Kingdom  of 
Belgium and to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
4 March  HE Ampalavanar Selverajah, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Singapore to the Kingdom of 
Belgium and to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
7 March  Final of the competition of the European Law Moot Court 
10 March  HE  Carlos  Bastarreche  Sagües,  Ambassador  Extraordinary 
and  Plenipotentiary,  Permanent  Representative  of  Spain  to 
the European Union in Brussels 
from 10 to 19 
March 
Delegation  from  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  Central  African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) 
11 and 12 March  Delegation from the European Scrutiny Committee, House of 
Commons (United Kingdom) 
13 March  HE  Umberto  Vattani,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary,  Permanent  Representative  of  Italy  to  the 
European Union in Brussels 
19 and 20 March  Mr Jacob Söderman, European Ombudsman Ofﬁ  cial visits  Meetings and visits
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Commons (United Kingdom) 
13 March  HE  Umberto  Vattani,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary,  Permanent  Representative  of  Italy  to  the 
European Union in Brussels 
19 and 20 March  Mr Jacob Söderman, European Ombudsman 
9 April  Mr  David  O’Sullivan,  Secretary-General  of  the  European 
Commission 
10 April  Mr  Péter  Bárándy,  Minister  for  Justice  of  the  Republic  of 
Hungary,  accompanied  by  Mrs  Judit  Fazekas,  Deputy 
Secretary of State, and Mr Mátyás Szilágyi, Chargé d’Affaires 
ad interim 
10 and 11 April  Mr  Ivan  Grigorov,  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation of the Republic of Bulgaria 
11 April  Delegation from the Finance Committee of the Parliament of 
Schleswig-Holstein 
6 May  Mr Ivan Verougstraete, President of the Court of Cassation of 
the Kingdom of Belgium 
7 and 15 May  HE Ingrid Apelbaum-Pidoux, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  Swiss  Confederation  to  the  Grand-
Duchy of Luxembourg 
20 May  HE  Clay  Constantinou,  former  Ambassador  of  the  United 
States  of  America  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  and 
Dean  of  Seton  Hall  School  of  Diplomacy  and  International 
Relations 
22 May  HE  Tudorel  Postolache,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  of  Romania  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg 
4 June  Mr Neil Kinnock, Vice-President  of the European Commission 
13 and 14 June  2nd Conference of the Association of European Competition 
Law Judges 
16 and 17 June  Judges' Forum 
19 June    Mrs  Alina  Dorobant,  Second  Secretary  in  the  Mission  of 
Romania to the European Union in Brussels 
24 June  Mrs Pinky Anand, Senior Counsel at the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of India 
26 June  HE  Walter  Hagg,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Austria to the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg 
7 July  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America 
8 July  Mr Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman 
8 July  Mr Paul de Jersey AC, Chief Justice of Queensland Ofﬁ  cial visits  Meetings and visits
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9 April  Mr  David  O’Sullivan,  Secretary-General  of  the  European 
Commission 
10 April  Mr  Péter  Bárándy,  Minister  for  Justice  of  the  Republic  of 
Hungary,  accompanied  by  Mrs  Judit  Fazekas,  Deputy 
Secretary of State, and Mr Mátyás Szilágyi, Chargé d’Affaires 
ad interim 
10 and 11 April  Mr  Ivan  Grigorov,  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Cassation of the Republic of Bulgaria 
11 April  Delegation from the Finance Committee of the Parliament of 
Schleswig-Holstein 
6 May  Mr Ivan Verougstraete, President of the Court of Cassation of 
the Kingdom of Belgium 
7 and 15 May  HE Ingrid Apelbaum-Pidoux, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  Swiss  Confederation  to  the  Grand-
Duchy of Luxembourg 
20 May  HE  Clay  Constantinou,  former  Ambassador  of  the  United 
States  of  America  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  and 
Dean  of  Seton  Hall  School  of  Diplomacy  and  International 
Relations 
22 May  HE  Tudorel  Postolache,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  of  Romania  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg 
4 June  Mr Neil Kinnock, Vice-President  of the European Commission 
13 and 14 June  2nd Conference of the Association of European Competition 
Law Judges 
16 and 17 June  Judges' Forum 
19 June    Mrs  Alina  Dorobant,  Second  Secretary  in  the  Mission  of 
Romania to the European Union in Brussels 
24 June  Mrs Pinky Anand, Senior Counsel at the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of India 
26 June  HE  Walter  Hagg,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Austria to the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg 
7 July  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America 
8 July  Mr Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman 
8 July  Mr Paul de Jersey AC, Chief Justice of Queensland 
9 and 10 July  HE  Agneta  Söderman,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Sweden to the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg 
9 September  Delegation  from  the  12th  Civil  Chamber  of  the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) 
29 and 
30 September 
Delegation  from  the  Bundesarbeitsgericht  (German  Federal 
Labour Court) 
8 October  Mr Adrian Năstase, Prime Minister of Romania 
15 October  HE  Tassos  Papadopoulos,  President  of  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus 
16 October  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Norway 
10 and 11 
November 
Judicial Study Visit 
13 November  HE  Porfirio  Muñoz  Ledo,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary of the United Mexican States to the Kingdom 
of Belgium and to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
17 November  Delegation  from  the  Committee  for  European  Integration  of 
the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic 
18 November  Mrs Mary McAleese, President of Ireland 
19 November  HE  Peter  Balàzs,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary, Head of Mission of the Republic of Hungary to 
the European Union in Brussels 
24 November  HE  Peter  Terpeluk  Jr,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg 
26, 27 and 
28 November 
Delegation  from  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  of  the 
Republic of Lithuania 
1 and 2 December  Delegation from the Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus 
2 December  Delegation from the Constitutional Council of the Republic of 
Algeria Meetings and visits  Study visits
205Study visits  Meetings and visits
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C —  Formal sittings in 2003
31 March    Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from ofﬁce of Mr Rui 
Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos, Judge at the Court of First Instance, 
and the entry into ofﬁce of Mrs Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré 
Ribeiro as Judge at the Court of First Instance
1 April    Formal sitting on the occasion of the solemn undertaking given by 
Mr Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman
25 September    Formal sitting in memory of Mr Thomas Francis O’Higgins, former 
Judge of the Court of Justice
6 October    Formal  sitting  on  the  occasion  of  the  partial  renewal  of  the 
membership  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (see  “Changes  in  the 
composition of the Court of Justice in 2003”, p. 105) and the the entry 
into  ofﬁce  of  a  new  Judge  at  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (see 
“Changes in the composition of the Court of First Instance in 2003”, 
p. 191)Meetings and visits  Participation in ofﬁ  cial functions
209Meetings and visits  Participation in ofﬁ  cial functions
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D —  Visits and participation in ofﬁcial functions in 2003
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����������������������Participation in ofﬁ  cial functions  Meetings and visits
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������ ����������� ��� ����� �������� ��������� ���� ����
������������� ��� ��������� ��������������� ���������� ��� ����
������������������������������������������Chapter IV
Tables and statisticsCourt of Justice  Tables and statistics
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A –  Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice  1
1  The introduction of new software in 2002 has enabled the statistics in the Court’s annual reports to be 
presented with greater clarity. The tables and ﬁgures have, in large part, been revised and improved, 
at the cost of certain adjustments. Consistency with the tables of past years has been preserved 
where possible.
General activity of the Court
  1. Cases completed, new cases, cases pending (1999-2003)
 
Cases completed
  2. Nature of proceedings (1999-2003) 
   3. Judgments, orders, opinions (2003) 
  4. Bench hearing actions (2003) 
  5. Subject-matter of the action (2003) 
  6. Proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2003) 
   7. Judgments concerning failure of a Member State to fulﬁl its obligations:
   outcome (2003) 
   8. Duration of proceedings (1999-2003) 
New cases
  9. Nature of proceedings (1999-2003)
  10. Direct actions – Type of action (2003) 
  11. Subject-matter of the action (2003) 
  12. Actions for failure of a Member State to fulﬁl its obligations (1999-2003)
Cases pending as at 31 December 
  13. Nature of proceedings (1999-2003)
   14. Bench hearing actions (2003) 
General trend in the work of the Court (1952-2003)
  15. New cases and judgments
  16. New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State per year)
  17. New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court
      or tribunal)
  18. New actions for failure of a Member State to fulﬁl its obligationsCourt of Justice  Tables and statistics
215Tables and statistics  Court of Justice
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����������� �� � ��
����������� �� � ��
� ��
������������������������� �� � ��
�������������������� � �
������������������ � ��
���������������� ��
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��������������������������� �� ��
� �
��������������������� � �
������������������������ � ��
������������������������������ � � ��
��������������������������� � ��
������������������������� � �
������������� �� ��
����������������������������������� � �
��������� �� � ��
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1
2
��� ������� ����� ������ �������� ��������� ��� ����� ������ �� ������ ������� ������� ����� �����
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
������ ����������� ����������� �� �������� ������������� ������ ���� ����� �������� � ���� ����
��� ��������� ��������� ���� ����� �� �� ���� �� ���� � �������� �� ��������� � ���� �� ��� ����� ��
����������������
�������������
�����������������Tables and statistics  Court of Justice
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���� �� � �� �� � �� �� � ���
���� �� �� �� � �� � �� � ���
���� �� � �� � � �� � � � �� � ��
���� �� � �� �� � �� � � � �� � ���
���� �� � �� � �� �� � �� �� ���
���� �� � �� � � �� � �� � �� � �� ���
���� �� � �� � � �� � �� � � � �� ���
���� �� � �� � � �� � �� � �� � �� ���
���� �� � �� � � �� �� � �� � �� ���
���� �� � �� � � �� � �� � �� � �� ���
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1   The introduction of new software in 2002 has enabled the statistics in the Court of Justice’s annual 
reports to be presented with greater clarity. The tables and ﬁgures have, in large part, been revised 
and improved, at the cost of certain adjustments. Consistency with the tables of past years has been 
preserved where possible.
B –   Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of First Instance 1
General activity of the Court of First Instance 
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (1995-2003)
New Cases
  2.   Nature of proceedings (1999-2003) 
  3.   Type of action (1999-2003)
  4.   Subject-matter of the action (1999-2003)
Completed cases
  5.   Nature of proceedings (1999-2003)
  6.   Subject-matter of the action (2003) 
  7.   Bench hearing action (2003)
  8.   Duration of proceedings in months (1999-2003)
 
Cases pending as at 31 December of each year
  9.   Nature of proceedings (1999-2003)
  10.   Subject-matter of the action (1999-2003) 
Miscellaneous
  11.   Decisions in proceedings for interim measures: outcome (2003)
  12.   Appeals against decisions of the Court of First Instance
  13.   Results of appeals
  14.  General trend (1989-2003) – New cases,
  completed cases, cases pendingCourt of First Instance  Tables and statistics
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The Court of Justice may be contacted at:
Court of Justice of the European Communities
  Postal address:  L-2925 Luxembourg
  Telephone:  (00352) 4301.1
  Telex (Registry):  2510 CURIA LU
  Telegraphic address:  CURIA
  Télécopieur de la Cour:  (00352) 4303.2600
  Fax (Press and Information Division):  (00352) 4303.2500
  Fax (Internal Services Division — Publications Section):  (00352) 4303.2650
  The Court on Internet:  www.curia.eu.int